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Introduction
It was the year Suharto died; China held Olympics; Japan again changed 
prime ministers; Kevin Rudd, a Mandarin-speaking Australian, led a new 
government; the US elected a president who spent part of  his childhood in 
Indonesia; world financial systems shuddered; and ‘nuclear power’, ‘clean 
energy’, ‘climate change’ and snow-deprived polar bears peppered news 
bulletins.
Members of  the ANU College of  Asia and the Pacific interpreted these 
events and processes in newspapers and periodicals ranging from our city’s 
Canberra Times to The Economist and The New York Review of  Books.
This is the third year that the college has published a selection of  popular 
writing produced by its members. From more than 100 articles published by 
college members in the past year,* we have selected 73, written by 49 of  the 
college’s members.
The College of  Asia and the Pacific has more than 150 academic members 
whose duties are to research, publish, teach—and communicate with 
Australians and Australia’s global neighbours. College members fulfil their 
obligation to communicate by maintaining blogs, doing radio and television 
interviews and writing for newspapers and magazines. This popular writing, 
which represents the distillation of  years of  research, is represented in 
Capturing the Year.
* For purposes of  Capturing, we take an elastic view of  ‘the year’: it extends from about 
November of  one calendar year to October of  the next.
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Themes and issues change, but the fascination that people have with the 
stories of  other people remains constant. We chose again to begin Capturing 
the Year with a focus on people—Australia’s new prime minister, the 
former president of  Indonesia, an influential Indonesian economist and an 
assassinated former prime minister of  Pakistan. For Australians, the arrival 
of  a new prime minister, able to converse in Mandarin, inspired cartoonists* 
and occasioned pride in the College of  Asia and the Pacific: Kevin Rudd 
studied Mandarin here and graduated from ANU. In this collection, Geremie 
R. Barmé examines the careful use of  language in Rudd’s speech in Mandarin 
at Peking University in April. Robert Ayson and Hugh White reflect on the 
prime minister’s foreign policy.
The college has a long-standing commitment to studying and working 
with Indonesia. When ex-President Suharto died in January at the age of  86, 
members of  the college were called on to write about the former dictator and 
his legacy. We publish four accounts, ranging from Jamie Mackie’s detailed 
obituary to George Quinn’s personal memoir. Less noticed, but perhaps 
almost as influential as Suharto himself, Sadli, the economist, also died in 
January. An architect of  Indonesia’s economy from the 1970s, Sadli and his 
legacy are considered by Peter McCawley. And Shakira Hussein reflects on 
Benazir Bhutto whose murder in December 2007 cast still graver doubts 
over the future of  Pakistan.
The College of  Asia and the Pacific acts as a hinge: it connects scholars 
with deep knowledge of  specific cultures and histories to others whose 
interests are in important, world-spanning themes. At their best, these 
collaborations ensure that nuance and fine detail are captured in Big 
Pictures and, in turn, that scholars who work on the local are in constant 
conversation with the global. Thus the concerns with human rights and 
ethical government, reflected in the writing of  John Braithwaite, Hilary 
Charlesworth and Gabrielle McKinnon, sit easily with ‘Something borrowed, 
something blue’ by Shakira Hussein, which sensitively analyses aspects of  
* ‘Was that the Mandarin version?’ cartoonist Peter Nicholson has a figure ask a neighbour 
in a hall full of  snoring people after the new PM has given a complicated speech on 
‘emissions trading’. The Australian, 19–20 July 2008.
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marriage in Pakistan, and Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s ‘Why the senate should pass 
the comfort women motion’. 
Climate change, environment and energy—particularly nuclear energy—
were at the forefront of  public concern. Ross Garnaut published The Garnaut 
Climate Change Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), a 
landmark report on the need to reduce fossil-fuel emissions. ‘A revolution 
in humanity’s fossil fuel-based energy’, Garnaut writes in Capturing the 
Year, ‘would be necessary sooner or later to sustain and to extend modern 
standards of  living. It will be required sooner if  we are to hold the risks of  
climate change to acceptable levels’.
Immense economic growth generates immense environmental pressures, 
as Dai Qing vividly illustrates in ‘Thirsty dragon at the Olympics’, her 
analysis of  the water-guzzling Games held in Beijing in August. In the same 
month in India, too much water—or water in the wrong places—saw the 
Kosi (the ‘river of  sorrow’) change its course, flood thousands of  hectares 
and leave millions of  people homeless, as Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt describes 
in ‘Anatomy of  a flood’. And India pursued its nuclear-power ambitions 
by concluding an agreement with US for acquisition of  nuclear technology 
—without embracing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The remarkable range of  expertise among members of  the college 
carries them from Afghanistan’s insurgency to the politics of  Tonga and 
the tortured state of  North Korea. Struggles over political change, where 
democratic transitions are unknown or less established and predictable, led 
contributors to Capturing to traverse the Pacific, East Timor, Thailand, Tibet, 
Burma and even South Korea where the ‘beef  protest’ challenged a new 
government, as Hyung-A Kim recounts in ‘Cyber-savvy Koreans take their 
beef  to the president’. 
Australia figures prominently in all this, as it should, for one of  the roles 
of  the college is to enable Australia to understand and situate itself  in its 
region and the world. Thus Paul Dibb, Hugh White and Clive Williams 
ponder Australian defence policy and the big decisions about what sorts of  
forces and weapons Australia needs for the next two generations. And where 
should Australia stand in the new equations being formulated between the 
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US, China and a burgeoning Asia? As a vast repository of  energy, Australia 
cannot escape involvement, even if  it wished; but what form should such 
involvement take?
Members of  the college tackle these questions in various ways. Capturing 
the Year 2008 will, we hope, impress, stimulate and entertain.
Robin Jeffrey and Barbara Nelson
12 April 2008
SYdNEY MORNING HERALd
GEREMIE R. BARMé
Facing up to friendship*
On Wednesday [9 April 2008], the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, made a 
speech to an audience at Peking University, China’s pre-eminent tertiary 
institution. Given the tensions over Tibet and the Olympic torch relay, as 
a practised diplomat Rudd could have taken the easy path by speaking in 
platitudes about the strength of  the bilateral relationship and any number of  
mutually acceptable and anodyne topics.
Instead, with finesse and skill, he chose to address the students on 
the broad basis for a truly sustainable relationship with the economically 
booming yet politically autocratic state that is China. In doing so, he rewrote 
the rules of  engagement in a way that can only benefit Australia and our 
relationship with this important country.
First Rudd acknowledged where he was: at a university that, more than 
First published as ‘Rudd rewrites the rules of  engagement’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 
2008.
People
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any other educational institution in China, has helped shaped that country’s 
modern history, one known for its contributions to Chinese intellectual 
debate, political activism and cultural experimentation. He mentioned some 
of  China’s twentieth-century intellectual heroes whose careers were entwined 
with Peking University. Some were involved in reshaping Chinese into a 
modern language capable of  carrying urgently needed political, cultural and 
historical debate. One was a leading democratic thinker.
He also made three references to Lu Xun (1881–1936), China’s literary 
hero, unyielding critic of  authoritarianism and principled dissenter, noting 
that Lu Xun personally designed Peking University’s crest. It would not have 
been lost on his audience that the prime minister’s choice of  intellectual 
exemplars acknowledged China’s dominant communist ideology while 
pointing to the traditions of  free speech and debate that have made Peking 
University so important.
Rudd’s strategy was thus first to honour the place where he was speaking 
and its connection to significant, complex historical and cultural figures. 
He went on to speak more personally of  his own educational and political 
trajectory, and about Australia’s national interest. Appealing to his youthful 
audience to consider what positive role they could play in China’s rise as 
a world power, he evoked the concept of  harmony (hexie), embraced by 
the present Chinese leadership, before making a canny digression. This was 
to note that 2008 is the 110th anniversary of  the Hundred Days Reform 
movement, during which an enlightened emperor struggled to enact a process 
of  political reform and modernisation similar to the Meiji Restoration in 
Japan that had taken place not long before. Rudd didn’t need to say that 
this movement failed and its leaders were beheaded; his audience would 
know that. Instead he noted that one of  the leading lights of  the reforms, 
the thinker Kang Youwei, who survived by fleeing into exile, went on to 
write about ‘the Great Harmony’ (datong), ‘a utopian world free of  political 
boundaries’. Thus, in a manner both subtle and eminently clear to a Chinese 
intellectual audience, he linked the officially approved concept of  harmony 
to the broader course of  political reform, change and openness.
Rudd then spoke about China joining the rest of  humanity as ‘a responsible 
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global stakeholder’—a lead-in to addressing the pressing issue of  Tibet. 
By framing his comments in such a manner, he established his right—and 
by extension the right of  others—to disagree with both Chinese official 
and mainstream opinion on matters of  international concern. There is a 
venerable Chinese expression for this position: ‘A true friend’, Rudd went 
on, ‘is one who can be a zhengyou (诤友), that is a partner who sees beyond 
immediate benefit to the broader and firm basis for continuing, profound 
and sincere friendship.’
The subsequent Chinese media discussion of  Rudd’s use of  the powerful 
and meaning-laden term zhengyou—the true friend who dares to disagree—
has been considerable. That is because the more common word ‘friendship’ 
(youyi) has been a cornerstone of  China’s post-1949 diplomacy. Mao Zedong 
once observed, ‘The first and foremost question of  the revolution is: who is 
our friend and who is our foe.’
To be a friend of  China, the Chinese people, the party-state or, in the 
reform period, even a mainland business partner, the foreigner is often 
expected to stomach unpalatable situations, and keep silent in the face of  
egregious behaviour. A friend of  China might enjoy the privilege of  offering 
the occasional word of  caution in private; in the public arena he or she is 
expected to have the good sense and courtesy to be ‘objective’, that is to 
toe the line, whatever that happens to be. The concept of  ‘friendship’ thus 
degenerates into little more than an effective tool for emotional blackmail 
and enforced complicity.
Rudd’s tactic was to deftly sidestep the vice-like embrace of  that model 
of  friendship by substituting another. ‘A strong relationship and a true 
friendship’, he told the students, ‘are built on the ability to engage in a direct, 
frank and ongoing dialogue about our fundamental interests and future 
vision.’
The distinction was not lost on the Chinese. The official newsagency 
Xinhua reported: ‘Eyes lit up when [Rudd] used this expression…it means 
friendship based on speaking the truth, speaking responsibly. It is evident 
that to be a zhengyou the first thing one needs is the magnanimity of  pluralism.’ 
Of  course, in the land of  linguistic slippage it is easy to see that while for 
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some zhengyou means speaking out of  turn, for others it may simply become 
another way for allowing pesky foreigners to let off  steam.
Of  course, there are dangers, not mentioned in the Chinese media. Perhaps 
the most famous zhengyou relationship of  modern times was that between 
Mao and Liang Shuming, a Confucian thinker and agrarian reformer. Mao 
declared that although their politics were different, Liang was a true zhengyou. 
Liang advised Mao on rural policy from the 1940s into the early 1950s. But, 
in 1953, Liang dared to venture that class struggle was having a calamitous 
effect on rural life. He asked Mao whether he had the ‘magnanimity’ to accept 
his views. The Chairman shot back, ‘No, I don’t have that magnanimity!’ 
Shortly thereafter, Liang was denounced and silenced.
On the other hand, there are examples from Chinese history where 
a zhengyou has played a key role in bringing about good governance and 
prosperity.
The most famous zhengyou was Wei Zheng, a friend and critic of  the 
Emperor Taizong of  the seventh-century Tang dynasty. Wei told the ruler 
that ‘if  you listen to wise counsel all is brightness; if, however, you give in to 
bias darkness falls’. When Wei died, some years later, the emperor bitterly 
mourned his death. He offered this tribute: ‘One looks at a reflection in a 
mirror to see if  one’s dress is in order. One studies history to understand the 
changing fortunes of  time. And one seeks wise counsel to avoid mistakes. 
Wei Zheng has died, and I have lost my mirror. To have a zhengyou is to be 
fortunate indeed.’ The metaphor is used by China’s leaders and the media 
even today. One can only hope that when they look in the mirror they do 
not do so with eyes wide shut.
By introducing the term zhengyou with all of  its liberating connotations 
into our dealings with China, Kevin Rudd has achieved something of  
considerable significance.
People 5
December 2007
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REvIEW 
HUGH WHITE
Australia’s Rudd awakening*
None are more vulnerable than those who think themselves invincible. 
After John Howard won his triumphant fourth election as prime minister of  
Australia in 2004 with a big swing in his favour, many people said that he had 
fundamentally transformed the terms of  Australian politics and established 
an unshakeable hold on the loyalty of  its voters and the national leadership. 
He apparently believed them. If  so, that might explain the disaster that 
befell him in the elections held on 24 November 2007, in which he lost 
not only the prime ministership, but his own seat in Parliament. Only once 
before, in 1929, has an incumbent Australian prime minister suffered this 
humiliation.
Howard had been expected by many, including his deputy and presumed 
successor, Peter Costello, to step down during his fourth term, so joining the 
select band of  democratic leaders who achieve the dignity of  choosing their 
own departure date. Instead he chose to hang on and fight another election. 
His plans to be re-elected for a fifth term included hosting the APEC 
Leaders’ Summit in Sydney in September 2007, just a few weeks before the 
election was due to be called. He intended that APEC would showcase his 
strengths as an international statesman. Instead it showcased his weaknesses 
in the face of  a sustained challenge by a new, young, earnest and effective 
opponent whose strengths he apparently never really understood.
It was during the summit that the reality sank in—for the voters, for 
Howard’s colleagues, and for Howard himself—that his era was over. 
Nothing captured this sense of  transition more tellingly than two images 
An edited version was published in Far Eastern Economic Review, December 2007, pp. 43–46. 
Reprinted from The Far Eastern Economic Review © 2007 Review Publishing Company 
Limited. All rights reserved..
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that dominated Australians’ view of  the APEC week in Sydney. One was of  
John Howard, still in lock-step with the shop-soiled George W. Bush, still 
forlornly spruiking success in Iraq. The other was Kevin Rudd, welcoming 
China’s President Hu Jintao in fluent and remarkably well-accented Mandarin. 
By the end of  the week Howard’s own closest colleagues were suggesting he 
should step down before the election was called.
Kevin Rudd is different. He is not only different from John Howard, but 
from his other predecessors as prime minister of  Australia, in ways which will 
do much to shape his approach to Australia’s place in Asia and the world. He 
is a relative newcomer to politics, having entered Parliament only in 1998. 
His early career was spent as a diplomat in the Australian foreign service. He 
has worked as a senior bureaucrat in one of  Australia’s state governments. 
And he has made a lifetime’s study of  China. He is the first Australian prime 
minister to speak Chinese, and indeed the first to speak any Asian language 
at all fluently. No one has come to the Australian prime ministership with 
such a comprehensive and professional grounding in foreign affairs before. 
Normally it takes an Australian prime minister a few years to find their feet 
on the international stage. Not so with Rudd: he will put his own clear stamp 
on Australia’s international posture from the start.
What does Rudd inherit from his long-serving predecessor? The Howard 
legacy is complex and hard to pin down. He is credited by some with taking 
Australia to a leadership role on the world stage, but this leadership was 
reflected primarily in his willingness to follow others into the quicksands of  
Iraq and Afghanistan. He has been praised for strengthening Australia’s US 
alliance with the US, but his conception of  the alliance was largely based on 
the transitory and fragile foundations of  his own personal relationship with 
George W. Bush. He deserves credit for committing Australia to a more 
energetic engagement with its weak and troubled small island neighbours, 
but has failed to commit the energy, patience and imagination required to 
help find lasting solutions to their problems.
He has cooperated effectively with Australia’s giant neighbour Indonesia 
on specific issues like counter-terrorism, but has failed to build a trusting 
and durable rapport with this new and rambunctious democracy. He has 
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been hailed as the liberator of  East Timor, whereas in fact its independence 
came as an entirely unintended consequence of  events that rapidly spiralled 
out of  his control. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Howard has built 
a strong trading relationship with China, but for years he has ignored the 
troubling signs of  emerging strategic competition between Beijing and 
Washington, and has recently found himself  drawn heedlessly into dubious 
schemes to ‘contain’ the Chinese challenge to US primacy.
In all of  this it is hard to see any coherent theme or strategy underlying 
Howard’s foreign policy. He was never as anti-Asian as his detractors 
claimed, but it might be fair to say that he never understood the urgency, the 
complexity and the excitement of  the task of  fashioning a place for Australia 
in the Asia Pacific. For Howard Asia always remained, in the end, a place to 
trade and a source of  threats. And this may be the key to understanding the 
new direction that Australian foreign policy will take under Rudd. It is way 
too simple to see Rudd as simply returning to the focus on engagement with 
Asia which was the hallmark of  the Labor governments of  Bob Hawke and 
Paul Keating from 1983–96. For a start the circumstances are very different, 
and so are the challenges. But nonetheless it remains as good a way as any to 
characterise the basic direction of  Australia’s new foreign policy. Australia is 
back in business in Asia and the Pacific, not just as a US ally but in its own 
right, and willing again to try to make a distinctively Australian contribution 
to addressing the region’s problems.
What will this mean in practical terms for the shape of  Australia’s diplomatic 
agenda? First, it is important to see that Rudd is not in any sense a classic 
leftist ‘progressive’ in foreign policy approach. Philosophically he is a realist, 
placing emphasis on power and the way it is exercised and constrained. By 
instinct he is a free-trade advocate and will sustain the strong Australian 
tradition of  active promotion of  global multilateral trade liberalisation. But 
he will differ sharply from his predecessor in placing climate change in the 
front rank of  his policy priorities. Global warming is now a key mainstream 
political concern in Australia, and Howard’s long-standing scepticism about 
it has been an important factor in his political demise. Rudd will be an activist 
on climate change, at home and abroad.
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At first glance the most obvious difference between Rudd and Howard 
has been over Iraq, with Rudd following established Labor policy by 
promising to pull some of  Australia’s troops out of  the US-led coalition 
forces there, after Howard has doggedly stuck it out in support of  his friend 
George. In fact the difference is less important than it appears: Rudd is 
committed to leaving a small but symbolically significant number of  troops 
in Iraq, enough for Washington to claim that Australia is still a member of  
the coalition. And Howard made it clear that he too would have scaled back 
Australia’s commitment had he retained office. Either way it has been clear 
that Australia’s recent enthusiasm for high-profile commitments to US-led 
operations in the Middle East has passed. What remains is a grim recognition 
that as a close US ally Australia has little alternative but to maintain some 
forces as a symbolic gesture of  support.
Deeper differences can be seen in their approach to the small weak states 
in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood. Australia now has substantial 
deployments in East Timor and Solomon Islands, and has attempted major 
programs in Papua New Guinea as well. While these operations reflect a 
welcome recognition of  Australia’s interests and responsibilities among its 
immediate neighbours, there is a strong sense that the police and military-
led approach has not worked. In East Timor, for example, there are no 
signs when Australia’s military contingent will be able to leave, 18 months 
after the initial deployment. Rudd is committed to sustaining Howard’s 
policy of  engagement, but shifting its emphasis from security interventions 
to economic, social and political reconstruction designed to address the 
underlying causes of  insecurity, as well as addressing the violent symptoms 
themselves. No one imagines this will be easy or quick, but there is a 
welcome recognition that bold and imaginative new thinking is required 
to help neighbours find solutions to deep-seated problems. Rudd has also 
promised closer and more respectful relationships with the governments of  
these countries themselves.
Likewise, Rudd seems likely to set a new course on relations with 
Indonesia. Observers on both sides of  the Arafura Sea recognise that, despite 
close cooperation on terrorism and generous Australian aid after the 2004 
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tsunami, Australia’s relations with Indonesia remain fragile and fractious. 
Small issues like the 2006 dispute over Papuan asylum seekers landing in 
Australia can quickly escalate to full-blown diplomatic crises, with public 
opinion inflamed on both sides. It is particularly sad that almost ten years 
after Indonesia began its remarkable experiment with democracy, Australia’s 
relations remain as uncertain as they were during the military dictatorship 
of  President Suharto. Rudd has always taken the relationship with Indonesia 
very seriously, and while he is unlikely to replicate the sometimes rather 
breathless enthusiasms of  Paul Keating, he does seem committed to laying 
deeper and more robust foundations for the relationship. This will require, 
above all, the recreation of  the trust which was so badly eroded on both 
sides by the events in East Timor in 1999. That will only happen if  both 
sides are willing to take some political risks at home. This Kevin Rudd may 
be willing to do.
Finally, of  course, there is the question of  China, and how Asia’s power 
structures evolve in response to China’s rise. No issue is more important to 
Australia than this, and none poses bigger challenges to Australia’s diplomacy 
over coming years. China this year overtook Japan to become Australia’s 
largest trading partner. But it has also become increasingly clear that China’s 
relationship with Australia’s great ally, the US, is becoming more strategically 
competitive as America responds to the subtle but unmistakable challenge 
posed by China to US primacy in Asia. Both sides have a huge stake in 
trans-Pacific harmony, but it is no longer possible to say, as Howard said 
in a speech to the Lowy Institute in 2004, that he did not regard strategic 
competition between the US and China as inevitable. It is already happening. 
This places Australia in an awkward spot. Australia’s vision of  its future, 
like those of  so many others in the Western Pacific, depends on being able 
to trade freely with China, Japan and the US, while still relying on the US 
to underwrite regional security. Australia cannot afford to have to choose 
sides if  and when strategic competition escalates. And yet Howard, blithely 
assuring Australians that China would not mind, lent Australia’s name to ideas 
from Tokyo and Washington designed to build an alignment of  US allies and 
others which would specifically exclude China and clearly be directed against 
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it—creating exactly the kind of  divisions that it is in Australia’s interests to 
avoid.
Rudd has put this issue firmly on his foreign policy agenda. In launching 
his election campaign Rudd listed the rise of  China and India as one of  
the handful of  key challenges facing Australia over coming years. He 
has opposed some of  Howard’s recent diplomacy, including the bilateral 
defence agreement reached with Japan in March 2006. He has suggested 
that Australia should urge the US and China to deal with one another more 
frankly over key issues such as the development of  their nuclear forces. He 
has made it clear that Australia’s close relationship with China is conditional 
on China’s continuing to conform to the norms of  the global community 
and not starting to throw its weight around. But he has also acknowledged 
that China’s international conduct on many issues in recent years has been 
responsible and has contributed to stability in Asia. He accepts that as China’s 
power grows, it should be accorded a bigger leadership role in Asia.
That is the good news for Beijing. The bad news is that Mr Rudd will urge 
China to be more respectful and accommodating of  Japan’s rightful place 
as a regional leader. He will promote Australia’s growing relationship with 
Japan and support the evolution of  Japan’s bigger role in regional security 
affairs—as long as that is not done in ways which are directed at China. 
He will also encourage the emergence of  India as a key player in a regional 
concert of  powers.
Finally, of  course, Kevin Rudd will adhere to Australia’s close alliance with 
the US, but he will seek to persuade Americans of  his vision of  Asia’s future 
and America’s role in it. Like others in the Western Pacific, Rudd believes 
that the US must remain engaged in Asia, but that Washington’s future 
engagement cannot assume that American primacy remains unaffected by 
the immense changes in the distribution of  power that economic growth 
has brought. In the Asian century America needs to join and support an 
emerging concert of  power in which all the major players are treated as 
equals. That will be hard for Americans to accept. Trying to persuade them 
of  it may be Mr Rudd’s toughest foreign policy challenge. Mr Rudd may 
speak fluent Mandarin, but his toughest diplomatic exchanges are likely to 
be in plain English.
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28 November 2007
PACNET
ROBERT AYSON
Kevin Rudd and Asia’s security*
Kevin Rudd has been swept into power after 6 per cent of  the voters swung 
to the Australian Labor Party. With domestic issues dominating the contest, 
the Howard government’s unpopular industrial relations policies became the 
focus of  discontent and a central argument for political change.
Rudd becomes prime minister after having cut many of  his political teeth 
on foreign policy issues. Foreign policy looms fairly large in how he will 
differentiate his government from its predecessor, including enhanced Asian 
engagement. Rudd knows it will not be easy to promote Australia’s interests 
in stable great power relations at a time when the indexes of  power in Asia 
are fundamentally changing.
The Sydney Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in September 
revealed much about the prism through which Rudd will view Asia’s security. 
Not so important here is the well publicised fact that he addressed China’s 
Hu Jintao in Mandarin. The more significant point is that, in the English 
portion of  his address to China’s president, Rudd spoke of  the United States 
as Australia’s ‘great friend and ally’ and China as Australia’s ‘great friend and 
partner’. Getting Australia in the right position to cope with the evolving, 
and often competitive, relationship between the US and China is Rudd’s 
primary foreign policy objective. Everything else is secondary.
Well known for his political and linguistic fluency in things Chinese, 
Rudd has had to demonstrate his US alliance credentials. On election night 
he devoted his first words on foreign policy to the argument that the US 
alliance will be central to his government’s foreign policy. This is doubly 
important because two of  his government’s first acts in international politics 
First published in PacNet, no. 49, 28 November 2007.
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will distance Australia from the Bush administration. One is the ratification 
of  the Kyoto Protocol, leaving the US isolated as the only industrialised 
country not to have done so. The second is a negotiated withdrawal of  
Australia’s combat forces from Iraq.
These initiatives will be welcomed in those parts of  Asia for which the 
Howard government’s approach to international security issues was too 
similar to Washington’s. Rudd, however, believes that a strong US presence 
in the region is crucial to a stable regional balance between the great powers. 
That means a policy of  US strategic engagement in Asia is central to 
Australia’s own approach to the region. But that needs to occur in a way that 
does not require Canberra to concur with Washington on all issues.
Until the last 12 months in office the Howard government had succeeded 
in maintaining brand differentiation from the US by taking a more optimistic 
view of  China’s rise. But this distinction became muddied as the Australian 
election approached. In March the Howard government made such a fuss 
of  its new security declaration with Japan that Australia risked becoming too 
closely identified with one side of  the major power divide in North Asia.
Soon afterward, a new Australian defence policy update gave comfort to 
China-sceptics in the Pentagon and in Tokyo with its warning that the Middle 
Kingdom’s military modernisation could destabilise the region. Rudd will 
not back out of  the security declaration with Japan or the trilateral strategic 
dialogue that links the two countries with the US, but Canberra will display 
an even greater resistance to any ideas of  a wider Asian alliance system that 
could be seen as an attempt to contain China.
This philosophy extends to the new Australian government’s approach to 
relations with India, singled out by Rudd as Asia’s second rising power. If  
the Howard government was lukewarm on the idea of  an Asian democratic 
quad involving Japan, the US, India and Australia, the Australian Labor 
Party leadership will be positively against the notion of  dividing the region 
strategically on the basis of  different political systems. This will not necessarily 
be a problem in Australia–India relations given New Delhi’s ambivalence 
toward the quad concept. But if  he wishes to court India, Rudd may need to 
reconsider his opposition to Australian uranium sales to it.
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Rudd also has at least one eye on Australia’s immediate neighbourhood. 
His visit to Bali to join climate change discussions is an ideal opportunity to 
sell his new policy of  Asian engagement in a strategically important country 
that occupies a neutral position in the US–China and China–Japan great 
power relationships.
Rudd has indicated that his new government will be keen to deepen 
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia beyond the friendly atmospherics that 
Howard enjoyed with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yet deeper 
ties might be said to already exist, courtesy of  the recovery in Australian–
Indonesian relations following the Bali bombing in 2002. And no Australian 
prime minister can insulate this particular bilateral relationship against the 
problems that appear with very little notice.
Rudd also faces a challenge in delivering on his promise of  a more engaged 
Australia in the South Pacific, given the extent of  aid and intervention that 
came in the later Howard years. Even so, the state of  Canberra’s diplomatic 
relations with Papua New Guinea could hardly be worse, so there is still 
plenty of  room for improvement. The South Pacific is also a region where 
even a Rudd-led Australia may find itself  at odds with Beijing—in the 
medium term—if  China’s quest for regional influence in the Pacific Islands 
becomes too strong, and with Tokyo if  Japan’s whaling vessels engage in 
illegal activities in the Southern Ocean.
The countries of  Asia will find that the Rudd government is committed 
to regional engagement and to positioning Australia wisely in the emerging 
great power picture. Support for multilateral institutions (including the 
United Nations) will enjoy greater prominence under Rudd foreign policy. 
But Australia’s 26th prime minister will be under no illusion that old-
fashioned power relations between states are being sidelined in the region, 
or that Asia is destined for increasing peace and prosperity. The region’s 
many realists will find that Rudd is someone who can understand and speak 
their language.
14 Capturing the Year — 2008
19–20 January 2008
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REvIEW
PETER McCAWLEY
Indonesia mourns economic visionary*
No crisis in Indonesia ever seemed to rattle Mohammad Sadli. He was 
famous for his easygoing approach even when the nation was facing one 
or other of  its many crises. Pressed for comment after the latest turmoil in 
Jakarta, he would chuckle and say, ‘Oh, I’m sure it will turn out alright.’
Sadli, mentor to an extraordinary range of  Indonesian and foreign 
colleagues during his long career in public life, has died in Jakarta aged 
85—almost exactly one year younger than Suharto, the president he served 
for many years but distanced himself  from.
While Suharto has been widely criticised for corruption and human rights 
abuses, he also oversaw a long period of  economic stability and growth. And 
much of  this was due to the remarkable role played by some far-sighted 
economists who persuaded Suharto, a little known general when he assumed 
power in the mid 1960s, to embrace sensible economic policies.
In August 1966, while Indonesia was still in crisis following the overthrow 
of  President Sukarno, the nation’s top military leaders invited a small group 
of  Indonesian economists to a key national strategy seminar to plan for 
economic recovery. Suharto listened closely to the group. He not only 
adopted their ideas but also recruited them as advisers to his ‘New Order’ 
government.
The group of  five economists was quickly dubbed the ‘Berkeley Mafia’ 
because of  their links with the University of  California, Berkeley. Sadli was 
a member of  this remarkable group.
Born in Java in 1922, Sadli studied engineering in Indonesia in the 
early 1950s. Later, he spent time at Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute 
First published in Australian Financial Review, 19–20 January 2008.
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of  Technology, and at the University of  California, Berkeley, on US 
government scholarships, before taking up a research job at the University 
of  Indonesia.
Sadli officially became a senior government adviser when he was 
appointed chairman of  the Foreign Investment Board in the late 1960s. 
Sadli’s easygoing approach was a dramatic contrast to the Konfrontasi style 
noisily promoted by Sukarno just a few years earlier. Soon, a much-needed 
revival in investment was underway.
As the economic recovery strengthened, the influence of  the Berkeley 
Mafia grew. In 1971, Sadli was appointed Minister of  Manpower. Two years 
later, he was promoted to Minister for Mining. The mining ministry was 
a key portfolio both because of  the large oil revenues and because of  the 
need to maintain effective contacts with the powerful foreign and domestic 
mining companies.
Liberated from his responsibilities as a minister in 1978, Sadli took on 
the role of  senior economic commentator for the nation. He remained a 
key adviser to Suharto, he fostered his many links in business circles, and he 
became an active economic journalist.
It was as an economic commentator that Sadli made his most important 
contribution in Indonesia in recent decades. His untouchable status was 
such that he could chide or praise almost anybody in public life at will—and 
he did! He was one of  the first senior figures in Indonesia to become openly 
critical of  the Suharto regime. And his most consistent theme was the need 
for good economic policy.
He supported economic growth, sound budgetary policies and international 
trade reform. He opposed monopolies (including, pointedly, those linked to 
the Suharto family), price-fixing and the tendency of  bureaucrats to dream 
up unhelpful regulations.
The final departure of  Suharto, Sadli and other key ‘New Order’ figures 
from the stage brings down the curtain on a remarkable era in Indonesia. A 
start was made on building a strong, modern and prosperous Indonesia, but 
only a start. The challenges that Suharto and the Berkeley Mafia identified in 
the mid 1960s remain immense.
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The torch has passed to the next generation of  Indonesian leaders. It is 
now the turn of  President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the group of  
Sadli’s students who are now economic ministers, to build both democracy 
and economic strength in Indonesia.
28 January 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
JAMIE MACkIE
President Suharto: Cold War hard man who reshaped 
a nation*
Army officer and former president of  Indonesia
Suharto dominated the political scene in Indonesia for more than 30 years, 
from when he first burst into the limelight in October 1965 by crushing the 
leftist Gestapu coup attempt until his downfall in May 1998, the latter due 
largely to the East Asian financial crisis of  the previous year. The swing 
to an intensely anticommunist regime in the decades following the coup 
attempt was a major political transformation.
His regime has evoked intense controversy ever since 1965, initially over 
the disputed explanations put forward about the coup attempt, later over the 
scale of  the killings that resulted from its suppression and the authoritarian 
character of  his military-backed New Order regime, as well as because of  
the grossly excessive wealth accumulated by his family throughout his life. 
Indonesia’s seizure of  East Timor in 1975–76 and its later oppressions there 
were also highly controversial, not only in Australia, but worldwide.
Published as ‘Cold War hardman shaped a nation—death of  a strongman’, The Australian, 
28 January 2008.
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Yet it is undeniable that Indonesia flourished under his leadership and 
was transformed from the economic basket case it was in 1965—afflicted by 
acute poverty, dangerous political tensions and administrative chaos—into 
a strong and stable state, one of  the rapidly developing Asian Tigers in the 
1990s.
In an admirably balanced assessment of  his strengths and weaknesses, his 
Australian biographer, Robert Elson, concluded:
His period in office brought the greatest period of  enduring growth in the 
country’s history, and hitherto only imagined levels of  prosperity and hope to 
millions of  Indonesians. Moreover, whatever the damage caused by corruption, 
much of  that growth was channelled into productive investment, into the 
elaboration of  physical infrastructure and communications, into education, 
family planning and into agricultural and industrial development.
On the political front, however, his record was much more mixed:
He created a long-lived phase of  political order and relative tranquillity such 
as the country had not known since the height of  Dutch colonialism. Yet that 
order came at a great cost. It was created by the imposition of  an artificial and 
repressive set of  ideas that abolished pluralism and by the engineering of  a 
paternalistic political framework that could not accommodate change.
Until 1965, he was almost unknown outside military circles. His name was 
never heard among the dozen or so leading Indonesians touted as successors 
to the first president, Sukarno. His opponents were inclined to belittle him 
at first as a political novice in comparison with the vastly more experienced 
and charismatic Sukarno, asking how such a prosaic, untried military officer 
could hope to inspire and unify the strife-torn country, as the latter had once 
done.
Suharto soon showed how wrong they were, displaying impressive political 
skills, by no means inferior to Sukarno’s in effectiveness, although utterly 
different in style. In the end, few should deny that he possessed remarkable 
political talents and shrewdness—plus considerable ruthlessness—for he 
maintained his supremacy over Indonesia until he was forced out in 1998, 
achieving far greater successes than the mercurial Sukarno ever did.
This all-powerful yet curiously enigmatic second president of  Indonesia 
will go down in history as one of  the most effective of  the great Asian 
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nation-builders of  the postcolonial era, along with Pandit Nehru, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Chiang Kai-shek, Ho Chi Minh, 
Lee Kuan Yew and Sukarno. Yet his almost reclusive private life and the 
controversial aspects of  his public career make it hard to reach confident 
judgements about him.
From the political angle, he can be seen as a strong, successful leader 
who got things done in a way that had rarely happened previously in 
Indonesia. From a more personal angle, Suharto was often portrayed as a 
quietly spoken, almost avuncular figure, ‘the smiling general’, not at all the 
jack-booted soldier so often caricatured by hostile cartoonists. He enjoyed 
appearing on nationally televised discussions with ordinary farmers about 
better ways of  growing rice, corn or cattle. Yet he could be hard, ruthless 
and unforgiving towards enemies or critics.
From yet another angle, he was a family man who cherished his privacy, 
choosing not to reside in the ornate presidential palace but continuing to 
dwell in his old house (initially quite a modest one, later much enlarged) in 
Jalan Cendana until the end of  his life. He delighted in getting away to his 
cattle farm at Tapos, in the hills near Bogor. Yet his family’s immense wealth 
and his apparent unconcern about the rapacious business activities of  his 
children was one of  the most damaging blots on his record.
Suharto shielded his deeper thoughts and feelings even from his closest 
colleagues, in typically Javanese fashion—except when he revealed them 
in rare outbursts of  bad temper. ‘No one knows what that man thinks,’ a 
veteran Jakarta insider remarked to me many years ago. ‘That is the secret 
of  his power.’
As his authority increased, his style of  ruling came to resemble that of  a 
traditional Javanese sultan in many respects, omnipotent and reclusive. He 
demanded complete loyalty from his ministers and other subordinates, to 
such an extent that even the strongest of  them became reluctant in his later 
years to criticise him or pass on bad news. He was ungenerous in failing 
to acknowledge the help of  his colleagues and showed an utter lack of  
magnanimity towards old comrades-in-arms who fell out with him.
He seems to have accepted unhesitatingly the doctrine that the end 
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justifies the means. His autobiography reveals no trace of  remorse over the 
massive slaughter and jailing of  communists in the late 1960s, or the killings 
of  innocent people in East Timor after 1975.
Yet on almost any view of  his record he must be given the lion’s share 
of  the credit, along with his technocrat advisers, for the country’s amazing 
transformation from the chaos and instability of  the mid 1960s to the 
increasingly prosperous, industrialising country Indonesia was becoming 
by the early 1990s. Per capita incomes rose by 230 per cent between 1969 
and 1982, then doubled again between 1985 and 1995. The title of  Bapak 
Pembangunan (Father of  Development) bestowed upon him by the People’s 
Consultative Assembly in 1983 was deserved, and cherished.
The revolution in rice farming productivity throughout Java achieved under 
the leadership of  this boy from a poor village family was an achievement 
of  historic significance, with average yields rising from two to more than 
six tonnes a hectare, making Indonesia self-sufficient in foodstuffs despite 
its steadily rising population. By establishing a family planning program 
he reduced population growth towards a point where zero net growth is 
foreseeable within a few decades, an even greater contribution to the 
country’s long-term development potential.
The shift from an agricultural economy in the 1960s towards a rapidly 
industrialising one in the 1980s changed Indonesia’s basic socio-economic 
structure along lines similar to what has happened in the other Tiger 
economies of  East Asia. Export earnings from manufactured goods began 
to exceed the previously abundant revenues from oil and natural gas around 
1990, diversifying the productive base of  the economy to an unprecedented 
degree. 
How did he do it? The most crucial point to note is that whereas the state 
was hopelessly weak in 1965 and society-based forces too strong for the 
state authorities to control them, the reverse was the case within 20 years, 
due almost entirely to his cautious, single-minded, step-by-step approach, 
and skilful husbanding of  his political assets.
Suharto gradually centralised power, patronage and immense financial 
resources into his own hands, as well as those of  a handful of  cronies in 
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the palace circle, such as Liem Sioe Liong, Bob Hasan and other wealthy 
Sino-Indonesian businessmen. The state apparatus had become so much 
stronger and more effective by the 1980s that no group in the society could 
retain much effective strength or autonomy without its backing—neither the 
middle class, nor any regional forces, nor even organised Islam.
Suharto was born in the village of  Kemusuk, a few kilometres south 
of  Yogyakarta, in 1921. He grew up, as Adam Schwarz has put it, ‘in a 
sprawling family…heaped with step-brothers and cousins…the only child 
of  his natural parents who divorced shortly after he was born’. In his first 
10 years he was shuffled from one household to another, to a degree that 
must have been highly unsettling even by Javanese standards of  considerable 
family fluidity. His childhood was haunted by poverty, but he was able to get 
reasonable schooling because of  the social status of  his father’s relatives as 
priyayi (lesser nobility).
He joined the Dutch colonial army (KNIL) about a year before the 
outbreak of  the Pacific War, a step that opened the way towards his later 
military career. When the Japanese conquered Java, he volunteered to join 
their forces and soon found himself  an officer in the PETA, a Japanese-
sponsored local militia. From there it was a logical step to become an officer 
in the Indonesian army soon after independence was declared in August 
1945. 
During the 1945–49 struggle for independence Suharto became a battalion 
commander with the rank of  lieutenant colonel. He achieved fame as leader 
of  the attack on Yogyakarta in March 1949, a symbolic gesture of  great 
significance in demonstrating that the Indonesian army was still capable of  
hitting back at a time when the Dutch claimed to have almost destroyed it.
In the first decade of  independence he commanded a battalion sent to 
Makassar (later Ujung Pandang) to crush regional dissidence, then spent 
most of  the 1950s in central Java, initially in anti-rebel operations, then as 
commander of  the Diponegoro division in Semarang, one of  the key posts 
in the army, when the dramatic rise of  the Communist Party (PKI) there was 
a source of  concern to civil and military authorities.
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In 1959, Suharto was recalled to army headquarters after a scandal over 
smuggling operations within his command. He was sent to the Army Staff  
and Command School, where he made a deep impression on the influential 
commander, Suwarto, and had contact for the first time with the University 
of  Indonesia economists who were to become know later as ‘the technocrats’, 
or ‘the Berkeley mafia’, the brains trust he called in to run the economic 
stabilisation program introduced soon after he came to power.
During the 1961–62 campaign to wrest Irian Jaya from the Dutch, 
Suharto was appointed as military operational commander, playing a very 
active role. He was appointed to head Kostrad, the elite strategic reserve 
force in Jakarta, during the 1963–65 Konfrontasi struggle against Malaysia, 
which led to his involvement in the events of  October 1965 and the army’s 
decisive confrontation with the PKI and Sukarno.
Suharto’s part in foiling the Gestapu coup attempt of  1 October 1965 
has given rise to controversy, mystery and mythology on both sides of  the 
political spectrum, with far-fetched conspiracy theories on the Right about 
Chinese complicity and from the Left about CIA involvement.
There are still many puzzles about what happened that day and why, yet 
Suharto’s role was straightforward. After hearing at dawn of  the murder 
of  six senior officers overnight, including army commander Yani, Suharto 
assumed command of  the army under standard operational procedures and 
made the key decisions which soon neutralised the rebel forces in Jakarta. 
After slowly piecing together who was behind the coup attempt and where 
Sukarno stood in relation to it, he was confident enough to launch an attack 
on the rebel headquarters that evening, after advising Sukarno to move 
out of  harm’s way. By the following day, he found himself  in a uniquely 
powerful position, militarily and politically, as the country’s most senior 
officer exercising control of  the capital.
This put him on a collision course with Sukarno, however, who had 
aroused suspicions among the army leadership by his strange actions during 
the crisis and his later attempts to deflect any blame for the coup from 
the PKI. Suharto dramatically utilised the exhumation of  the bodies of  
the murdered generals so as to focus responsibility for the coup attempt 
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on left-wing elements behind Sukarno, thereby polarising the country’s 
political alignments irreversibly. Attacks against the PKI mounted during 
the following weeks, with tacit approval from the army, escalating to a point 
where its mass base was utterly destroyed by the killings that occurred at the 
end of  1965 in a conflict situation tantamount to civil war.
Suharto carefully avoided any open confrontation with Sukarno over the 
following months, manoeuvring cautiously to undermine the basis of  his 
power while minimising the risks of  conflict, which could easily have been 
precipitated—or of  a split within the armed forces between pro and anti-
Sukarno units. Not until 11 March 1966 could he be prevailed upon to exert 
overt military pressure against the president, when he did so at the behest of  
a coalition of  anticommunist student activists demonstrating in Jakarta and 
anti-Sukarno elements in several army divisions. Sukarno was compelled 
to transfer executive authority to Suharto to restore law and order in the 
capital, and from that day on the latter was in charge, formally becoming 
president in March 1968.
The character of  Suharto’s rule went through several phases. During the 
first eight years of  the New Order, until the Malari riots of  January 1974, his 
power was limited by the need to juggle a coalition of  supporters behind him. 
That was to change radically later, but at first he was not much more than 
primus inter pares among the group of  senior army officers of  his generation. 
There were several senior officers who could have stepped into his shoes 
(and were eager to) if  he had stumbled.
Those early years constituted a period of  relative freedom of  expression 
and political activity (for all except the banned PKI and its members, 
who were systematically excluded from political life and government 
employment) after the constraints of  the late Sukarno era, although new 
curbs on political freedom were being steadily reintroduced. Rifts were 
widening and disillusionment with Suharto deepening among the student 
activists and the Islamic parties as they found themselves increasingly 
alienated by Suharto’s economic policies; but they were marginalised from 
any positions of  influence in government. Political parties were restructured 
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into two easily controlled, factionalised mega-parties in 1973, which could 
pose no real threat to the government’s electoral standard-bearer, Golkar. 
The anti-Japanese Malari riots in January 1974, triggered by a visit by Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka but directed just as much against the government 
and the rich Sino-Indonesian cukong (big bosses) who were closely associated 
with it—and partially funding its off-budget expenditures—marked a 
watershed in the development of  Suharto’s rule. The riots were followed 
by a crackdown on the press and political activists, then by a decade of  
increasing concentration of  power in the hands of  Suharto.
After 1983, the highly personalised and patrimonialist character of  
Suharto’s rule became most striking, as did the increasing prominence of  his 
children. Decision-making power over nearly all significant aspects of  the 
nation’s political and economic life was concentrated more and more within 
the palace circle of  officials and business associates, with Suharto exercising 
the final decision over almost all key policy decisions and appointments, 
which were automatically referred to him.
Suharto proclaimed a shift towards greater openness in 1992, but reversed 
abruptly soon after the first sharp press criticisms of  politically sensitive 
issues arose. Yet the momentum of  economic development was then 
increasing dramatically and if  it had continued beyond the 1997 financial 
crisis, the political effects might also have been far-reaching. But that was 
not to be.
A major political issue in those final years arose out of  the highly 
controversial business activities of  Suharto’s six children, who were the 
beneficiaries of  many lucrative contracts given out by the government, 
thereby gaining control of  some of  the largest enterprises in the country. 
This generated intense dissatisfaction with Suharto’s singular blind spot 
about their behaviour.
Former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating’s view in the 1990s that the 
Suharto regime represented ‘the single most beneficial strategic development 
to have affected Australia and its region in the past 30 years’ was essentially 
correct (although many Australians objected to it on human rights grounds). 
The close personal relations developed by Keating, and by Gough Whitlam 
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in the 1970s, helped greatly to alleviate tensions over East Timor and led to 
close cooperation between our two governments over APEC issues.
Suharto came in for sometimes vehement criticism and often excessive 
praise during his years in office, both at home and abroad. There was 
certainly much to applaud among his socio-economic achievements, as well 
as a lot to be deplored on the repressive civil rights and political side. Since 
his downfall, attention has inevitably been focused largely on the attempts 
to bring him to trial for corruption or misappropriation of  public funds 
or his various misdeeds, not least his family’s defamation case against Time 
magazine for its report on the Suharto family’s wealth. But in view of  
the prevalence of  corruption and patrimonial politics in East Asia more 
generally, it is arguable that this alone is not the most important ground on 
which he should be judged. The balance we strike between his achievements 
and his shortcomings is a much trickier issue.
Evaluations of  his rule are bound to fluctuate over time, coloured 
especially by the ups and downs of  the post-Suharto regimes. The erratic 
records of  presidents B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, plagued as they were by the economic stagnation and acutely 
hard times brought about by the 1997 financial crisis, left many Indonesians 
looking back wistfully at the more prosperous and predictable years they 
had enjoyed under Suharto. As conditions have improved under Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono since 2004, it has become more reasonable to hope 
that Indonesia has at last found a workable alternative formula for sustained 
progress on both the economic and political fronts, vastly preferable to 
Suharto’s New Order regime.
Disappointing though Yudhoyono’s record has been on some issues—
but still much better than Suharto’s—he has delivered a steady recovery 
from the crippling economic stagnation of  1997–2002 towards the high 
growth rates achieved by Suharto at the peak of  his economic miracle. If  
this progress can be continued over the next five or ten years, Suharto’s 
successes will not appear to have been as unique as they seemed earlier (and 
his failures far greater). But if  Indonesia falters again and plunges back into 
political and economic chaos—which we in Australia must earnestly hope 
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it will not—the Suharto legend may again look far more impressive than it 
does at the time of  his death. Yet, whatever the outcome, he will still deserve 
great credit for having got the process of  economic development under way 
and having pointed out the path to be followed.
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ROBERT CRIBB
Enigmatic mastermind of change*
Former President Suharto, who died yesterday, dominated Indonesian politics 
and society during the last third of  the twentieth century. The beginning and 
end of  his rule were marked by political chaos and economic decay, but for 
three decades he gave Indonesia political stability and spectacular economic 
growth. His achievements seemed to mark him as a model for Third World 
modernisation. His rule led to hopes that Indonesia had made progress 
along the road to democracy and prosperity in the footsteps of  South Korea 
and Taiwan. But his economic achievements proved to be fragile and both 
corruption and brutality were deeply embedded in his regime.
Suharto was an enigmatic man. Although he occasionally revealed his 
inner views in angry outbursts, many aspects of  his life remain shadowy. 
He was born in the village of  Kemusuk in Central Java on 8 June 1921. He 
was possibly the illegitimate child of  an important local figure, because he 
received a good education, something out of  the reach of  most village boys 
in colonial Indonesia. His family life, however, was unstable, and as a child 
he was repeatedly shuffled between relatives. Suharto’s biographer, Professor 
First published in Australian Financial Review, 29 January 2008.
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Robert Elson, attributes Suharto’s remarkable sense of  self-reliance to this 
lack of  family stability during his childhood.
Suharto’s early career drifted until the outbreak of  the Indonesian 
revolution against the Dutch in August 1945 at the end of  the Second World 
War and the Japanese occupation of  Java. He joined the revolutionary army, 
and his calm leadership qualities carried him quickly into the middle echelons 
of  the officer corps. Central Java was the heartland of  the new Indonesian 
republic and Suharto developed important political contacts in these years. 
Still more important, however, he learnt the art of  inscrutability. In the 
tangled and sometimes vicious politics of  the independence movement, he 
learnt to keep his cards close to his chest, maintaining cordial contacts with 
all sides and making a decisive commitment to the winning group only at 
the last moment.
The revolutionary years seem to have crystallised his political attitudes, 
too. He took part in suppressing a rebellion by the Indonesian Communist 
Party in 1948. The campaign was marked by atrocities on both sides and 
seems to have created in Suharto and many other military leaders a deep 
hatred and fear of  communism. He also fought the Darul Islam movement 
which aimed for an Islamic state in Indonesia and became highly suspicious 
of  political Islam.
Many revolutionary generals slipped into obscurity after the Dutch 
finally pulled out in 1949, but Suharto’s career prospered. He moved into 
increasingly senior posts and his career was not significantly damaged by a 
reputation for extensive involvement in business. Military budgets at the time 
were small, and a responsible commander was virtually forced to engage in 
business to keep his troops from starving. Suharto, however, in cooperation 
with his wife Tien (Hartinah) and Chinese Indonesian business associate 
Liem Sioe Liong, seemed to have a special knack in this area.
Suharto was still a low-profile, ‘non-political’ general in 1963, when he 
became commander of  Kostrad, the army’s crack strategic reserve. Being 
non-political was difficult in these times. Sukarno was the ageing president 
of  a tumultuous and chaotic ‘guided democracy’ in which the army and 
the resurgent communist party were jostling for the keys to future power. 
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Suharto’s skill at keeping his opinions to himself  was a great advantage 
and his Kostrad position was pivotal two years later, when the rest of  the 
army’s high command was killed in an ambiguous coup in Jakarta in October 
1965.
Although the coup was officially blamed on the communist party, much 
remains unexplained. Suharto himself, who knew some of  the plotters and 
seems to have had at least an inkling that an action was to be launched, has 
been accused of  masterminding the coup. It seems most likely, however, 
that he simply remained ambiguous until the last moment before striking 
decisively.
With his commanding officers out of  the way, Suharto took over the army 
and presided over the bloody destruction of  the communist party in which 
perhaps half  a million people were killed and twice as many were jailed. He 
systematically dismantled Sukarno’s power and took over as president in 
1967, leaving Sukarno to languish under house arrest.
Calling his regime the New Order, Suharto reversed the radical policies 
of  Sukarno. He took the advice of  American-trained economists and 
opened the economy to Western investment. Using both aid money and 
windfall income from vast oil and timber exports, he invested massively in 
infrastructure, especially communications and education.
He preserved the large state sector, most notably in banking, and regarded 
direction and intervention as the key to accelerated economic growth. 
Important industries were backed with abundant state funds, and he put the 
formidable resources of  the bureaucracy behind major policy goals such as 
controlling population and achieving self-sufficiency in rice production.
Early observers of  Suharto sometimes portrayed him as a simple, 
authoritarian man with good (or bad) advisers, but in fact he was a 
consummate manager. He listened to different viewpoints, rapidly mastered 
the key policy issues and delegated effectively. The fruits of  his rule were 
impressive. Indonesia, which had been one of  the poorest countries in the 
world when Suharto came to power, underwent rapid growth and increased 
prosperity for most sections of  society.
The combination of  state intervention and windfall income from resources 
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created ideal conditions for corruption on a vast scale. Suharto siphoned 
state money into private charitable ‘foundations’ under his own control, and 
he granted lucrative licences and concessions to family, friends and political 
allies. Perhaps because he was not personally greedy—he always lived a 
rather modest life—he saw these favours as a way building up Indonesia’s 
own capital base and business expertise and of  freeing the country from 
domination by Western and Japanese business. To outsiders, however, and 
to Indonesians not in the president’s favour, the regime seemed increasingly 
mired in self-enrichment.
Suharto’s control of  Indonesian politics was tight, even stifling. Elections 
and parliamentary sessions were hedged about with so many controls that 
there was no possibility of  initiatives from below having any influence. He 
turned the vague state ideology, Pancasila, into a comprehensive set of  social 
injunctions which told people to stick to their work and not to question the 
orders that came from above. And he was brutal when he felt it necessary: 
secessionists in East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya were killed, dissidents were 
jailed and harassed, the press was censored. In the early 1980s, Suharto 
reacted to a crime wave in Indonesian cities by ordering the assassination of  
more than 5,000 ‘known’ criminals, their bodies often left in the street as a 
warning to others.
The New Order was also marked by a callous disregard for the victims 
of  development. On thousands of  occasions, urban squatters and rural 
peasants were pushed out of  their houses or off  their lands to make way for 
development projects, receiving little or no compensation.
In the end, Suharto was brought down in 1997 by a wide variety of  
factors. The president’s own self-importance grew, while public impatience 
increased over his authoritarian style and his shameless support for his 
children’s predatory business activities. During the New Order’s last decade, 
the gap between rich and poor widened dramatically. As Suharto aged, 
moreover, politics became increasingly dominated by a feeling that the 
country was waiting, marking time until the installation of  a new president 
with fresh ideas and greater energy. Financial reforms in the early 1990s, 
however, allowed the development of  a bubble economy in Indonesia 
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whose vast scale was exacerbated by the government connections of  many 
key players. The collapse of  the rupiah in the second half  of  1997 created an 
economic crisis which no government could have withstood. Amidst rioting 
in Jakarta and other cities, the wholesale collapse of  Indonesian businesses 
and growing international pressure against him, Suharto resigned his office 
on 21 May 1998.
Many Indonesians wanted Suharto put on trial, either on human rights 
charges or for corruption, but few in the elite, including the new president, 
B. J. Habibie, felt any appetite for pursuing their former patron. They felt 
respect for his achievements and feared the serious pursuit of  the New 
Order’s crimes would end up implicating them as well. Although Suharto 
was charged with corruption in August 2000, the charges were dismissed a 
month later on grounds of  ill health. Deprived of  the adrenalin of  power, 
Suharto had rapidly declined from a stocky, pugnacious figure in early 1999 
to a frail, wheelchair-bound old man by mid 2000.
Suharto, born Kemusuk, Central Java, 8 June 1921, died Jakarta, 27 
January 2008. His wife Hartinah (Tien) died in 1996; he is survived by six 
children and several grandchildren.
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Suharto’s divided legacy*
Suharto (who passed away last night aged 86) was one of  a handful of  
figures who dominated twentieth-century postcolonial Asia. Controversial, 
Published as ‘Strongman of  southeast Asia slowly lost his grip’, Australian Financial Review, 
29 January 2008.
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enigmatic, reserved, mystical, ruthless, tactically brilliant and little understood, 
even in his own country, he ruled Indonesia with an iron grip for 32 years, 
making him one of  the world’s longest serving leaders.
Opinions of  him divide sharply. To some he was seen as Indonesia’s 
saviour, who presided over its economic transformation from its ramshackle 
state in the mid 1960s, to a modern, high-growth industrialising economy.
To others, he perpetrated, or at least presided over, some of  the worst 
human rights violations of  his era, following the violent suppression of  the 
Indonesian Communist Party in the mid–late 1960s, the brutal annexation 
of  East Timor in 1975, and his tight, authoritarian management of  the 
country throughout.
There can be no disputing Suharto’s remarkable economic achievements. 
The Indonesian economy had been in long-term decline for much of  the 
twentieth century, and was viewed by many as a failed state. Yet under his 
rule the hyperinflation of  the 1960s was quickly brought under control, per 
capita income nearly quadrupled and the incidence of  poverty fell from over 
50 per cent to around 15 per cent of  the population.
The 1980s saw another of  his great achievements. By then in supreme 
control, and aided by his gifted team of  ‘technocrats’, he managed adroitly 
to steer Indonesia through the collapse in commodity prices and the Third 
World debt crisis that engulfed many oil exporters. His deep and unquestioned 
commitment to rural development resulted in Indonesia becoming self-
sufficient in rice, after being the world’s largest rice importer just a decade 
earlier. Major investments in education and infrastructure were generating 
rapidly improved living standards throughout the entire archipelago.
If  he had stepped down from power at the end of  this decade, he would 
surely have been revered as one of  the truly great leaders of  economic 
development in the Third World, even allowing for his blemished human 
rights record. But he continued to exercise absolute authority, notwithstanding 
an apparent—but in retrospect short-lived—experiment with political 
liberalisation in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, he took two decisions that were 
eventually to lead to his demise.
First, his children were becoming extraordinarily rapacious, and he did 
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little to curb their excesses. Four of  the six—Sigit, Bambang, Tommy and 
Tutut—built up billion dollar empires within a decade, on the basis of  little 
more than extraordinary audacity and blatant nepotism.
Their activities were initially tolerated but by the 1990s they had become 
a subject of  deep resentment. That they were able to continue reflected 
not only Suharto’s political management and tactical genius, but also the 
otherwise able management of  a booming economy, and continued 
improvement in living standards of  the poor. Moreover, even his staunchest 
critics were forced to concede that Suharto himself  led a simple lifestyle.
Second, and a factor that was eventually the trigger for his removal, Suharto 
had begun to part company with his technocrat advisers. With the economy 
booming, and private capital inflows at unprecedented levels, he felt he had 
little further need for them. Surprisingly, in his 1989 autobiography, he gave 
little credit to them for the country’s remarkable economic turnaround.
From a seemingly impregnable position, his fall from power occurred 
quickly. The Asian economic crisis, which originated in Thailand in July 1997, 
quickly spread to Indonesia. By then, Suharto had lost his sure touch. He 
prevaricated when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform program 
would have dismantled some of  his children’s business interests.
A bitter row erupted between him and the IMF, not helped by the latter’s 
incompetent management of  the crisis. With the economy and the rupiah 
in free fall, he tried to maintain a semblance of  unity by installing the last of  
his five-year cabinets in March 1998.
But the game was up. Eventually, in the face of  persistent and increasingly 
strident student protests, he resigned on 21 May. At a stroke, Suharto virtually 
disappeared from public life.
The last decade of  Suharto’s life was an unhappy one, and he increasingly 
came to be regarded as a tragic figure. His wife had predeceased him, his 
children were under investigation (Tommy was imprisoned for a while) and 
the family of  which he was so proud began to disintegrate. He himself  was 
the subject of  corruption investigations. For a period, his name was reviled, 
especially amongst student activists and the urban intelligentsia. But it says 
something about his standing with the common people, and perhaps also 
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the Indonesian capacity for reconciliation, that he remained in the country 
(unlike Ferdinand Marcos, with whom he is sometimes, misleadingly, 
compared) and was treated gently, and mostly with respect, in his last years.
Suharto’s impact on Southeast Asia and beyond, including Australia, 
was immense. He immediately dispensed with Sukarno’s adventurous, 
swaggering foreign policy. Indonesia rejoined the United Nations, the IMF 
and the World Bank. The ‘confrontation’ against Malaysia (and by default 
Singapore) was terminated. He played a major role in the establishment in 
1967 of  the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations, a grouping that has 
since underpinned the region’s political stability, economic transformation, 
social identity and growing self-confidence.
Suharto was not able to visit Australia after 1975 owing to the certainty 
that his presence would be dogged by humiliating and violent protests. But 
his rise was of  inestimable importance for this country. He transformed 
Indonesia and its neighbourhood into a region of  political stability and 
economic modernisation.
There were abundant commercial opportunities created for our companies 
as a result, but far more important have been the broader geostrategic 
implications of  a dynamic and peaceful region on our doorstep.
There were ebbs and flows in the bilateral relationship during his tenure. 
Suharto formed very close personal relations with two of  the eight Australian 
prime ministers over his period of  rule—Whitlam and Keating. But 
differences emerged, as would be expected from such different neighbours. 
Along with Indonesia’s former colonial master, the Netherlands, Australia 
has been the subject of  some of  the fiercest criticism from those close to 
Suharto (though never, unlike Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew, from the man 
himself). There was always an undercurrent of  unhappiness in this country 
with Suharto’s human rights record. These criticisms became more vocal after 
the sorry events of  East Timor in 1975, exacerbated by issues elsewhere in 
the country, especially in West Papua. Nevertheless, with occasional hiccups, 
the official bilateral relationship remained cordial and effective for most of  
his rule.
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Mixed feelings about the president of paradoxes*
I remember vividly the first day I spent in Indonesia in January 1966. Under 
the incompetent rule of  President Sukarno the country was in a Zimbabwe-
like meltdown. With a young student activist I went to Pasar Baru, then 
Jakarta’s main shopping street. In one of  its department stores dispirited 
shop assistants kept watch over counters sparsely stacked with rolls of  
cheap cloth. A sharp twittering sound came from the empty rear of  the 
shop. I looked up. A writhing colony of  bats was nesting in the ceiling. Their 
rank smell filled the air. Beneath them a pair of  neatly dressed girls mopped 
droppings from the tiled floor. I caught the eye of  my student friend and he 
turned away. His face spoke shame and anger.
The following day he was in the streets with thousands of  other young 
Indonesians shouting his contempt for Sukarno. There was noisy support 
for the young, still little known General Suharto who had seized power three 
months earlier and was effectively in charge of  the country. Over the next 
32 years Suharto’s repressive, corrupt, often murderous rule lifted scores of  
millions into relative prosperity. And with prosperity came the self-respect 
that so many yearned for.
The passing of  the former strongman has triggered a surge of  nostalgia 
for the authoritarian certainties and the high rates of  economic growth that 
marked most of  his rule. The public consensus is that Father Harto (as most 
call him) ‘did great things for the nation’. To be sure, he, his family and his 
cronies enriched themselves on an outrageous scale. Human rights, openness 
and the justice system were trampled. But, as an Indonesian journalist 
remarked to me, he could have taken Indonesia in the same direction as 
A slightly abridged version of  this piece appeared in Canberra Times, 2 February 2008.
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Burma’s military rulers have taken their country. But he did not. For many 
in Indonesia, Suharto was in the same mould as the military rulers of  South 
Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s, perhaps even of  Japan before the 
war. He laid down a tough but, they say, a necessarily tough, foundation for 
a later era of  prosperity and democracy.
There are still plenty of  Suharto hardliners. I met some of  them last 
Wednesday when I visited Giribangun, the family mausoleum in a remote 
spot on the slopes of  Mount Lawu in Central Java where the former president 
was laid to rest. Early in the morning pilgrims were already filing into the airy, 
cool burial chamber with its dark, ornately carved teak panels. I joined them 
sitting crossed-legged on the carpeted floor. Under a ceremonial umbrella 
Suharto’s grave was a simple rectangle of  bare earth with two temporary 
wooden grave markers. At one end a modest portrait of  him in military 
uniform stood on an easel.
‘He was no mere office-holder,’ one of  the pilgrims whispered to me. 
‘He was a genuine leader whose personal vision fundamentally changed 
our country and changed it for the better.’ In his civil servant’s uniform 
he crawled forward to the graveside and digging his hands into a tray of  
red and white flower petals (Indonesia’s national colours) he scattered them 
reverently over the fresh earth. Among the varnished wooden columns in 
the mausoleum’s outer gallery, men and women sat in ranks on the floor 
intoning the chant: ‘There is no god but Allah.’
As the quiet rhythms of  the chant filled the inner burial chamber, my 
memory took me back to 1997, just before the financial crash that threw 
Suharto from office. I was at the tomb of  Java’s revered saint Sunan Kalijaga. 
Seated crossed-legged on the floor of  the mosque I chatted with a group of  
young men who, they told me, had been two weeks at the saint’s graveside, 
fasting and praying to him for help. Delicately adjusting his white skull cap 
and fingering a string of  prayer beads, one of  them told me that Indonesia’s 
boom of  the 1990s—driven by Suharto’s policies—had turned him from 
a small-time market trader into a successful second-hand car dealer. He 
bought clapped-out cars, reconditioned them, and sold them for big profits 
to a hungry market.
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But the ‘king’, he said, referring sarcastically to Suharto, had given his son, 
the ‘crown prince’ Tommy, the monopoly right to manufacture and market a 
new car, the so-called Timor car built from components supplied by Korea’s 
Kia motor company. Overnight the bottom dropped out of  his business as 
consumers rushed to grab the glitzy and super-cheap new product. Now 
bankrupt, and with no recourse in the country’s supine legal system or in the 
equally craven mass media, he had turned to religion for help. In the quiet 
of  the mosque his eyes burned with rage.
Since his fall in 1998 Suharto’s legacy has been fiercely disputed, and there 
are signs the debate will continue. Those who castigate him for his cruelty 
and human rights abuses are answered by others who argue that the rise in 
living standards that he engineered saved or lengthened the lives of  untold 
millions.
The live coverage of  Suharto’s funeral and the endless retrospectives on 
television have been almost wholly complimentary. But Suharto’s critics are 
hinting the eulogies have a lot to do with the dropping of  big money into the 
reporting process by the strongman’s associates and family members.
There has also been a suggestion that Suharto be officially declared a 
national hero. This has come mainly from the leaders of  Golkar, the still-
powerful political organisation that was a mainstay of  the strongman’s 
ruthless rule. Sceptics fear that Golkar is seeking to snatch a morsel of  
political advantage in the lead-up to the 2009 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. In the aftermath of  Suharto’s death, while people are still politely 
reluctant to speak ill of  the dead, Golkar is hoping to bypass the normal 
process of  debate that should accompany this prestigious beatification.
Last Monday, as Suharto was being buried, delegates to an international 
anticorruption conference in Bali paused to honour the famously 
supercorrupt former president. Possibly their gesture was a reluctant one 
and certainly it is what cliché-loving journalists would call a ‘delicious irony’. 
But it mirrors the somewhat grudging respect most Indonesians feel they 
have to express. Like Mao in China, Suharto’s authority in Indonesia’s recent 
history is such that in death he cannot be officially or rudely denounced.
Suharto was indisputably the father of  Indonesia’s modern economic 
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development and deserves to be honoured for this. But he was also an old-
style Javanese tyrant, unable to escape from his heritage into true modernity. 
Contradictory though they seem, these extremes of  judgement can easily be 
justified, though neither comes close to telling the whole story. Suharto, it 
seems, is destined to remain a paradox in his own country, but one whose 
key place in Indonesian history will not be in dispute.
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Bloodstained memorials to a life that failed to fulfil 
its promise*
Review of  Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West by Benazir Bhutto, 
London: Simon & Schuster, 2008; and Daughter of  the East by Benazir Bhutto, 
London: Pocket Books, 2008.
It is impossible to read Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West without 
being starkly conscious of  the events that preceded its publication. It was 
completed, so we are told, the same morning that its author was assassinated 
during her campaign to regain the prime ministership of  Pakistan. And in the 
opening chapter, Bhutto describes how the manuscript itself  was maimed 
during the homecoming parade in Karachi that ended her years of  exile. A 
suicide bombing killed 179 people at that parade, which Bhutto survived in 
part thanks to the young men who acted as human shields to protect her. 
As she describes:
Within hours of  my reaching Pakistan, some of  the pages of  this book would 
First published in The Australian, 12 April 2008.
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be symbolically charred by fire and splattered with the blood and flesh of  
disembodied innocents thrown up by devastating terrorist bombs.
No doubt this image of  the blood-consecrated manuscript is intended 
to impress the importance of  its message upon the reader. But it had the 
opposite effect on me; I physically recoiled, and slammed the book shut. 
And I remembered Asif, one of  the young men who Bhutto’s political party 
had sought to recruit as they trawled the country from one end to the other 
in search of  people who could be persuaded or paid to attend her grand 
homecoming. Asif ’s disdain for such offers turned to outright disgust after 
the parade’s bloody conclusion. ‘They offered to pay us. Pay us to travel all 
that way, just to be killed.’
In the end, Bhutto herself  paid for her political ambitions with her life. 
But it is worth remembering that she was also prepared to pay with the 
lives of  others, regarding with apparent equanimity a security strategy that 
consisted of  insulating herself  with a generous layer of  bodies belonging to 
people whose loyalty she extolled, but whose lives she does not seem to have 
valued very highly.
Two strands run through Reconciliation. The first strand outlines Bhutto’s 
personal political philosophy. Here, she refutes claims by both Muslims 
and non-Muslims that Islamic and Western values are fundamentally 
incompatible. Bhutto and her collaborator, Mark Siegel, cobble together 
evidence from a range of  Muslim scholars to argue that Islam is in essence 
democratic in spirit, tolerant of  other religions and supportive of  women’s 
rights. There is a lengthy repudiation of  Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of  
civilisations’ thesis, which maintained that Islam and the West were destined 
to engage in bloody intercivilisational conflict. Such conflict can be avoided, 
Bhutto argues, if  Western democracies (most notably America) end their 
support for dictatorships in Muslim societies. Democracies, whether Muslim 
or Western, will not make war upon one another.
The second strand of  the book sits uneasily with the first. It consists 
of  a self-serving account of  the political careers of  Bhutto and her father, 
the executed former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This account only 
highlights the disjuncture between Benazir Bhutto’s professed (and probably 
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sincerely held) beliefs and her political record. She was the first female leader 
of  a modern Muslim state, yet once in power she failed to repeal legislation 
under which thousands of  Pakistani women, including rape victims, were 
jailed for adultery. She denounced religious extremism, yet under her prime 
ministership, Pakistan facilitated the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan 
in the name of  gaining ‘strategic depth’. She speaks passionately of  the need 
to sweep aside dictatorships, suffered terribly under the dictatorship of  
Zia ul-Haq and urges America to cut loose contemporary dictators such as 
President Musharraf. Yet even as this book was written, she and Musharraf  
were reluctantly engaged in negotiating an American-brokered power-
sharing agreement.
Bhutto’s memoir Daughter of  the East has also been updated and reissued, 
timed to coincide with her homecoming, but now another memorial to her 
life. Reading this book, first published as she came to power in 1988, only 
highlights the extent to which she disappointed the hopes invested in her. 
She writes movingly of  her imprisonment, the execution of  her father and 
the mysterious poisoning death of  her younger brother in France during the 
family’s years in exile. But the account of  her years in office merely recounts 
achievements and offloads responsibility for failed policies (such as the 
support for the Taliban) onto military intrigues and disloyal colleagues. The 
bitter political feud with her second brother and his death in a police shootout 
during her prime ministership is dealt with in a couple of  paragraphs.
Bhutto’s death was a terrible loss for Pakistan. For all her willingness 
to compromise her principles in the pursuit of  her political ambitions, she 
represented an alternative path to governance by the military or the mullahs. 
It was still possible to invest some cautious hope in her return to the political 
centre stage. But despite this, neither this book nor its author were worthy 
of  the blood that stained its pages after that tragic homecoming parade in 
Karachi.
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Amendment to ensure administration is brought  
to rights*
Important amendments to the Australian Capital Territory Human Rights 
Act are currently being considered by the Legislative Assembly. In 2004, the 
ACT was a pioneer in introducing the first legislative human rights charter 
in Australia. The Human Rights Act offered a model for human rights 
protection quite different to that contained in traditional bills of  rights, 
such as that of  the United States, which have been criticised for allocating 
too much power to judges to override the will of  democratically elected 
parliaments through declaring legislation invalid.
The ACT legislation, by contrast, was built on a dialogue model of  
human rights protection, which left the final decision on legislation to the 
Legislative Assembly, but ensured that human rights were considered at each 
step of  the political and legislative process. If  the ACT government were to 
First published in Canberra Times, 25 February 2008.
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enact laws that breached human rights, it would have to do so in the face 
of  judicial and public scrutiny. In this sense, the ACT legislation followed 
Britain’s Human Rights Act of  1998, which is credited with transforming 
the public administration of  Britain.
The impact of  the ACT Human Rights Act has not been headline news 
since and there have been few court cases invoking the legislation. The real 
effects have been largely out of  the public eye, but they have been significant. 
All ACT laws and policies are now subject to human rights scrutiny and 
a number of  proposals have been altered and improved as a result. For 
example, the ACT’s Terrorism (Extraordinary Temporary Powers) Act 2006 
reflects the influence of  a human rights approach and includes a number 
of  important safeguards for those subject to preventative detention, which 
were absent from the equivalent federal legislation.
The positive results of  human rights legislation in the ACT encouraged the 
enactment of  a Charter of  Human Rights and Responsibilities in Victoria, 
which came into full effect on 1 January this year. Public consultations have 
been held in Tasmania and Western Australia and government-appointed 
committees have each recommended that similar legislation be passed in 
those jurisdictions. The ACT Human Rights Act has also paved the way for 
consideration of  a charter of  rights at the national level. These proposed 
amendments to the ACT Human Rights Act will introduce a greater level of  
accountability for government and its agencies to observe human rights.
The Human Rights Amendment Bill places a direct responsibility on 
public authorities to consider human rights in their decision making. Public 
authorities are defined to include not only all government agencies and 
instrumentalities but also all entities that exercise public functions. This will 
mean that private businesses that provide public services, such as public 
transport, gas or water supplies, will be required to act consistently with 
human rights. The amendments will allow people who have had their human 
rights breached by a public authority to have those decisions reviewed. The 
Supreme Court can make any order that it considers appropriate to remedy 
the violation (such as an apology) but the legislation specifically rules out the 
possibility of  monetary compensation.
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An intriguing provision in the new law is the possibility that any entity, 
such as a private business that does not act as a public authority in any 
context, may opt in to the duty to comply with human rights. Such 
possibilities are available at the international level, for example through the 
United Nations Global Compact, but unusual in national legal systems. We 
hope that Canberra’s private sector will take up this invitation to participate 
in observing human rights.
Other amendments to the Human Rights Act in the bill include clarifying 
the wording of  the provision at the heart of  the legislation, section 30. The 
aim of  section 30 was to ensure that all ACT legislation was interpreted to 
be consistent with human rights as far as possible. The original wording was 
somewhat convoluted and has led to some misunderstandings within ACT 
courts and tribunals, which were cautious about interpreting legislation in 
light of  human rights principles unless the legislation was ambiguous in its 
wording. The new wording of  section 30 makes it clear that a human rights-
consistent interpretation of  legislation must prevail unless this contradicts 
the very purpose of  the law.
Another helpful clarification to be made to the Human Rights Act is 
the expansion of  section 28, which allows reasonable limitations on rights. 
A claim of  human rights by one person can often be met by a claim of  
another right, for example, the right to privacy can be met by invoking the 
right to freedom of  speech. Decision-makers thus require a mechanism to 
balance contending claims of  rights. The amended section now provides a 
list of  factors which a court or tribunal can take into account in working out 
whether a proposed restriction on a right is reasonable and justified. These 
include the nature of  the right, the extent of  the limitation and whether 
there is any less restrictive way of  limiting the right.
Overall, the changes to the Human Rights Act will provide a stronger 
incentive for government and public agencies to observe human rights. 
The amendments will not come into effect until 2009 in order to allow 
government and public authorities to prepare for greater accountability.
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CANBERRA TIMES, PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMANT
RICHARd MULGAN
No minister: frank, fearless or just partisan?*
How far should public servants go in responding to the directions of  their 
political masters? Grafting legitimate democratic control on to rule-based 
administrative agencies is a problem all democracies grapple with. They 
also face some new challenges to traditional conventions brought on by 
international trends such as the managerialist adoption of  private sector 
employment practices, the growing influence of  media management over 
all areas of  government activity and increasing public availability of  official 
information.
The meaning of  ‘responsiveness’
Responsiveness refers to the readiness of  public servants to do what 
government ministers want (though it can also be applied to other 
relationships, such as that of  public servants and the community at large). The 
concept itself  is not altogether straightforward. First, there is the question of  
responsive to whom? A secretary, for instance, may be responsive either to 
the portfolio minister or to the prime minister. Though the relationship with 
the portfolio minister might seem dominant, as it is on a day-to-day basis, 
ministers (and therefore secretaries) always operate within the context of  
the government’s program and priorities as articulated by the prime minister 
and the cabinet and as relayed by the secretary of  the Department of  the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). Given the power of  that secretary and 
the prime minister over secretaries’ tenure and advancement, secretaries can 
be expected to respond to the wishes of  the prime minister even if  this leads 
them into some tension with portfolio ministers.
First published in Canberra Times, Public Sector Informant, April 2008.
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Secondly, responsiveness does not necessarily involve acceding to explicit 
directions from ministers. As with any superior/subordinate relationship 
built on professionalism and trust, the subordinate will often anticipate the 
superior’s wishes without prompting. Experienced senior public servants 
are skilled in knowing what ministers will and will not want them to do 
and in acting accordingly. For responsiveness to occur, all that is needed is 
that public servants act in accordance with what they perceive to be their 
political masters’ wishes. Indeed, much responsiveness takes place within 
departments without ministers being aware of  it. Secretaries and other senior 
public servants take the initiative themselves on the minister’s behalf, either 
through their own actions or through instructions to their own subordinates. 
At the same time, ministerial advisers, acting on the minister’s behalf, 
make requests of  public servants in the minister’s name, often themselves 
anticipating the minister’s unspoken wishes.
Ministers want many things, not all of  them consistent. They want to 
win the next election but they also want to serve the long-term good of  the 
country. They want to win the daily political contest in the media but they 
also want to avoid making any foolish commitments that may come back to 
haunt them. Being responsive may be a matter of  looking past the minister’s 
immediate demands and recalling other wants temporarily eclipsed in the 
minister’s mind. On this understanding, public servants may be responsive 
to ministers while going against what ministers are actually pressing for at 
the time. They may point out difficulties in government proposals which 
ministers might prefer not to hear but which they ought to listen to if  they 
wish to avoid unwelcome consequences.
The principle of  democratic legitimacy
The main principle that supports responsiveness is democratic legitimacy. 
Ministers are elected politicians forming a government with the support of  
a majority in the lower house. Chosen by the voters, via Parliament, they 
are accountable to the voters, via Parliament and through other channels. 
This fact gives them the democratic right to impose their own directions 
on government departments and gives non-elected public servants a 
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corresponding obligation to follow such directions.
The principle of  democratic legitimacy is sometimes expressed in terms 
of  the elected government’s right to determine the public interest, at least 
in relation to the substance of  government policy. The public interest is a 
contested concept, referring to a judgement of  what is best for the people 
as a whole. Everyone has their own ideas about the public interest, not 
least public servants, who often have quite decided views about the public 
good. Public servants are not expected to relinquish these views, still less to 
become moral and political eunuchs. But democratic values do require them 
to defer to the elected government’s view of  the public interest in public 
policy when it conflicts with their own.
Contrary to some misconceptions, the tendering of  ‘frank and fearless’ 
advice is demanded by democratic responsiveness and is not necessarily in 
conflict with it. Good advice in any organisation always requires pointing 
out weaknesses and potential pitfalls in policy options proposed by the 
leadership as well as offering alternative options, even when such advice is 
unwelcome. All good executives—whether public or private sector—need 
frank advice and the best ones learn not to resent it.
In the government sector itself, frank and fearless advice is also required 
within ministers’ private offices from political advisers and media minders 
(and even from the minister’s family), all of  whom need to have the courage 
to give unwelcome news and unpalatable advice. Indeed, it may take more 
courage for an adviser to tell a minister to change his or her hairstyle than 
for a public servant to point out difficulties with a policy proposal. From 
this perspective, frank and fearless advice is part of  the loyal service that a 
good managerial team owes ministers in helping them to implement their 
policies and achieve their goals. If  it sometimes requires saying things that 
ministers do not want to hear, this can be justified in terms of  the need to 
be responsive to the whole range of  ministers’ wants, not just those that 
are uppermost in ministers’ minds at the time. It does not depend on any 
supposed obligation to present an opposing view of  the public interest.
One can thus understand the obvious irritation expressed by senior 
public servants such as Peter Shergold with public servants who invoke the 
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principle of  frank and fearless advice as a mandate for offering advice that 
takes little account of  government priorities and attempts to be impartial 
between competing political viewpoints. As the Public Service Act makes 
clear, frank advice is to be offered within the context of  responsiveness to the 
government. ‘The APS is responsive to the government in providing frank, 
honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice and in implementing the 
government’s policies and programs.’
That is, the awkward and unpalatable elements to such advice (about which 
one should be properly frank and fearless) are those that ministers need 
to know if  they want to meet their chosen objectives. Though advice may 
run counter to the government’s immediate preferences or commitments, 
it should not present or assume alternative policy directions incompatible 
with the government’s values. Responsiveness does have its limits but they 
should not be set by public servants’ own sense of  the best policy direction 
for the country.
Many who join the public service as a career bring with them a genuine 
vocation to serve the community as well as a share in the widespread 
public prejudice against politicians and party politics. They prefer to see 
their role as ‘above politics’, offering advice from a more detached and 
independent perspective, one that is not confined to the partisan values 
of  the government of  the day. They tend to look on departmental seniors 
who embrace ministers’ policy priorities as having yielded to undue political 
pressure or as having sold out to the government.
Traditions of  policy independence can also be found in departments such 
as treasury and defence which have their own strongly institutionalised views 
about what the public interest demands in their particular area of  policy. The 
treasury view of  what is good for the country is often sharply at variance 
with the government’s view, a point underlined by the leaked speech given 
to staff  in March 2007 by the treasury secretary, Ken Henry. In this speech 
Dr Henry criticised the government’s water initiative for being insufficiently 
grounded in economic (that is, treasury) analysis and also warned against 
government pre-election spending proposals ‘that are, frankly, bad’.
Dr Henry’s criticism of  coalition government policy could be partly justified 
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on the ground of  process, that good policymaking requires treasury to be at 
the table to present expert economic advice. Talk of  ‘bad’ policy could also 
be construed as being responsive to the government’s own long-term wants 
(for agreed goals such as low inflation, low interest rates, continuing growth) 
if  not to the government’s short-term intentions (in spending up big in the 
hope of  re-election). But such language treads a fine line. Departmental 
views of  ‘good’ policy at variance with the chosen directions of  an elected 
government run counter to the principle of  democratic legitimacy and 
represent a potentially dangerous limitation on responsiveness.
Departmental advice known to be at variance with ministers’ ultimate 
decisions provides potent ammunition for oppositions and other government 
critics. Ministers can be attacked for overlooking ‘expert’ advice for short-
term political advantage. One can see why treasury maintained such firm 
opposition to freedom of  information (FOI) requests for in-house research 
that may have been critical of  the coalition government’s first home 
buyers’ grants and the effects of  bracket creep on tax rates (the subjects 
of  ‘conclusive certificates’ that were appealed unsuccessfully as far as the 
High Court). Henry was unrepentant about conclusive certificates, arguing 
that confidentiality was fundamental to treasury’s research function and that 
most FOI requests were from people seeking to embarrass the government. 
It was not his role, he said bluntly, to help people embarrass the government. 
If  all treasury reports were available under FOI, he would be forced to block 
any research that had the potential to yield politically damaging results for 
ministers. But this is precisely the type of  advice that governments ought to 
be getting.
Frank advice always has the potential to be damaging to corporate 
decision-makers if  publicly revealed, a consideration that applies in all 
sectors, not just government. Confidentiality is thus often assumed to be a 
necessary condition for effective advice. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that Australian governments and their advisers are too defensive about the 
possible impact of  FOI disclosure of  advice and research that runs counter 
to government policy. A more democratically robust approach (as appears 
to be developing in New Zealand) would be for ministers to frankly admit 
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divergence from public service advice and to mount a political argument in 
defence of  acting otherwise.
21 June 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
RUTH BARRACLOUGH
I was one of Nelson’s nine academic victims*
Brendan Nelson’s time as Minister for Education had a lasting impact on 
the university sector, with his most infamous act his veto of  funding for 
research projects that bothered him. Nine projects were vetoed in the face 
of  recommendations for funding based on peer review by the Australian 
Research Council (ARC). This created a culture of  paranoia in universities, 
leaving many researchers wondering if  they should stop pursuing the 
questions they believed were important and instead focus on the question: 
will the government be bothered by this?
In 2005 my ARC fellowship was one of  those vetoed by Brendan Nelson. 
Apparently the title of  my project made him unhappy. As a part-time tutor 
at Sydney University, and with a newborn baby, I rushed to take the first job 
I could get and relocated to a Big Ten university in the US. Then, late last 
year back in Australia I got a phone call from the ARC: I was one of  the 
‘Nelson Nine’.
It is important to explain the impact that the vetoing of  grants has 
had upon research culture in Australia. In the rumours, paranoia and 
disappointment that followed the news of  vetoes, a culture of  fear took hold. 
I know freshly minted PhDs who have been scared off  from applying for an 
First published in Canberra Times, 21 June 2008.
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ARC grant because they believe it funds only ‘political research’ that caters 
to a narrowly defined national benefit. These people, who are some of  our 
best, will go overseas or, worse, not pursue the kind of  research that requires 
a real culture of  confidence and support. Following the vetoes people began 
to question if  the largest and most prestigious research funding bodies in 
this country would continue to succumb to ideological intervention. The 
damage has been enormous.
It turns out that I was fortunate. I was at a university where our Vice-
Chancellor, Ian Chubb, protested on our behalf. I know of  academics at 
other universities who have been advised to keep quiet about their vetoed 
grant for fear it might jeopardise their career. In my corridor people stumped 
up to congratulate me on having won anyway, and their support was the 
only thing that stopped me railing at the loss. For the loss is considerable. 
Without the precious time and money that the grant awarded me, the project 
has stalled. Let me explain this research that the minister felt had to be 
stopped.
My project examined the Korean kisaeng, a profession similar to the 
Japanese geisha only with a history that goes back several hundreds of  
years. Kisaeng occupied the lowest rank of  traditional Korea’s caste system. 
Born or sold into the profession they were exceptional amongst women 
for their accomplishments: they were trained in literature, music, dance and 
composition. As slaves who were literate, erudite women they also wrote 
some of  the most treasured poetry in the Korean literary canon. My project 
asked: how do we understand them as both slaves and figures in high culture? 
I proposed that sex work and sex trafficking today in Korea and other parts 
of  East Asia cannot be understood without reference to the historical basis 
of  this trade. Bonded labour practices are rife in the contemporary sex 
industry in this part of  the world. I argued that we need to understand the 
economic origins and cultural history of  bonded sex labour if  we are to 
truly address the resilience of  the industry.
From the examiners’ reports available, it appears that the grants vetoed by 
Nelson over 2004 and 2005 were ranked highly. At least three of  the Nelson 
Nine took up positions overseas following the vetoes. Behind closed doors 
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the ARC fought the vetoes but ended up being blamed for the political 
fiasco. Meantime Nelson moved onwards and upwards, refusing to disclose, 
refusing to be accountable, refusing to defend an organisation within his 
own portfolio.
But the question must be asked of  academics and university administrators: 
how did we let this happen? And this is the crux of  the matter: as long 
as ‘national benefit’ can be harnessed by a fidgety education minister then 
this will happen again. Now is the time to set down a transparent process 
that defines ministerial accountability and the appropriate limits of  political 
power.
9 July 2008
NEW MATILdA
SHAkIRA HUSSEIN
Something borrowed, something blue*
Brides are supposed to cry on their wedding days. Even Western brides, 
marrying the man of  their choice, cry on what is supposed to be the 
happiest day of  their life. And my aunts told me that Pakistani brides would 
be considered somewhat strange if  they didn’t cry. ‘It’s not a happy day, is it? 
Leaving your family and everything you know. Of  course you cry.’
But this bride was different. Her wedding was taking place in an Afghan 
refugee camp in northern Pakistan. Even though her face was coated in a 
heavy layer of  makeup, it was possible to see that her expression was frozen 
in a rictus of  fear. Her eyes were blank and seemed not to take in any of  
the scene before her—the wedding guests, the foreign visitor, the women 
Posted on New Matilda, http://newmatilda.com/2008/07/09/something-blue, 9 July 2008.
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who sang and laughed in a vain attempt to draw her into the celebration. It 
occurred to me that she might have been given a drug of  some kind to calm 
her down.
The mother of  the bride was nowhere to be seen. And when the other 
women explained why, they dropped all pretence of  celebration. ‘The 
girl’s mother is in another room, crying. The family is newly arrived from 
Afghanistan, and they have nothing. They can’t afford to feed everyone, 
so they had to find a husband for their daughter. She is only 16, and she 
is marrying an old man. He already has a wife his own age and, just a few 
months ago, he married another young woman. It is not what anyone wants 
for their daughter, but what can they do? They cannot take care of  her 
themselves, and they cannot find her a husband of  her own age.’
In peacetime, the mathematics of  polygamy does not add up. If  there are 
equal numbers of  men and women, then for every man who takes a second 
wife, another man has no wife at all. That is why breakaway polygamous 
Mormon sects in the United States have taken to leaving excess teenage boys 
by the side of  the highway—to leave the field clear for the older men to 
take their pick of  the women. Polygamy is damaging to lower ranking men, 
as well as to women, when a few high-ranking studs corral more than their 
share of  the available females.
But wartime leaves communities with an excess of  women. In Australian 
suburbs there are still maiden aunts who never married because the young 
men of  their generation were killed in the Second World War. But post-war 
Australian society was better able to provide for such women than present-
day Afghanistan. The early days of  Islam, too, were marked by warfare, 
by the presence of  women whose husbands or potential husbands had 
been killed in the fighting. And war-torn societies are insecure places for 
unattached women. Better half  a husband, or even a quarter of  a husband, 
than destitution. And if  the husband is not to your taste, you might prefer 
not to have him all to yourself.
I understand this. I can see why that terrified young woman’s family 
handed her over to that old man, so that she would be fed, and her share of  
the family’s resources could be distributed among their other needy children. 
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In similar circumstances, I can imagine that most of  us might do the same, 
whatever our views of  polygamy.
But most Muslim women regard polygamy in a similar light to the guests 
at that sad wedding—as a last, desperate resort. Of  course, polygamous 
matches happen in peacetime, as well as during war, although they are much 
less common. If  a first marriage does not produce children, then a second 
wife may be taken in the hope that she will prove more fortunate.
Polygamy may also be used as an alternative to the form of  ‘serial 
monogamy’ more familiar in Western societies, so that a first wife may 
retain her status as a married woman once a marriage has broken down 
and her husband has effectively moved on to a new love. But this violates 
the injunction for the wives in a polygamous relationship to be treated with 
equal love and care.
However, the usual justification for polygamy is that it provides women 
who might otherwise have to fend for themselves with a male protector 
and breadwinner. This may make sense during times of  great social 
upheaval, when no other form of  welfare is available (although I will always 
remember the blank-eyed terror of  that young Afghani woman whenever 
I hear polygamy justified in these terms). But in a just society, women and 
girls should be provided for by other means. Many so-called monogamous 
relationships are of  course no such thing, and Muslims are as free to engage 
in informal polygamy as anyone else.
But institutionalised polygamy assumes that women are in such need of  
male providers that even a quarter share will do. In contemporary Australian 
society, women do not need to resort to such means of  support. In fact, it 
seems to be men who need the support of  women—need it so badly that 
one woman is not enough. But that, frankly, is their problem.
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26 August 2008
NEW MATILdA
SHAkIRA HUSSEIN
High tea with a disgraced political dynasty*
You cannot trust anyone. These people used to follow us everywhere. 
They would tell us ‘We are your cats and your dogs.’ Now, we can’t get 
our own shadows to follow us.
Maryam Safdar was an inconsolable young woman. It was July 2000, 
nine months since Musharraf  had taken power in Pakistan, deposing and 
imprisoning Safdar’s father, Nawaz Sharif. The Sharif  men were in prison or 
in exile, leaving the Sharif  women to rally the faithful. The faithful, however, 
were few and far between, leaving Sharif ’s wife and daughter with time on 
their hands. Frankly, when you have endless hours to spare for a rambling 
chit-chat with a passing Australian freelancer, you have hit rock bottom.
Now, the political cycle has turned. Last week, Musharraf  finally bowed 
to the inevitable and resigned from office, his own cats and dogs having 
fled into the night (although he still rated a phone call of  appreciation from 
George W. Bush, who was among the last of  his friends to desert him). 
Watching Musharraf ’s televised resignation speech, I looked for his shadow, 
and saw no sign of  it.
And Nawaz Sharif  is a man on the political rise. His party performed 
unexpectedly well in the elections earlier this year, although the Pakistan 
People’s Party won the largest share of  the vote in the wake of  the 
assassination of  its leader, Benazir Bhutto. And in the months since then, 
Sharif ’s hardline stance against Musharraf  has further restored the public 
standing that lay in shreds back in 2000, when I met Maryam Safdar and her 
mother.
Posted on New Matilda, http://newmatilda.com/2008/08/26/high-tea-disgraced-political-
dynasty, 26 August 2008.
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By the time Sharif  was overthrown in 1999, after an unsuccessful attempt 
to sack Musharraf  as chief  of  the armed forces, his rule had become so 
authoritarian that many Pakistanis felt that military dictatorship could hardly 
be any worse. Journalists who dared to question Sharif ’s grip on power were 
beaten up and arrested, opposition rallies were violently dispersed, and the 
Supreme Court was stormed by a mob when it attempted to hear a contempt 
of  court case against Sharif.
I visited the Sharif  women along with a couple of  local journalists, one of  
whom had left the country during Sharif ’s final months in power, after some 
not-so-subtle hints that his presence was unwelcome. ‘The electricity on 
the house was cut. Just our house, nobody else’s. The tyres on the car were 
slashed. And then I was shot in the leg. Here, let me show you—or perhaps 
not here. There are many people around. Later.’
In the circumstances, it was perhaps too much to expect that this journalist, 
along with many other Pakistanis, was going to have much sympathy for 
the Sharif  women’s troubles. Sharif ’s wife Kulsoom had been placed under 
house arrest at various points, but since the luxurious Sharif  residences had 
been the source of  much resentment among ordinary Pakistanis, there was a 
general sense of  satisfaction at having them confined to their golden cages. 
The journalist with the bullet scar in his leg surveyed the Sharif ’s bling-
studded Lahore residence with a proprietary air. ‘All of  this, paid for with 
our money!’
Kulsoom Nawaz seemed somehow out of  place amid all the glitz. She 
was dressed like a frumpy auntie, very un-Benazir—which may well have 
been the point. Her manner, too, was low-key and nervous. She clutched a 
rubber band in one hand, and as she spoke she began to twist it between her 
fingers in agitation. Her husband had stood firm against ‘certain forces’ who 
wanted Pakistan to become ‘like Spain’. I was momentarily disconcerted by 
an image of  Pakistani streets filled with tapas bars and flamenco dancers, 
before I realised that she meant a country that had once been governed by 
Muslims, from which Muslims had been entirely eliminated.
She detailed the various indignities inflicted upon her family—the 
discomforts of  prison, the unjust accusations, the way her son had been 
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roughed up in prison. The rubber band twisted faster and faster. (‘That 
elephant!’ snorted a journalist later, at the mention of  Sharif  junior. ‘Always 
speeding around the country in his father’s armour-plated jeep.’)
The Sharif  entourage—what was left of  it—first arranged for us to visit 
the hospital that the Sharifs had paid for opposite their country estate (or 
‘palace’ as most Pakistanis referred to it) outside Lahore. It was a lovely 
hospital—clean, shiny, fitted out with impressive-looking equipment—and 
almost entirely deserted. A young boy with his arm in a sling was the only 
patient in sight. Then it was over to the palace to meet Sharif ’s daughter. 
She was a stubborn woman, the Pakistani journalists had told me, who had 
insisted upon marrying her father’s aide-de-camp.
‘Was her father angry?’
The journalists giggled. ‘He was furious! They invited only 200 guests!’
But none of  those guests were apparently calling on Maryam Safdar 
anymore, as she sat alone with her children and the servants in the infamous 
family palace. ‘I do not trust anyone! Not anyone! None of  them can be 
trusted! And you’—she stabbed her finger in my direction—‘you must learn 
from my suffering! Never trust anyone!’
Except your family, of  course. Her father, she said, was ‘very close to 
God these days’—praying and seeing divine guidance. His faith was a great 
comfort to him in these difficult times. Her visits to him were difficult, the 
guards always keen to impose every humiliation, but their faith would see 
them through it all. And her mother was keeping the party running until he 
should return to them.
I asked whether she had ever considered going into politics herself, and 
she snapped ‘No! Not when I have seen what politics has done to my family. 
Unless’, her face brightened, ‘unless I could become prime minister. I would 
love that.’ Then her face fell again. ‘But I am Muslim. And it is against Islam 
for a woman to become prime minister.’ So there, Benazir.
The next day, the Urdu-language newspapers reported that the Sharifs 
had been visited by ‘a delegation of  Australian journalists’. I was impressed. 
Either my Pakistani colleagues had become honorary Australians, or I was 
worthy of  ‘delegation’ status all by myself. Even from a disgraced political 
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dynasty, it seemed like a compliment.
A few months later, the Sharifs were released into exile in Saudi Arabia. 
And now Musharraf  is gone, the Sharifs are back, and Nawaz Sharif  is 
sporting an improbably luxuriant regrowth of  hair and an equally improbable 
commitment to democracy and the independence of  the judiciary.
Yesterday, the shaky alliance between him and Bhutto’s widower Asif  Ali 
Zardari finally fell apart. Sharif  had insisted on the restoration of  the judges 
who were sacked last year by Musharraf, and who might have overturned the 
amnesty on corruption charges against Zardari.
Zardari and Sharif  had based their alliance on a commitment to return 
the judges to office, but Zardari apparently regarded this as a non-core 
promise, telling the BBC that the agreement with Sharif  ‘was not like the 
holy Qur’an’.
Sharif  will now position himself  as the opposition, the man of  principle 
who refused to sell out to Musharraf, to the United States and to the 
increasingly unpopular Zardari. And the cats and dogs seem to be hearing 
the call.
1 October 2008
AUSTRALIAN LITERARY REvIEW
SHAkIRA HUSSEIN
Prejudice beyond belief*
Review of  The Jihad Seminar by Hanifa Deen, Crawley, W.A.: University 
of  Western Australia Press, 2008; and Secularism, Religion and Multicultural 
Citizenship, edited by Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood, New York: 
First published in Australian Literary Review, 1 October 2008.
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Cambridge University Press, 2008.
After the carnage of  9/11, the bombings in London and Madrid, and 
the Bali bombings in which 88 Australians died, it is hardly surprising 
that conversations about the relationship between Islam and the West are 
dominated by the issue of  terrorism. However, alongside this fear of  physical 
destruction has grown a concern that Muslims do not only seek to shed 
Western blood—they seek to bring about a fundamental shift in Western 
cultural identity. According to many commentators, Muslims are laying 
siege to core Western values—secularism, equality of  the sexes, the Judeo-
Christian spiritual legacy and the intellectual legacy of  the Enlightenment. 
Free speech has become an issue of  particular concern in the wake of  events 
such as the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the murder 
of  Theo Van Gogh and the violent protests against the Danish cartoons. 
More recently, Random House cancelled the publication of  a historical 
novel narrated in the voice of  Muhammad’s youngest wife Ayesha, after 
receiving advice that the rather breathless description of  Ayesha’s wedding 
night might create security problems. (According to Sherry Jones, author of  
The Jewel of  Medina, the Prophet was fabulous in the sack. I don’t suppose it 
would have helped if  she had said that he was nothing out of  the ordinary.)
According to some commentators—Paul Sheehan and John Stone being 
two prominent Australian examples—the danger is due not only to the 
threat of  Muslim intimidation, but to the failure of  many within the West to 
adequately safeguard their own values. In their view, Muslims have deployed 
the rhetoric of  multiculturalism in order to manipulate Western social, 
political and legal institutions for their own ends. They have been abetted in 
this enterprise by the willingness of  Western multiculturalists to capitulate 
to Islamic demands because of  their lack of  certainty with regard to the 
values of  their ‘own’ culture. The confrontation with Islamic extremism has 
therefore generated debate over the governing norms of  Western societies, 
and whether they need to be either reassessed in the face of  social change or 
reasserted in the face of  external threat.
Two new books explore contemporary debates about religion and 
secularism, with particular focus on the ‘Muslim issue’. Hanifa Deen 
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describes herself  as being ‘as fascinated by religious people as only a 
secularist can be’. The Jihad Seminar draws upon her experience of  exploring 
Muslim communities in both Australia and overseas to tell the story of  a 
highly publicised court case between the Islamic Council of  Victoria and the 
Pentecostal Christian organisation, Catch the Fire Ministries.
Secularism, Religion, and Multicultural Citizenship originated in an international 
symposium held in Sydney in the immediate aftermath of  the 7/7 bombings 
in London. Edited by Geoffrey Brahm Levey from the University of  New 
South Wales and Tariq Modood from the University of  Bristol, the book 
provides a solid historical background on the issue of  secularism as well as 
discussing contemporary debates in which the issue of  Islam and Muslim 
communities features prominently. While Deen’s first-person narrative is very 
different in style to the academic essays in Levey and Modood’s anthology, 
both books offer thoughtful and reflective insights on issues that are too 
often discussed only in sound bites and alarmist headlines.
The Jihad Seminar is a lively and accessible account of  the first case to be 
heard under Victoria’s religious vilification legislation. The case centred on 
Catch the Fire’s ‘Insight into Islam’ seminar, an event that promised to ‘give 
you a tremendous insight into Islam and the future of  Australia’. Alerted 
to the seminar’s likely content, three Muslim converts attended and were 
horrified to hear Muslims described as liars who were waging a ‘silent jihad’ 
on Australia.
The resulting court case was presented by some media as a confrontation 
between Christianity and Islam, but the battlelines were not so clear-
cut. Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act was regarded by some 
Christians, including Catch the Fire Ministries, as a curb on religious freedom 
that sought to prevent them from preaching the fundamental basis of  their 
faith: that their religion held a monopoly on divine truth. However, other 
church groups regarded the legislation as offering protection to religious 
identity by curbing religious hate speech, and the expert witnesses for the 
Islamic Council of  Victorian included a Catholic priest and an Anglican 
academic.
Deen interviews the Muslim complainants and their witnesses as well as 
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the Christian pastor who had conducted the ‘jihad seminar’. Daniel Scot 
was a Pakistani-born Christian who had sought asylum in Australia after 
being threatened with imprisonment under Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy 
laws. In Scot’s view, the Australian court proceedings represented another 
Muslim attempt at religious persecution. He let it be known that he would 
go to prison rather than recant, although the judge made it clear early in the 
proceedings that regardless of  the outcome, imprisonment was not on the 
agenda.
At the heart of  the Catch the Fire case, and of  many other discussions 
of  religion in general and Islam in particular, is the question of  how to 
distinguish between believers and belief. Religious vilification legislation is 
not intended to act as a quasi-prohibition on blasphemy. Rather, it is intended 
to protect religious communities from hate speech. There is no prohibition 
on analysing, criticising or satirising Islam; problems only arise when speech 
crosses the line into vilifying believers as a collective.
The Catch the Fire ministers denied inciting hatred, claiming that they 
believed that one could ‘hate the sin, but not the sinner’. They did not hate 
Muslims—they loved them. They hated Islam, but that was a different 
matter.
However, the seminar presented by Daniel Scot did not simply preach 
against Muslims because of  their sins; it attributed certain sins to Muslims—
all Muslims—because they were Muslim. These sins were not simply 
theological lapses such as a failure to accept Christian doctrine; they were 
temporal sins with serious implications for the here-and-now of  Australian 
society, not just the hereafter.
Scot’s claim that Muslims were authorised to lie for the benefit of  their 
faith plays an important role here. This characterisation of  Muslims as 
inherently untrustworthy has become an increasingly prominent feature 
of  anti-Muslim rhetoric in recent years. Muslims are accused of  practising 
taqiyya, or dissimulation, in order to conceal their intentions from non-
Muslims. Taqiyya is a term used by Islamic theologians in discussing whether 
it is permissible to conceal one’s true beliefs in order to avoid harm. It has 
mostly arisen among Shia Muslims, during times when they faced oppression 
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from the Sunni majority. To practice taqiyya is to conceal one’s true beliefs 
in the interests of  self-preservation. While some Muslim thinkers believe 
that it is never permissible, others say that it is acceptable when necessary 
for survival.
However, anti-Muslim commentators such as John Stone have broadened 
the definition of  taqiyya by claiming that it allows Muslims to engage in deceit 
against the infidel in the interests of  a glorious Islamic victory. In particular, 
Muslims are supposed to misrepresent their beliefs to non-Muslims in order 
to make Islam appear more benign than it really is. ‘Moderate Muslims’ are 
therefore not to be trusted when they dissociate themselves from violent 
extremism, since taqiyya mandates them to make soothing noises to non-
Muslims while pursuing an entirely different agenda behind closed doors.
The claim that Muslims routinely misrepresent their true beliefs has the 
effect of  binding together all Muslims, from ruthless enforcers of  Taliban-
style doctrine at one end of  the spectrum to whisky-drinking nominal 
Muslims at the other. It allows individual Muslims to be regarded as the 
enemy, regardless of  anything they may have ever done or said or believed. 
Any apparently friendly word or action from a Muslim may safely be 
disregarded, since it is in all likelihood simply another strategy of  taqiyya. It 
is, of  course, a completely circular accusation—Muslims may deny practicing 
taqiyya, but that is simply another form of  taqiyya. Even as I write this, I 
anticipate the responses accusing me of  practising taqiyya in my discussion 
of  taqiyya—although when I was first accused of  exercising this supposedly 
central element of  my identity, I had to ask an (incidentally Catholic) Islamic 
studies professor to tell me what the hell it was.
This line of  thinking reaches its logical conclusion in the persistent 
rumours surrounding US presidential candidate Barack Obama. Obama’s 
father and stepfather were at least nominally Muslim, and he spent part of  
his childhood in Indonesia. He is now a churchgoing Christian, but these 
family links with Islam have generated allegations that he is ‘really’ a secret 
Muslim and his presidential bid is part of  a sinister Islamic plot. Googling 
‘Obama AND taqiyya’ brings up 34,000 hits, plus several thousand more 
once you add in other transliterations. This is an extreme example of  the 
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racialisation of  Muslims, but it is part of  a wider trend in which Muslims are 
not so much criticised for their beliefs, as much as they are assigned beliefs 
on the basis of  a sometimes very tenuous religious affiliation.
In bringing the case, the Islamic Council had placed itself  in a no-
win situation. While Catch the Fire Ministries was the initial loser in the 
courtroom, they came out way ahead in the court of  public opinion. Muslims 
were seen as using the legal system to suppress free speech and religious 
freedom. Unsurprisingly, when the verdict was overturned the parties agreed 
to an out-of-court settlement rather than prolong the acrimony and expense. 
Deen nonetheless sees hope in the fact that Muslims chose to pursue their 
grievances through a secular court system in a case that drew support from 
Christians, Jews and secularists.
Levey and Modood engage similar issues in a co-authored chapter on the 
Danish cartoon affair, which also includes a footnote on the Catch the Fire 
case. Both cases raise the issue of  whether criticism of  Islam and vilification 
of  Muslims are the same thing. Levey and Modood argue that they are two 
separate issues, and that the category of  ‘Muslim’ has been racialised. They 
draw an analogy with anti-Semitism, which began as religious persecution 
but which morphed into the biological racism that reached its lethal depths 
in the Holocaust. ‘The prejudice against [Jews] transmuted from a damning 
theological disputation to the blood in their veins, where what they believed 
or did or how they looked was immaterial.’ Similarly, Bosnian Muslims were 
‘ethnically cleansed’ because they were ‘ethnically’ Muslim, not because of  
their individual religious practice. On a less extreme scale, the Cronulla riots 
targeted anyone who looked visibly Muslim, on the basis of  their ethnicity 
as much as their dress, without regard to their actual beliefs.
Levey and Modood argue that the Danish cartoons have been viewed as 
problematic in three regards: the alleged breach of  the widely held Islamic 
taboo upon visual representation of  the Prophet, the negative depiction of  
Islam as a creed, and the negative stereotyping of  Muslims. They regard the 
first two as a necessary entitlement in a liberal democracy, while the third is a 
form of  racism that breaches the boundaries of  acceptable relations among 
citizens.
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S. Sayyid, too, argues that Muslim identity is not simply religious identity 
and that this blurs the boundaries between the secular and the religious sphere. 
Contemporary debates about secularism, he argues, are not about separating 
religion from politics but about affirming the dominance of  Western norms 
over a multilayered Muslim identity. Rajeev Bhargava, however, concludes 
his discussion of  Indian secularism with the claim that ‘[t]he later history 
of  secularism is more non-western than western’, and that in dealing with 
the religious diversity that now characterises their own societies, Western 
secularists could benefit from ceasing to regard secularism as exclusive to 
their own terrain.
These books emphasise that debates around secularism and religious 
identity do not simply take place across religious boundaries. Despite 
attempts to corral individuals according to their religious and/or secular 
identities, there is at least as much disagreement within categories as between 
them. Recognition of  that simple fact holds the best hope for the future.
2 October 2008
THE AGE
HILARY CHARLESWORTH
Is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
universal?*
10 December 2008 is the 60th anniversary of  the adoption of  the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) by the UN General Assembly. The 
vote was unanimous, but there were eight abstentions.
The significance of  the UDHR is profound. For the first time, a general 
Published as ‘We must resist attempts to dilute our human rights’, The Age, 2 October 2008.
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catalogue of  the rights of  individuals was made the explicit subject of  
international standards. The president of  the General Assembly at the time 
of  the Universal Declaration’s adoption, Australia’s ‘Doc’ Evatt, called the 
declaration a ‘step forward in a great evolutionary process’, predicting that 
‘millions of  people, men, women and children all over the world, would turn 
to it for help, guidance and inspiration’.
The UDHR is the umbrella for the modern international human rights 
system, comprising general and specific human rights treaties at both the 
international and regional level. All countries have ratified at least one of  the 
UN’s human rights treaties; indeed, 80 per cent of  UN members have ratified 
four or more. The UDHR is also the basis of  constitutional rights guarantees 
in 90 countries, although it is not yet fully implemented in Australia.
A 60th birthday is usually the moment to celebrate a life well lived, 
success in public and private life, and perhaps to anticipate a comfortable 
retirement. But these are not apt measures for the UDHR. It was and remains 
a controversial document. One controversy has dogged the UDHR since its 
adoption: can it claim universal application in a world marked by religious, 
cultural and civilisational differences?
The future of  the declaration involves balancing the power of  universal 
ideals with the inevitable specificity of  their translation in particular 
local contexts. But claims that human rights do not acknowledge cultural 
difference are overplayed and indeed are regularly used as a gambit to avoid 
human rights scrutiny by governments of  all shapes and sizes.
Although experts from many nations were involved in drafting the 
UDHR, some countries argued that the UDHR was a Western enterprise. 
For example, Saudi Arabia criticised the reference to the equality of  the 
rights of  men and women in relation to marriage and the right to change 
one’s religion in Article 18 as a form of  colonialism.
Recent debates at the United Nations show that the issue of  universality is 
still contested. Last year the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution, 
introduced by Pakistan, entitled ‘Combating defamation of  religions’. The 
resolution encourages states to prohibit criticism of  religion and focuses 
on Islam in particular. The religious defamation issue was framed as one of  
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Western rights against Islamic values.
The resolution conflicts with the protections of  freedom of  thought, 
belief, opinion and expression set out in the UDHR and later human rights 
treaties. It contains no criteria to determine when freedom of  speech crosses 
over into unacceptable religious defamation. While international human 
rights standards accept the possibility of  limitations on freedom of  opinion 
and expression, for example, to protect public order or public health, it is 
not clear why religions should be protected against criticism. Although it is 
clear that there has been inadequate attention given to understanding Islam 
in the West, the resolution proposes a crude solution. By implying that states 
have a duty to prevent criticisms of  and debates about religions, particularly 
Islam, the resolution seems more intent on protecting religious ideas rather 
than the rights of  individuals to religious freedom.
Attacks on the universality of  human rights are also common in the West, 
although they are not usually pitched in these terms. Western governments 
regularly find international human rights standards as irksome and 
confronting as non-Western governments.
The conduct of  the ‘war of  terror’ in particular has led Western 
governments to resist the universal application of  the UDHR. Indeed, 
across the globe the post-9/11 era has generated laws that attempt to reduce 
the threat of  terrorism. One local example is the 2005 amendments to 
the Commonwealth Criminal Code, enacted in the wake of  the London 
bombings. These amendments rest on a very broad definition of  terrorism 
and introduced preventative detention orders and control orders, and 
expanded the definition of  sedition.
The Australian laws raise serious human rights questions: both preventative 
detention and control orders are mechanisms that are inconsistent with the 
rule of  law and with human rights principles such as the right to a fair 
trial and the right not to be arbitrarily detained. The sedition provisions are 
inconsistent with international guarantees of  freedom of  speech.
As Conor Gearty argued in his 2006 Oxford Amnesty Lecture, the war 
against terrorism is built on a division of  the world into ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
camps. The idea of  human rights developed over the last 60 years is that 
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human rights attach to every person, regardless of  whether we label them 
good or bad. The new wave of  anti-terror laws undermine this development 
by establishing categories of  people who are unable to claim the full 
protection of  basic rights because they have been tarred with the word 
‘terrorist’.
So, we can see that the universality of  human rights remains controversial 
60 years after the adoption of  the UDHR. All types of  governments tend to 
stake out areas in which recourse to human rights standards is suspect.
In this sense, the UDHR remains a radical document. It is difficult to 
imagine that the economically drafted text of  the thirty articles of  the 
Universal Declaration could emerge from a twenty-first-century United 
Nations process. Today, the formulation of  the rights contained in the 
Universal Declaration would be much more qualified. They would be hedged 
by the language of  exception and special circumstances.
We should hold onto the ideal of  universality in the human rights area 
and resist attempts from all sides to water it down. Universal principles 
can accommodate pluralism and cultural diversity while embodying a 
commitment to a flourishing human life. The idea of  universal human rights 
is valuable also in that it makes us scrutinise opposing claims of  culture 
carefully. Whenever exceptions to human rights based on cultural difference 
are proposed, we should investigate the political agenda of  the culture 
claim.
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6 October 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
JOHN BRAITHWAITE
The risk shifting society*
What do family violence and the global financial crisis have in common? 
The research shows that among the worst things we can do about violence 
when it first occurs in a family is natter at the child.
A busy parent sees a son punch his sister. Instead of  dropping everything 
to confront the violence, parents continue on their way to the kitchen, 
nattering at the boy ‘stop hitting your sister’. By failing to make it clear why 
this is behaviour that is never allowed to stand, failing even to check that the 
violence ceases, family violence escalates.
Similarly with a child caught at petty theft. Police may do nothing, 
handing the matter to the parents. Parents are good at blaming police 
and schools when the petty crime of  their children grows into something 
serious. Divorced parents can be particularly good at blaming each other. In 
fact, everyone involved in the lives of  children is good at shifting blame to 
others.
One day the boy lands a lucky punch and breaks a jaw, or worse. He feels 
a victim of  arbitrary justice when put in a cell. He has behaved worse in the 
past, seen his friends behave more violently and get away with it. Why me? 
Just bad luck the jaw broke.
We don’t need to punish children when they fail to respect the persons 
and property of  others. We just need to confront it. Punishment is only 
necessary when they refuse to pay attention.
The US mortgage crisis has occurred because the Bush administration and 
banks had a problem that they chose to natter about rather than confront. 
Now Wall Street and Washington natter blame at each other for the fiasco.
Published as ‘Shifting the blame has become the bankers’ game’, Canberra Times, 6 October 
2008.
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The problem started at a very micro level. Mrs Smith and Mr Jones were 
given bigger loans for bigger homes than they could afford. Some were ‘liar 
loans’ where the bank encouraged them to inflate their income so the loan 
could be sold.
The bank blames Mrs Smith for her destitution caused by this minor 
fraud. The bank did not feel responsible to confront this risk. It simply 
decided not to shoulder it. Banks believed financial engineering would shift 
the risks to others.
Mrs Smith’s default risk would be bundled with thousands of  other loans. 
Then that bundle of  loans would be divided into securities for sale. The 
bank shifted the risk to other banks who bought shares of  the loans.
Everyone in the system believed they were using clever financial 
engineering to shift and spread their risks. With none of  them owning and 
confronting the risk of  bad loans, the number of  bad loans in the system 
grew and grew to the point where a crisis was waiting to happen as soon as 
markets fell.
The primary purpose of  derivatives in contemporary capitalism is to 
allow financial institutions to get around regulatory responsibilities. That is 
an institutional problem America must confront.
If  we write a home loan to Mrs Smith, we have a responsibility to ensure it 
is a loan she can afford when times get tough. That is a banker’s responsibility 
to Mrs Smith and to the solvency of  our society.
If  we marry Mrs Smith, we have a responsibility to confront violence and 
theft by the children of  the marriage. This is a responsibility we owe to the 
child and to the safety of  our society.
If  we leave Mrs Smith for a younger woman and in the process neglect the 
needs of  those children, we shift responsibilities to Mrs Smith that are not 
hers alone. If  the banker shifts Mrs Smith’s loan risk to other banks, leaving 
the family homeless, that is not solely the responsibility of  Mrs Smith.
At root, at the micro level, the same virtue has collapsed. This is the virtue 
of  owning a responsibility to confront a risk rather than shift it. At a macro 
level, our institutions encourage us to be risk shifters.
We can remedy that with our crime control institutions by expecting 
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parents, police, teachers to sit in a restorative justice circle with victims and 
offenders when theft and violence occur. A restorative justice circle is about 
the virtue of  active responsibility, all stakeholders in the child’s life actively 
taking responsibility for putting things right and healing harm.
We can remedy insolvency with regulatory institutions that require those 
who sign reckless contracts to be ethically responsible for them. Financial 
engineering that subverts decent regulation, that allows escape from the 
consequences of  commercial immorality must be confronted. Nattering 
about it, shifting risk to taxpayers, will not do.
Aggressive use of  negative licensing laws that exist in Australia and New 
Zealand for regulating finance brokers and insolvency practitioners is one 
remedy. The idea is not to require a bank officer to have a licence before 
they can issue a loan or manage a bank. That’s a positive licence. A negative 
licence means the regulator can issue an order that the individual banker be 
banned from working in the finance industry.
Countless thousands of  people will lose their jobs in US banks soon. 
It would be just if  a few thousand of  these innocent employees were able 
to take the jobs of  morally culpable bank executives who were negatively 
licensed out of  the sector. Then the future use of  negative licensing would 
be a credible threat to get bankers to take notice of  their responsibilities. Of  
course, this is not enough. More systemic regulatory changes are needed. 
Threatening the future incumbency of  strategic executives is one way of  
levering cooperation with systemic change.
The United States is a rich society because it is clever financially compared 
to us in Australia. But it is also a country with more insolvency and more 
crime than any rich nation because it has become a society that shifts its risks. 
On the one hand, bailouts may restore some confidence. But if  they fail to 
follow up with new rules of  the game that demand ethical responsibility for 
loans, the bailouts will further worsen moral hazard.
Divorce and derivatives are necessary devices for easing out of  contracts. 
But they are corrosive of  responsibility if  unregulated by a moral code.
Many Australians are attracted to the freedom American institutions allow, 
especially to the rich, to shift away from risk, to shelter from tax and from 
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the crime of  poor communities. Now seems a good time for Australians to 
think seriously about the virtue of  owning risks that are properly ours. And 
the general virtue of  regulatory, family and justice institutions that require 
this.
Food and  
Wellbeing
6 December 2007
THE NEW YORk REvIEW OF BOOkS
dAI QING
Thirsty dragon at the Olympics*
The picture on this page† was taken by a People’s Pictorial photographer in 
1953. The sixty-year-old Mao Zedong had just finished writing a calligraphic 
inscription that read ‘Celebrate the successful completion of  the Guanting 
Reservoir Project’. The man sitting next to him was my father-in-law, Wang 
Sen, the project manager for the dam.
The photograph was probably published in some newspaper or other 
around that time. Even if  I’d seen it, I wouldn’t have paid any attention to 
it. I certainly never imagined that fifteen years later I’d marry the project 
manager’s son, Wang Dejia, thereby becoming the daughter-in-law of  a man 
once shown relaxing on the bank of  the dam, chatting and laughing with the 
‘Great Leader’.
The first time I saw this photograph was in 1968, during the Cultural 
Translated by Geremie R. Barmé. First published in The New York Review of  Books, vol. 54, 
no. 19 (6 December, 2007).
†  Available at http://www.nybooks.com/images/tables/2007120608img1.jpg.
70 Capturing the Year — 2008
Revolution. I found it at the bottom of  a pile of  discarded documents 
beneath some quilts. At that time most people would treasure a picture taken 
with Mao as if  it were a family heirloom, a talismanic charm, something to 
be carefully framed and hung in a prominent place at home. They prized 
such things even though in the picture they themselves might only have a 
head the size of  a pea.
I shouted out with surprise: ‘When was this picture of  you with Chairman 
Mao taken?’ My father-in-law was sitting holding his favourite deck of  
cards—they were so worn that only he could tell them apart. He looked up 
but said nothing. My husband, Dejia, didn’t say a word either. It was obvious 
that neither of  them wanted to see the thing brought out for display. Only 
many years later did Dejia tell me that his father—a man who had overseen 
the building of  a number of  major dams and who ‘struggled throughout 
his life for the Party’s cause’—once whispered to him, ‘Build a dam, bleed 
a river dry.’ By then it was the late 1980s and I myself  was involved with an 
environmental group opposed to the Three Gorges Dam being planned 
for the Yangtze River. My environmental group was investigating what had 
happened to the earlier Sanmen Gorge Dam Project on the Yellow River, 
and we had publicly started lobbying to protect China’s rivers and water 
sources.
I didn’t ask Dejia when his father had made the remark. Even if  it wasn’t as 
early as 1968, the year I discovered that old photograph, he must have been 
thinking along those lines by then. China had been through the calamitous 
famine created by the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s. One of  the slogans 
of  the Great Leap had encouraged people everywhere to ‘put maximum 
effort into building hydrology projects’. As a result, cadres—or officials—in 
the People’s Communes had ordered the construction of  countless small 
dams. The wild enthusiasm of  the ‘Great Leap into communism’ passed, 
leaving disaster, agricultural dislocation, and mass starvation in its wake. 
Unstable embankments and leaking dams littered the countryside.
By the late 1960s, the Ministry of  Hydrology in which my father-in-
law had worked was preoccupied with the overwhelming task of  trying to 
deal with the ongoing ecological disaster created by the Great Leap. Even 
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my father-in-law’s hometown in Jixian County, Hebei province, had been 
devastated. His village had been submerged when they dammed the Jizhou 
River to create the Yuqiao Reservoir, less than one hundred kilometres from 
the Guanting Reservoir. The inhabitants of  141 villages had been resettled 
during the building of  that project. There probably wouldn’t have been any 
complaints if  the dam had really benefited local farmers.
But as was the case with so many grandiose dam-building projects, 
the local cadres behind the Yuqiao Reservoir had failed to ascertain the 
geological makeup of  the area. The two-kilometre-long dam was built 
on sandy soil. Within a few years water was seeping out to create a vast 
marshland downstream. The result was the destruction of  50,000 acres of  
land that had provided food for the population of  nearly one million people 
in the six major counties downstream. What was left, so Dejia told me, 
was a bumpy moonscape that could no longer support agriculture of  any 
consequence. The farmers had long since been forced to leave their homes, 
but they snuck back to their ruined towns and eked out a living, harvesting 
only a fraction of  the food they used to produce. To this day those villagers 
are still on state welfare.
Meanwhile, the authorities in Beijing are preparing for the competitors 
and visitors who will descend on the Chinese capital next August for the 
2008 Olympics. Unprecedented efforts have gone into transforming the 
city. Of  course, international audiences will mostly be concerned with who 
jumps the highest or runs the fastest. But Beijing, the capital of  a ‘rapidly 
rising’ China, is anxious to show off  its architectural magnificence: the grand 
Olympic Stadium (the ‘Nest’), the ‘Water Cube’ built for swimming events, 
all the new luxury hotels, the Rem Koolhaas-designed China Central TV 
building, and the multilane ring roads around the city.
While the farmers living on the outskirts of  greater Beijing are given 
strictly controlled allocations of  water, in central Beijing the people in 
charge are celebrating the construction of  the ultimate ‘water follies’ which 
will be ready in time for the Olympic year. These include the vast lake that 
will surround the titanium, egg-shaped National Grand Theatre next to the 
Great Hall of  the People, just off  Tiananmen Square, as well as the largest 
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fountain in the world at the Shunyi ‘Water Heaven’—one that can shoot 134 
metres high. The Shunyi water park has been built on the dried-out remains 
of  the Chaobai River—no irony intended. And then there are the hundred 
golf  courses that have been laid out in greater Beijing. These infamous 
‘water guzzlers’ occupy over 20,000 acres of  land and their imported turf  
has become a serious drain on the city’s dwindling water resources.
Perhaps if  this spectacle had been held three hundred years ago, or even 
a hundred years ago, the environment of  Beijing might have been able to 
sustain it. After all, the city is surrounded by mountains on three sides, has 
five major water sources, and once had numerous lakes and marshes with 
underground springs constantly welling up and disgorging crystal-clear 
water. It was a rich and fertile place, and was home to five imperial capitals. 
But today Beijing is entirely different. Its reservoirs are 90 per cent dry, and 
all of  its rivers flow at historically low levels. The aquifer under Beijing has 
been drastically lowered by long-term overuse.
Is all of  this just because of  climate change? Certainly the city has been 
afflicted by drought for the past eight years, but the problems are more 
fundamental. Since 1949, the Beijing metropolitan area has experienced an 
eightfold population increase (growing from 2.2 million in 1948 to 18 million 
today). The city itself  covers a geographic area that is fifty times larger, and 
uses thirty-five times as much water. Even the consumption of  whisky has 
increased one hundredfold in recent years. And what of  the city’s water, that 
precious commodity without which no one—young or old, rich or poor—can 
survive? On average, Beijing people have only three hundred cubic metres 
of  water resources per capita, one-eighth of  the Chinese average—which is 
2,200 cubic metres—and one-thirtieth of  the world average.
But during the Olympic Games, Beijing will enjoy an unprecedented 
supply of  water. Special pipes will bring unpolluted water from the provinces 
to provide for the whole city, allowing people to enjoy potable water 
from their taps for the first time—but only for as long as the games last. 
Meanwhile, when the crowds watch and applaud the Olympic performances 
at the aquatic events, neither they nor the athletes will be aware that they 
are not really competing on the waters of  Beijing’s original Chaobai River. 
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The ‘river’ they will be using is an artificial creation made by damming the 
two ends of  a long-dry riverbed and filling it with water pumped from deep 
underground.
After the Olympics, what then? The quest of  Mao Zedong and his fellow 
Communist leaders to conquer nature led to the widespread razing of  
forests, the destruction of  grasslands, the conversion of  wetlands to farms 
and the incessant damming of  rivers. The heedless and unaccountable use 
of  natural resources in more recent decades has led poor Beijing to the 
desperate state it is in today. My father-in-law’s warning was prescient: the 
Guanting Reservoir for which Mao wrote his inscription in 1953 was China’s 
first large reservoir, storing four billion cubic metres. For four decades it was 
Beijing’s main source of  drinking water. Today it is three-quarters empty 
and has not supplied Beijing with water for ten years. The Miyun Reservoir, 
Beijing’s other lifeline on the Chaobai River, today operates at a tenth of  
its original capacity, supplying Beijing with only a tenth of  its current water 
needs.
To make up for the dramatic water shortage, Beijing for the moment 
‘mines’ 80 per cent of  its water supply from its underground aquifer. But it 
is doing so at a rate faster than the aquifer can be replenished, causing the 
water table beneath the capital to drop precipitously and the land to subside 
in a two thousand square kilometre ‘funnel’. The balance of  the city’s water 
is being piped in from increasingly resentful neighbouring provinces, such 
as Hebei and Shanxi. How will the city’s insatiable thirst be satisfied in the 
future?
China’s new rich and the financial capital controlled by the party-state 
bureaucracy are expanding into the world market at an alarming rate. While 
they have created previously unknown wealth, it is a wealth made possible 
by the avaricious consumption of  natural resources. Today, some people of  
conscience have begun to speak out about what is happening and the dangers 
ahead. But these voices of  concern and protest among China’s citizens are 
rarely heard, and are weak at best. Although I am still based in Beijing, my 
own writings have been banned in China for many years.
The writer Lu Xun, who died in 1936, likened China to an iron room. He 
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described a terrifying situation:
Suppose there were an iron room with no windows or doors, a room it would be 
virtually impossible to break out of. And suppose you had some people inside 
that room who were sound asleep. Before long they would all suffocate. In other 
words, they would slip peacefully from a deep slumber into oblivion, spared 
the anguish of  being conscious of  their impending doom. Now let’s say that 
you came along and stirred up a big racket that awakened some of  the lighter 
sleepers. In that case, they would go to a certain death fully conscious of  what 
was going to happen to them. Would you say that you had done those people 
a favour?*
Lu Xun called the China of  the past ‘voiceless China’. But China is now 
part of  the global community, and we all face the decision about what we 
should do about our shared iron room. Moreover, there is another, more 
fragile China that truly has no voice: the natural environment. The fertile 
plains, the mineral wealth of  the nation, the mighty forests and the vast 
waterways—they are silently dying. This is the silence of  China today. It is a 
silence that speaks of  the grave.
The second-century-BCE Confucian philosopher Xunzi said, ‘The people 
are the water [in a river], the ruler a boat. The water can keep the boat 
afloat, the water can also capsize it.’ His metaphor described the relationship 
between the ruler and the will of  the ruled. It took for granted the presence 
and the abundance of  water. But if  the actual water has been polluted and 
the rivers bled dry, a new metaphor is needed, one that will reflect China’s 
looming environmental catastrophe.
* Lu Xun, Diary of  a Madman and Other Stories, translated by William A. Lyell (Honolulu:  
University of  Hawai‘i Press, 1990), p. 27. 
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4 March 2008
THE NATIONAL
BRYANT ALLEN
Poor people are not lazy people*
Recent letters to The National have asserted that in Papua New Guinea, 
because everyone has access to land back in their villages, as long as they are 
prepared to work hard, there is no reason for anyone to be hungry or poor. 
Therefore, people who are in ‘poverty’ have only themselves to blame. They 
are ‘lazy’.
Leaving aside the likelihood that not everyone in PNG has access to land 
(for example, unmarried youths, women, migrants), there is a great deal of  
evidence that there are significant numbers of  poor people in PNG.
They live in remote locations that are mountainous, with high rainfall, 
high levels of  cloud cover and poor soils, or are on flood plains that are 
inundated regularly, or are on small islands.
They have limited or no access to basic services, including health and 
education services, and, importantly, to markets where they can sell 
agricultural produce in exchange for cash.
They also have poor access to information and knowledge about important 
matters like health care, nutrition and political developments. They cannot 
afford to buy imported foods to supplement their traditional diets that are 
low in protein and oils. They are often poorly represented politically and are 
‘invisible’ from the main centres of  the country.
The 1996 Papua New Guinea Household Survey, the first nationwide 
survey of  consumption and living standards in PNG, was similar to surveys 
used to identify poverty in many other countries in the world. There is not 
the space here to describe the technical details of  this survey, but it estimated 
that 34 per cent of  rural people and 11 per cent of  urban people lived 
Published as ‘Poor people are not lazy people’, The National (Papua New Guinea), 4 March 
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in households in which the value of  the food eaten and the services used 
(such as health and education) was significantly below what was considered 
acceptable by PNG standards.
The places where these poor people live have been previously unidentified 
in the 1970s and 1980s, by researchers in what is now the National Research 
Institute, as ‘underdeveloped areas’. They are located in the western parts 
of  PNG along the Indonesian border (for example, Telefomin), at high 
altitudes (for example, Lagaiap), along both sides of  the Highlands (for 
example, Bosavi, Kaintiba or Bundi), down the length of  the main mountain 
range (for example, Tapini), on the Saruwaget and Finnisterre mountains 
(for example, Finschhafen), in inland New Britain (for example, Pomio) 
and on many small offshore islands. These areas are commonly high and 
mountainous, cold and wet, steep and subject to erosion, are flooded annually 
(for example, Middle Ramu) or are on small islands. Most are isolated from 
roads and urban centres. The 1982–83 National Nutrition Survey found 
that, in many cases, these are also areas of  high child malnutrition.
The argument that all it takes to live a ‘good life’ in PNG is a bit of  land 
and some hard work is questionable. Nutritionists tell us that it is likely that 
before colonisation, subsistence diets in these same poor places in PNG 
were inadequate, leading to high rates of  disease and high death rates. This 
is a fairly convincing argument as to why, for example, the Highlands valleys 
were heavily populated, while the Highlands fringes were not.
Whether this is true or not, after PNG was colonised, the present day poor 
places did not attract investment in the form of  infrastructure, plantations 
or village cash-cropping. Where village cash-cropping provided cash 
incomes, people were able to supplement their precolonial diets, which were 
exceptionally low in protein and fats with purchased, imported food that are 
high in protein, fats and oils. This has led to improved human nutrition and 
to lower infant and child mortality and higher population growth rates in 
many parts of  PNG. But today’s poor areas were left behind, while the more 
favoured areas became ‘developed’.
Colonial administrators, planters and missionaries were drawn towards 
the higher potential land, with its higher population densities and easier 
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access and it was here that ‘development’ occurred, in the form of  towns, 
roads, wharves and plantation agriculture.
Villagers were able to take advantage of  these developments and rapidly 
adopted cash-cropping. These are now the districts with relatively high 
personal cash incomes from cash-cropping and the sale of  fresh food. They 
also have the best access to education and health services.
Those who live in underdeveloped areas are not just sitting down and 
waiting for help to come to them. They are moving to towns and to the 
countryside around towns or along the main roads. These poor people 
move, even though life can be very tough for them in their destinations, 
where they do not have access to land, they have very low incomes (the price 
of  imported foods like rice has increased by four or five times over the last 
10 years) and they and their children are branded as raskols. Nevertheless, 
many of  them say they are better off  in their destinations than in their home 
areas, where there is no chance of  their children being educated or for them 
to receive medical treatment should they become sick.
The eradication of  poverty in PNG will not be easy or simple, because 
the places where poor people live are very difficult to develop, and because 
there is increasing prejudice against poor migrants: even though most well-
educated, employed people or their parents have migrated from a rural area 
somewhere in PNG sometime in the past.
Nor will the situation of  poor people be helped by calling them ‘lazy’ and 
blaming them for the predicament they find themselves in.
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29 July 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
JAMES J. FOx
From fuel to food subsidies in Indonesia*
The price of  rice, even more than the price of  fuel, is the key political 
barometer in Indonesia. As the country’s primary staple, rice is eaten twice, 
often three, times a day. Any significant increase in the rice price in the 
coming election year can have major consequences for political incumbents, 
both nationally and locally.
Intermittent, soaking rains in June and through much of  July should ensure 
a bumper rice crop for Indonesia this year. In the high production areas of  
Java, the first season’s crop has now been harvested and the prospects for 
the second crop, especially in West Java, look promising.
Indonesia’s Central Statistics Agency has forecast a rice harvest of  58.2 
million tons. If  this optimistic forecast were achieved, it would be a 2 per cent 
increase on last year’s harvest. How this production increase will translate 
into food for the poor is critical, especially following the government’s 28.7 
per cent reduction, in May of  this year, of  its subsidy for fuel.
Under President Suharto, the National Logistics Agency (BULOG) had 
monopolistic powers on food imports. Its central task, however, was to 
stabilise rice prices. In the first half  of  each year as the harvest came in, 
it would acquire a large stock of  rice, thus maintaining a floor price for 
farmers selling their crop. With this stock, it could later intervene in the 
market to ensure acceptable rice prices for consumers. It built a network of  
warehouses throughout the country and could ship rice from the productive 
areas on Java to other parts of  the country.
BULOG has now been stripped of  its monopoly powers but in the process 
it has been given a new role in providing rice for the poor. Its principal 
Published as ‘Top Java crop, but rice cost alarms’, Canberra Times, 29 July 2008.
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task is still price stabilisation but it does this primarily by purchasing and 
distributing rice as food security for the poor.
This year’s ambitious purchasing target is 3.8 million tons. A good harvest 
should make this target achievable. Rice imports will be at a minimum 
since BULOG has already purchased half  its target within Indonesia and is 
confident of  obtaining the rest of  its needs for this year locally.
The Central Statistics Agency conducts regular surveys to identify 
Indonesia’s poor. It has currently identified 19.1 million households living 
in poverty. Under Indonesia’s ‘Rice for the Poor Program’ (RASKIN), 
these households are entitled to purchase a ration of  rice—ten to fifteen 
kilograms—per month at approximately one-fourth of  the current market 
price. BULOG’s distribution network now functions to move rice throughout 
the islands to the districts where it is then made available locally.
Since community consultation is a factor in determining who obtains 
this cheaper rice, local distribution has varied greatly from district to 
district. Despite national guidelines, there is no longer any uniformity 
of  implementation among the patchwork of  hundreds of  districts that 
now constitute Indonesia’s system of  decentralised government. Despite 
numerous irregularities at the village and district level, the ‘Rice for the Poor 
Program’ has been a success in providing, for the first time in Indonesia’s 
history, a basic national safety net for the poorest members of  society.
The program was begun as a ‘Special Operation’ in 1998 and has continued 
to evolve since then. A new poverty survey is about to be conducted and 
it is expected that the number of  identified poor will increase. The net will 
certainly continue to widen. Five provinces are experimenting with a village 
kiosk system for local allocations.
Although rice may be available for the poor, it has been recognised that 
they may not have the purchasing power to buy it. Hence after the fuel 
price increases in May, the government has begun providing a monthly cash 
payment of  Rp.100,000—roughly A$11.50—to the same families for whom 
the cheap rice is available. As it slowly and painfully weans itself  from its 
general subsidy of  fuel, Indonesia has in effect instituted the beginnings of  
a welfare system.
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Huge problems remain. For many, rice prices, even for the cheapest rice, 
are felt to be too high. The chief  cause of  these rising prices is the increased 
cost of  fertiliser. Although Indonesia is a major producer of  nitrogen 
fertiliser, the cost of  the natural gas used to produce it has increased and 
thus there has been a steady rise in the price of  urea. As a consequence, for 
reasons of  food security, Indonesia must maintain a subsidy on fertiliser.
Indonesia’s continuing reduction of  its massive fuel subsidy has meant 
a restructuring of  other subsidies. In an election year, keeping these 
subsidies in place and setting their strategic levels will be a major concern of  
government policy.
8 August 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
RAGHBENdRA JHA
Investors punish the poor*
The global spike in food prices started late in 2007 and shows no signs 
of  abating. The price of  rice, the single most important cereal consumed 
in the Asia Pacific region, was rising steadily but incrementally until late 
2007 by which time it was roughly double the levels of  2002. However, 
there was a huge spike in the price of  rice in late 2007 to early 2008. The 
monthly average price for white rice (Thai 100 per cent B second grade), for 
example, went up from US$385/ton in January 2008 to a peak of  US$962.60 
in May 2008 before falling marginally to US$836.50 in July 2008. The annual 
average price for this brand of  rice climbed from US$196.89/ton in 2002 to 
US$334.45/ton in 2007 but jumped to US$696.54 in 2008. Prices of  other 
First published in The Australian, 8 August 2008.
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food grains have also experienced similar, if  less spectacular, spikes.
A number of  explanations have been offered for this price rise including 
the use of  grain for biofuels, the increasing consumption of  meat in fast-
growing economies, stagnating agricultural productivity and investment, the 
weak dollar and so on. However, two important caveats are in order. First, 
while these factors can explain the tendency of  food prices to rise they 
cannot explain the magnitude and the timing of  the spike. Second, while all 
these explanatory factors have been known to be around for a while, none 
of  the many econometric models that are used to predict food prices was 
able to predict this spike.
In this article I want to advance an explanation for this spike in food-
grain prices. Prior to August 2007 most major stock markets looked healthy 
and growth prospects appeared sanguine. Then financial markets were hit by 
the subprime mortgage crisis in the US. Like other financial crises in the past 
this spread like a contagion to financial markets in other countries and to the 
real sector. The ensuing credit crunch now threatens major economies with 
a severe slowdown, if  not outright recession.
In the wake of  this downturn in stock markets, funds started to move 
out of  stock markets, further fuelling stock-market downturns. These funds 
looked for an avenue for investment. Opportunities appeared in the areas 
of  food and petroleum products, both of  which are inelastically demanded. 
Everyone has to have transport and food. As a consequence there was huge 
investment in futures markets for food (a portfolio wealth effect) and prices 
in futures markets for food grains went up sharply. One report from IBT 
Commodities and Futures estimated that July 2008 futures price for rice 
went up by a whopping 71 per cent between early December 2007 and the 
third week of  April 2008. Margins went up more substantially. Of  course, 
there are strong speculative elements in this price rise but the impact of  
the influx of  funds from financial markets is strong. The UN’s Food and 
Agriculture Organisation estimates that with financial products becoming 
ever more sophisticated investors have started using agricultural markets 
either for speculative reasons or to seek portfolio diversification. Global 
trading activity in futures and options in agricultural derivatives markets 
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has been experiencing very high rates of  increase since February 2005. 
These have only accelerated since the subprime mortgage crisis hit financial 
markets.
The rise in futures prices of  food grains has pulled up spot prices, since 
spot prices are sensitive to futures price movements. This then caused the 
spike in food prices that we have been witnessing since late 2007/early 2008. 
Thus the credit and food price crises are linked and have to be understood 
as such.
In hindsight this conclusion should not surprise us. In the wake of  the 
sharp fall in stock markets beginning in the third quarter of  2001 (which 
followed the collapse of  the dot-com bubble and the terrorist attacks in 
the US) vast amounts of  funds moved from stock markets into housing 
markets and led to sharp rises in house prices. This time around, however, 
the problem (the subprime mortgage crisis) began with the housing sector 
and thus alternative destinations for funds had to be found. Food markets 
presented a relatively safe home.
11 August 2008
SYdNEY MORNING HERALd
GEREMIE R. BARMé
Painting over Mao*
The ancient city of  Beijing was literally turned on its head to help achieve 
the effects of  the Olympic opening ceremony on Friday night [8 August 
2008].
Six hundred years ago, the city was designed around a north–south axis 
Published as ‘Olympics come to life as a painting by Beijing and the world’s athletes’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 August 2008.
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that runs from the south of  the old city through the Forbidden City and on 
north. Along this axis, the spectacles of  imperial times would unfold. Since 
the 1910s, Chang’an Avenue, now a multilaned highway that runs east–west 
through the heart of  Beijing, became the focus for military parades. From 
the 1950s, mass rallies organised by China’s ruling Communist Party have 
paraded along the avenue past Tiananmen.
As part of  the makeover of  the city in the past decade, the long-disused 
north–south imperial axis has been revived with new parks, a long shopping 
mall and even a rebuilt city gate in the south. On Friday night, a line of  
fireworks exploded in the air along this axis describing a path to the National 
Stadium as a prelude to the opening ceremony.
Far in advance, the ceremony designers created a digital mock-up of  the 
fireworks so Chinese and international TV viewers could see an idealised 
version of  Beijing’s central axis editing out the pollution haze that generally 
covers the city despite years of  effort and billions of  dollars. The show that 
followed was also one of  canny artifice, stunning design and digital wizardry. 
Zhang Yimou, the renowned filmmaker and director of  the show, used a 
quotation from Mao Zedong to describe the thinking behind the opening: 
‘Using the past to serve the present and the foreign to serve China.’
Most observers noted that Mao Zedong, the party chairman who founded 
the People’s Republic in 1949 and led the country until his death in 1976 
(launching the disastrous Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the 
decade of  disruption of  the Cultural Revolution from 1966) was entirely 
absent from this paean to China’s past civilisation. In reality, the Great 
Helmsman does get a look-in, if  only obliquely.
On the unfurled paper scroll that featured early in the show, dancers 
traced out a painting of  mountains and a river, to which is added a sun. It is 
an image that evokes the painting-mural that forms a backdrop to the statue 
of  the chairman in the Mao Memorial Hall in the centre of  Beijing. That 
picture is, in turn, inspired by a line from Mao’s most famous poem ‘Snow’ 
(1936) that reads: ‘How splendid the rivers and mountains of  China.’ The 
poem lists the prominent rulers of  dynastic China and ends by commenting 
on how all these great men fade in comparison to the true heroes of  the 
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modern world: the people. The poem is generally interpreted as being about 
Mao himself, the hero of  the age.
In their opening ceremony design, what Zhang Yimou and his colleagues 
achieve (among many, sometimes too many, other things) is a rethinking of  
this reference. Eventually, the painting is coloured in by children with brushes 
and the sun becomes a jaunty ‘smiley face’. In the remaining blank space of  
this landscape, the athletes of  the world track the Olympic colours as they 
take up their positions following their march. Thus, a Chinese landscape, 
with its coded political references, is transformed into something that is 
suffused with a new and embracing meaning by the global community. It 
offers a positive message for the future of  China’s engagement with the 
world, not only to international audiences, but perhaps also to China’s own 
leaders, who sat stony-faced through the extravaganza.
But after the spectacular highlights of  traditional China, powerful images 
jostle, appear momentarily and are crowded out as one mass scene after 
another presses in, or some vignette comes and goes in fleeting glitz. The 
Chinese voice-over speaks repeatedly about traditional aesthetics and the 
language of  understatement and elegance, but as the show goes on, a certain 
failure of  artistic coherence becomes increasingly obvious.
One Chinese web blogger commented immediately after the ceremony: 
‘We’ve been waiting for this banquet for a long time. Instead what we got 
was hotpot in which all the flavours have ended up confused.’
People will debate the contents and significance of  the visual banquet 
for some time. What does remain, however, is a Chinese painting which the 
whole world, through its athletes, has helped co-create.
Environment
23 October 2007
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REvIEW
JEFF BENNETT
Beware a carbon theory of value*
In the nineteenth century, Karl Marx argued that the value of  goods and 
services was generated by the input of  labour. A key outcome of  Marx’s 
thinking was the formation of  political systems that placed paramount 
importance on the position of  the worker in society and the neglect of  
capital inputs into production, notably through restrictions on the private 
ownership of  property.
Over the course of  the last decades of  the twentieth century, the 
fundamental flaw in Marx’s theory became increasingly apparent. Without 
due recognition of  and rewards for the roles of  all inputs of  scarce resources 
in the production of  goods and services, wealth creation through economic 
activity will be curtailed.
As we venture into the twenty-first century, there is a real danger of  
Published as ‘Carbon isn’t a black and white option’, Australian Financial Review, 23 October 
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falling into the trap again of  giving trump status to one aspect of  resource 
use. This time, the focus has shifted away from labour to the production, 
consumption and wealth creation process. Now attention is being devoted 
to a particular output of  the process: carbon.
Marxist regimes developed policy on the basis of  labour as the primary 
source of  value. Policy in many western democracies, including Australia, has 
begun to be driven by the goal of  avoiding carbon as an output. Incentives 
are provided for power to be generated from windmills and solar panels. 
Penalties or even bans are applied to goods deemed to have a heavy ‘carbon 
footprint’ such as incandescent light bulbs and plasma screens.
Furthermore, options are being favoured that reduce the carbon outputs 
arising from their ‘operation’ without recognising the carbon outputs 
generated from their ‘manufacture’. Solar panels and ‘hybrid’ cars are 
examples.
The impact of  this ‘carbon theory of  value’ is that due recognition is 
not given in policy formation to the relative scarcity of  all resources at all 
times. The carbon concentration in the atmosphere is given trump status 
and so resources are being diverted to uses that are more costly than their 
less carbon friendly options.
The higher cost involved simply reflects greater relative resource scarcity. 
The carbon friendly alternatives are imposing greater pressure on other 
scarce resources. The higher cost of  hybrid cars is an example. So too are the 
cost premiums associated with wind and solar power generation. The result 
of  the carbon focus could well be an inappropriate drive to the exploitation 
of  other, relatively scarcer, resources.
A justification for favouring carbon friendly options may be that the costs 
imposed by carbon emissions are not embedded in the prices of  goods and 
services. But again this is a carbon biased view. Even carbon friendly options 
can have environment consequences that are not reflected by their prices. 
For example, the impacts of  wind generators on the aesthetics of  a district 
and the outcomes of  lead battery disposal are outside the market realm. Put 
simply, it is not only carbon emissions that may have negative environmental 
consequences. Favouring carbon friendly goods may simply tilt the balance 
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against other environmental assets.
Economic history has demonstrated the fallacy of  single issue approach 
to policy. These lessons need to be heeded if  we are to avoid falling into the 
trap with carbon-driven policy.
October 2007
APEC ECONOMIES NEWSLETTER
FRANk JOTzO
Global climate policy: change in the air?
Policy responses to climate change have been high on the international 
agenda amongst Asia Pacific and the rest of  the world in the lead-up to the 
Bali conference of  the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in December 2007. First, the June 2007 G8 summit 
endorsement of  the UNFCCC as the venue for negotiating a post 2012 
international climate agreement represented a significant concession by the 
United States. This was reaffirmed in the APEC Leaders’ Summit ‘Sydney 
Declaration’. Heads of  governments meeting at the UN in late September 
added to the sense of  purpose, clearing the way for formal negotiations. 
The United States re-entered the international climate talks by convening a 
meeting of  major economies in Washington at the end of  September, but the 
administration’s stance against emissions targets and for purely technology-
based approaches remains unchanged.
Science more than ever shows the risk of  dangerous climate change and 
the need to cut global greenhouse gas emissions drastically to limit future 
global warming. Climate change is now seen not just as an environmental 
problem but as one affecting development and economic prosperity.
Limiting global warming to around two degrees is increasingly seen as 
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an adequate goal to limit the risk of  dangerous climate change. That would 
require reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions of  50–85 per cent at 
2050 compared to levels in 2000, according to the latest Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report. By comparison, global 
emissions rose by 70 per cent from 1970 to 2004. Continuing on this path 
would set the globe on a trajectory to substantial warming and elevated risks 
of  large-scale, irreversible changes in earth systems.
So to mitigate climate change, the historical annual average increase in 
emissions of  around two per cent needs to be reduced to annual decreases 
of  minus three per cent or so, soon. Cutting back on economic growth is 
not an option in the policy mix, so climate change mitigation will require 
‘decarbonisation’ of  economies: decoupling economic activity and growth 
from carbon emissions.
The technology for decarbonisation exists and will continue becoming 
more available and affordable. A recent study prepared for the UN 
negotiations put the additional investment necessary for strong global 
mitigation at around A$200 billion per year at 2030, around 0.3 per cent 
of  global GDP at 2030. Different studies yield different cost estimates, but 
typical estimates put the future cost of  global greenhouse action in the broad 
vicinity of  one per cent of  GDP by the middle of  the century. This cost 
would occur against the backdrop of  GDP continuing to rise by perhaps 
three per cent a year, thus doubling in less than three decades. On this basis, 
to pay for climate mitigation the world might have to wait until May 2050 to 
be as rich as it otherwise would have been by January 2050.
If  that is all it takes, why do we not see decisive action? Because climate 
change is the ultimate externality, with damages dispersed globally and over 
long timescales; and because thorny issues of  equity, responsibility and 
capability stand in the way of  broad international cooperation. Developed 
countries caused much of  the greenhouse effect to date, have much 
higher emissions per person and command much greater ability to pay for 
mitigation. India points out that its per capita CO2 emissions are only about 
one-twentieth of  those in the United States or Australia, while its per capita 
income is less than one-tenth. China is higher up the ladder but still below 
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the global average. Meanwhile, increases in emissions come predominantly 
from developing and industrialising countries. China’s annual emissions more 
than doubled since 1990, with growth accelerating in recent years and no 
slowdown in sight. US emissions increased by around one-fifth since 1990, 
slightly faster than OECD emissions on average. China will soon overtake 
the United States as the largest emitter if  it has not already done so. Cutting 
global emission cost effectively requires action in all major economies and 
in most sectors of  those economies. .
The traditional stalemate in global climate policy has been characterised 
by poor countries demanding significant action on greenhouse gases by 
rich countries before committing themselves, and rich countries demanding 
immediate action in fast-growing poor countries. The UN Framework 
Convention attempted to bridge the gap by its principle of  ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’: rich countries go first, developing countries 
follow. The Kyoto Protocol reflects this, obliging ratifying rich countries 
to cut or limit emissions, and allowing developing countries to undertake 
emissions reductions projects and to sell emissions credits. The quantitative 
effects of  Kyoto are small relative to the challenge, but the treaty has sent 
a signal and created market incentives to reduce emissions: CO2 emissions 
now carry a price tag in many economies, and financial flows to developing 
countries for greenhouse gas reductions could reach A$25 billion or more 
by 2012.
Kyoto’s first commitment period runs out in 2012, and a more ambitious, 
comprehensive and flexible architecture is clearly needed after that. The 
European Union strongly supports retaining the Kyoto framework, 
expanding its mechanisms and getting more countries to commit to targets. 
Developing countries are also generally in favour of  continuing a Kyoto-
style arrangement. Developed countries including Japan, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand oscillate between support and opposition to the Kyoto 
Protocol, depending on the government in power or the perceived difficulty 
of  complying with their targets.
The opposing vision, where each country decides on its own action, with 
voluntary goals and international cooperation on technology, is promoted in 
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particular by the US administration, and has been the Australian government’s 
paradigm since about 2001. It is also attractive to developing countries that 
want to avoid pressure to take on climate commitments. Such agreement 
is easier to achieve than hard targets, especially if  the goals can be reached 
with little or no effort. For example, the APEC Sydney Declaration’s goal of  
reducing energy intensity (energy use per $ of  GDP) by 25 per cent from 
2005 to 2030 is little different from the historical trend in energy intensity. 
A 1 per cent annual reduction in energy intensity coupled with 3 per cent 
GDP growth implies that energy use increases by 2 per cent, and historically 
emissions have been closely in line with energy use.
Despite these different positions, strong political momentum is now 
moving toward an inclusive future climate agreement under the UN 
framework. An ambitious timetable for a post 2012 treaty is emerging, driven 
by the desire to avoid a gap between the end of  the first Kyoto period and 
a successor agreement. Under this timetable, negotiations take place over 
the next two years, and an architecture would be agreed by the end of  2009. 
However, this would leave little time for the next US administration (from 
early 2009) to decide its approach and contribute to the outcome, so a delay 
by a year or so would not surprise.
In the United States domestic pressure is rising on climate change, from 
voters concerned about climate change and business eager for certainty 
about future greenhouse policy. A number of  US states have announced 
emissions reductions goals and trading schemes, and Congress is much less 
opposed to greenhouse gas legislation than in the past. The winds of  change 
are evident also in Australia, where after long opposition to emissions pricing 
the federal government has announced a policy for comprehensive emissions 
trading—a policy also pursued by the opposition, which in addition pledged 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
Creativity on the architecture of  a future agreement could help overcome 
entrenched differences between countries about the nature of  future 
commitments. Outside of  the formal negotiations, an array of  options is 
being discussed that use the basic building blocks of  targets and trading, 
but add flexibility, entry-level commitments for developing countries and 
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commitments tailored to national interests. For example, emissions targets 
could be linked to future economic growth, apply only to selected sectors 
or provide an explicit opt-out clause as a safety blanket for developing 
countries. Offset mechanisms are already being expanded, and developing 
countries could enter policy-based commitments that create revenue 
through international carbon markets. A broader menu of  options might 
also be available to developed countries, through explicit recognition of  
public investment in low-emissions technology development, or large-scale 
funding aimed at reducing deforestation in tropical countries.
Whatever the architecture, the fundamental principle for effective 
international climate policy is that rich countries pay the incremental cost 
incurred in the developing world. Otherwise governments and businesses in 
low and middle-income countries cannot justify investing scarce resources 
in the long-term global public good of  climate change mitigation, in the 
face of  more immediate and local concerns of  development. Down the 
track, agreeing on equity principles for sharing rights to the atmosphere may 
be needed. The road will be difficult, but with strongly growing political 
momentum the prospects for a new climate agreement look much brighter 
than just a year ago.
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27 November 2007
CANBERRA TIMES
CLIvE WILLIAMS
Climate is right to tackle impacts of environmental 
change*
The election campaign was largely devoid of  debate about national security, 
and one of  the neglected security issues was the impact of  climate change. 
There are now few sceptics about global warming, given that the effects 
are apparent even to flat-earth proponents. The focus is now on how 
rapid (or delayed) climate change might be, the extent to which human 
countermeasures can mitigate the effects and consideration of  best and 
worst case scenarios.
In the UK, on 12 November, Prime Minister Gordon Brown in his first 
major foreign policy speech as PM noted that ‘The unprecedented impact 
of  climate change transforms the very purpose of  government. Once, 
quality of  life meant the pursuit of  two objectives: economic growth and 
social cohesion. Now there is a trinity of  aims: prosperity, fairness and 
environmental care.’ And ‘As we move to a post 2012 global climate change 
agreement, we need a strengthened UN role for environmental protection.’ 
He noted that ‘…without environmental sustainability, justice and prosperity 
are both imperilled and that the best route to long-term economic growth 
lies in action to tackle climate change.’
Climate change is also a trigger for internal strife, instability and disease, 
and for tensions between nation states. It can result in substantial loss of  
life, population migration, need for deployment of  external police, military 
forces and NGOs, and can have severe socio-economic consequences for 
affected states. In extremis, it could lead to conflict between nation states.
In April this year, the UN Security Council addressed the issue of  global 
First published in Canberra Times, 27 November 2007.
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warming for the first time, warning about its potential to be a ‘conflict 
catalyst’. London-based conflict resolution group International Alert has 
identified 46 countries at risk of  violent conflict and a further 56 facing 
a high risk of  instability as a result of  climate change. The US Center for 
Naval Analyses published a recent study which stated that climate change 
‘presents significant national security challenges to the US’ and is a ‘threat 
multiplier for volatile regions’.
In Asia and the South Pacific the main climate change concerns relate to 
food and water security, infectious diseases, natural disasters, sea-level rise, 
energy security, environmental degradation, population displacement—and 
the economic consequences of  all of  the above.
We need to recognise that climate change has the potential to generate 
major humanitarian crises in Asia through a greater frequency and intensity 
of  natural disasters, particularly severe storms and flooding. Extreme weather 
events can result in mass mortality and grave subsistence complications for 
affected communities, as we have seen recently in Bangladesh.
If  the environmental effect is severe and prolonged, it can also lead to mass 
displacement of  human populations, which may well destabilise the affected 
area and neighbouring states. Again, Bangladesh is a prime candidate.
Population migration is already occurring on a small scale from slowly 
submerging islands of  the Southwest Pacific. This can lead to disputes 
between neighbours—like Australia and New Zealand—about the absorption 
of  climate change refugees. Effectively what is happening in New Zealand is 
societal change as it absorbs most of  the climate refugees (and a lot of  Asian 
migrants), while other New Zealanders are coming to Australia in record 
numbers (40,000 in the past year).
Health experts have already noted the growing nexus between climate 
change and the emergence and spread of  diseases, particularly tropical 
diseases, which are spreading to warming areas. Mosquito-borne diseases, 
for example, are occurring at much higher elevations than before, and in 
geographic areas where they have not previously been a problem.
National security planners are most concerned about the disease threats 
to human populations, but they can also endanger livestock, crops and 
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fisheries.
Climate change within Australia will gradually modify the distribution of  
arable land, agricultural products, fresh water and fish stocks. Over the longer 
term, some of  our coastal land will become at higher risk to storm surges. 
The forward-looking insurance industry is already limiting its coverage for 
vulnerable coastal properties.
Perhaps the major external threat to Australia over the next 20 years or so 
will be to our fisheries. Overfishing and the decline in fish stocks in Asian 
waters have led to much of  the poaching in Australia’s northern waters. 
We can expect climate change to accelerate that process, including into the 
Southern Ocean, particularly as a more prosperous China makes poaching 
more lucrative.
Surprisingly, climate change did not even rate a mention in Australia’s 
‘Defence Update 2007’. Our Department of  Defence has traditionally 
focused on conflict between nation states, protective alliances, actions in 
support of  our major ally, and peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Some 
of  these are used to justify ever more capable and expensive combat ships 
and aircraft. The reality of  the future for the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) will most likely be more Afghanistan and Timor-type deployments, 
providing basic training team assistance, playing a major role in regional 
disaster relief  operations, enhancing Australian fisheries protection and 
support for government agencies struggling to cope with climate change 
problems. The shape of  the future ADF to meet these challenges will be a 
key issue for the new defence white paper.
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THE AUSTRALIAN
ROSS GARNAUT
Too hot an issue to ignore*
Climate change mitigation decisions in 2008, and for the foreseeable future, 
are made under conditions of  great uncertainty. Under such uncertainty, it 
is always sensible to ask whether it would be better to delay decisions while 
information relevant to the decision is gathered and analysed. Every climate 
scientist has their own views on some issues that differ from the mainstream 
in detail. But the broad findings of  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) have general support among scientists with relevant specialist 
expertise.
The broad wisdom of  the IPCC is strongly contested by a small minority 
of  reputed climate scientists. It is sometimes observed by dissenters that 
Galileo turned out to be right as a minority of  one against the intellectual 
establishment of  his time. Does not this establish that the intelligent dissenter 
can be right? Yes, it does. But the establishment of  seventeenth-century 
Catholic Europe was not learned in scientific method. Would not Galileo 
be with the majority of  established science today? Probably. Mainstream 
science is right on a balance of  probabilities.
The dissenters are sometimes called sceptics. This is a misnomer in 
general. Many hold to their views with profound belief  that is independent 
of  external information or analysis. The dissenters are possibly right and 
probably wrong.
I recall the perspective offered by former Australian science minister 
Barry Jones. In his World Meteorological Day Address in 1992, he applied 
the famous wager of  the seventeenth-century French scientist Blaise Pascal 
to the climate change problem. If  there were no God and one believed, 
First published in The Australian, 6 June 2008.
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pondered Pascal, what is the loss? Pascal’s wager would seem to make the 
case against the dissenters.
But it is not quite so easy with climate change. Belief, acted upon, could be 
costly and wasted if  it is all a warp in the modern history of  science. There 
is no alternative to seeking to measure the costs and benefits of  efforts to 
mitigate climate change while being mindful of  uncertainty. And, regrettably, 
there is no alternative to acting on the results of  that analysis now, actively 
or passively, as the passage of  time is rapidly reducing the scope for choice 
among policies affecting climate outcomes.
Economic development over the past two centuries has taken most of  
humanity from lives that were brutal and short to levels of  personal health 
and security, material comfort and knowledge that were unknown to the 
elites of  earlier times.
A new era began in the fourth quarter of  the twentieth century, with 
the rapid extension of  the beneficent processes of  modern economic 
development into the heartland of  the populous countries of  Asia. From this 
has emerged what I have described as the platinum age of  global economic 
growth in the early twenty-first century.
The era of  modern economic growth has been intimately linked to rapid 
expansion in the use of  fossil fuels. The amount of  fossil fuel in the Earth’s 
crust is obviously finite. However, the amount is so large that its limits are 
of  no practical importance for climate change policies.
There are, however, much tighter limits from the engineering point of  
view to the availability for human use of  fossil fuels: the point at which 
the energy used to extract the resources would be greater than their energy 
content. Tighter still is the economic limit: the availability of  fossil fuels in 
forms and locations that facilitate their extraction for human use at costs 
below the prices of  oil, gas and coal in global markets.
A revolution in humanity’s use of  fossil fuel-based energy would be 
necessary sooner or later to sustain and to extend modern standards of  
living. It will be required sooner if  we are to hold the risks of  climate change 
to acceptable levels.
The world is now some way down the track on an international system 
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based on emissions reduction targets, starting with developed countries. 
There are many imperfections in the Kyoto agreement that must be corrected 
in its successors if  there is to be worthwhile progress towards reducing risks 
of  dangerous climate change to acceptable levels. But the focus needs to 
be on the improvement of  the system that has been emerging within the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. There is no time to start 
again.
It is not a new idea for governments to make large financial commitments 
for insurance against low probability, high-impact events. Defence absorbs 
several percentage points of  gross domestic product each year, most of  it on 
insurance against genuinely low probability developments.
Climate change policy remains a diabolical problem. There is a chance—
just a chance—that Australia and the world will manage to develop a 
position that strikes a good balance between the costs of  dangerous climate 
change and the costs of  mitigation. The consequences of  the choice are 
large enough for it to be worth a large effort to take that chance in the short 
period that remains before our options diminish fatefully.
24 September 2008
INdIA WATER PORTAL
kUNTALA LAHIRI-dUTT
Anatomy of a flood: Kosi, India, 2008*
More than 17 million people have been affected in India, Bangladesh and 
Nepal by the recent floods in South Asia. Around three million people 
have been rendered homeless and more than one million are now living 
Posted on India Water Portal, http://www.indiawaterportal.org/bihar/, 24 September 2008.
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in relief  camps. Nature’s rage and human misery have both been written 
about in such graphic details that one needs to consider how and why this 
great disaster happened, whether it was avoidable and what lessons might 
be gleaned from it.
The deluge took place in the northern part of  eastern India where, in 
August, the Himalayan river, Kosi, burst its embankment in two locations 
and shifted its course to draw a straight line from north to south through a 
part of  Bihar state to join the Ganga [Ganges river].
This is not the first time the Kosi river has breached its embankment; 
indeed, the Kosi has been described as the ‘River of  Sorrow’. Describing 
its descent onto the plains, the British administrator, and the author of  the 
Imperial Gazetteer of  India, L. S. S. O’Malley, wrote in 1913:
Sweeping down from the hills, it brings with it volumes of  sand, which it 
heaps over the surface of  the country, destroying the productive power of  the 
land, choking the wells, and driving the villagers from their homesteads…and 
changing the whole face of  the country from a fruitful landscape to a wilderness 
of  sand and swamp.
This rage of  the Kosi made Christopher Hill, the American historian, 
describe Kosi as ‘a different type of  river’. Until the late 1800s, the river 
traced a violent and direct path through the districts of  Purnea in North 
Bihar to the Ganga. Kosi’s catchment is larger than that of  any Himalayan 
river excepting the Indus and the Brahmaputra bringing the floodwaters of  
roughly 62,000 square kilometres of  mountain basin. Yet, Kosi is less than 
1,300 kilometres in length. Its fury comes from the fact that it debouches 
onto the Gangetic plains through the Chatra Gorge in the Nepal foothills 
where the valley is only 5–8 kilometres in width. Consequent to its passage 
through this narrow pass, the velocity and power of  the Kosi increases 
to such an extent that the river roars through some 650 kilometres of  
Purnea district, carrying thousands of  tons of  silt and sand and destroying 
everything in its path. The river has been known to rise 10 metres within 24 
hours and to broaden into a 25 kilometres wide ‘floating sea’. Through an 
east–west swathe of  about 500 kilometres, the Kosi swung like a pendulum, 
leaving behind a mass of  gravel, kankar (nodules of  sandstone) and sandy 
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silt known as the ‘diaralands’, which over years became inhabited by people.
The Kosi’s destructive abilities were because of  the enormous amounts 
of  water, laden with silt, sand and kankar that it brought down from the 
Himalayas. The massive amounts of  silt caused the river to shift its course 
frequently. As the Kosi waters subsided in winter, the sand would settle and 
raise the bed of  the river, forcing it to cut a new channel almost every year. 
Hindu mythology attributed demonic characteristics to the river, equating it 
with a ten-armed monster because of  the many distributaries and channels 
through which it drained the North Bihar plains.
Mughal rulers built low-level embankments, locally called bandhs, which 
often broke and were temporary in nature. With the construction of  the 
railways and roads, these embankments rose in height during the British 
rule. One more reason was the need to formalise land revenue collection 
through a system called the Permanent Settlement in the diaralands which 
otherwise were an essentially shifting maze of  swamps. The compelling 
driving force, however, was the tendency of  seeing nature in India as an 
‘environmental laboratory’ in which to test European ideologies. Unfamiliar 
with the seasonal fury of  tropical rivers, the colonial British engineers saw 
them as uncivil and aberrant, needing control. Consequently more and higher 
embankments were built over the years until the villages became enclosed 
by—almost trapped within—what was often a series of  embankments. 
Another British administrator, Captain F. C. Hirst, in 1908 noted that 
‘Each succeeding generation has been compelled to raise the height of  the 
embankments to make them keep pace with an ever increasing flood level.’ 
Consequently by the time of  Hirst’s writing, the river was ‘many feet above 
the surrounding country’ and during the monsoons ‘the pent up waters deal 
death’ to the villagers living in this region.
The embankments were meant originally in good faith to protect the 
villagers from the floods but prepared the way for disasters. D. K. Mishra, 
the leader of  Barh Mukti Abhiyan (Freedom from Floods Movement) and 
an authority on the Kosi, describes this as ‘a protection that never was’. 
Postindependent India largely followed this pattern; after the last great flood 
of  1953, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru decided to embank the 
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Kosi, and by 1957 several hundred kilometres of  embankments ‘shadowed’ 
the main channels of  the river. From a meagre 160 kilometres, the length 
of  the embankments jumped to over 3,000 kilometres in 1998. Most of  
these embankments left adequate space within the two major embankments 
supposedly to contain the excess monsoon waters brought down by the 
river. This had the consequence of  engineering an artificial sense of  security; 
villagers began to live well within the embankments only to be inundated by 
the rising waters creating a false flood disaster year after year. Moreover, the 
Kosi experience of  embankment came to be accepted as the norm for most 
other rivers of  the Ganga and the Brahmaputra basin without any debate 
whatsoever on the need for such intervention.
The construction of  embankments has never been justified even by 
official data; the so-called flood prone area in Kosi basin rose from 2.5 
million hectares in 1952 to approximately 6.9 million hectares. Clearly the 
embankments have worsened the flood situation in a region where regular 
inundation is an integral part of  the hydro-ecology. Rural life has moved from 
the utilisation of  flood waters to seeing floods (and their cause, the rivers) as 
‘the problem’ that needs to be solved by river control to ensure the wellbeing 
of  people. When I went to see the Kosi floodplains as a resource person 
for a group of  visiting researchers sponsored by the Panos Institute of  UK, 
I was astonished to find areas that have been under stagnating waters for 
months since the monsoons because the higher riverbed prevents the flood 
waters from returning to the channel. Older villagers complained that the 
floods have become unpredictable and catastrophic and longer in duration. 
From a rich riparian region, North Bihar in the last sixty years has been 
turned into one of  the poorest parts of  India, a regular source of  migrant 
labour to the farms and factories of  richer regions and the rickshaw-pullers 
and manual workers in metropolitan India.
The recent flood in Kosi has invariably been compared by the Indian 
media to the one experienced by New Orleans when, unable to withstand 
the onslaught of  Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi breached its 
embankments. It is worthwhile to remember that even in the US there was 
early opposition to the construction of  embankments. This is exemplified 
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in the recommendations in 1850s of  the Congress-commissioned engineer 
Charles S. Ellet that large areas of  the Mississippi flood plains be used as 
flood storage and overflow areas. However, in 1861, the conclusion of  his 
contemporary Andrew A. Humphrey of  the US Army Corps of  Engineers 
was accepted, embanking the river and isolating it from its floodplain. This 
measure had far-reaching influence on the thinking and practices of  river 
management in the world since. Hurricane Katrina certainly taught a lesson 
there.
What lessons does the Kosi flood teach us? The recent flood shows that 
anthropogenic causes have heightened and aggravated the flood impacts, 
and that ‘flood control’ as seen by the state may not necessarily be the only 
viable response to floods. The technology of  such control relies overtly on 
insulating floodplains from rivers by embankments and dams. The current 
disaster devastating the lives of  so many poor people emphasises the urgent 
need to rethink water management strategies and policies. The future 
wellbeing of  millions of  rural Indians is at stake because it is well known 
that the official philosophy of  water management in India has been keenly 
in favour of  the construction of  capital-intensive large structures such as 
dams and embankments on rivers. The government is currently toying with 
the ‘Riverlink Project’, based on the idea of  linking all rivers through a series 
of  canals to create a gigantic water grid for the transfer of  water from one 
part of  the country to another. The long-term environmental impacts of  
such a gigantic project can only be assumed.
International  
Relations
27 February 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
HUGH WHITE
Nixonian spirit is essential for US–China relations*
It’s enough to restore one’s faith in the United States. On both sides, the two 
parties are propelling towards their respective nominations the two most 
interesting and impressive presidential candidates we have seen for many 
years.
As Hillary Clinton falters, it is likely the US will face a choice between 
Barack Obama and John McCain. Each seems capable of  becoming a good, 
maybe even a great, president.
But they are different people, suited to different times, and they would 
take the US in different directions. Which of  them gets to the White House 
may therefore make a big difference for Australia, too. So whom should we 
hope will win? Personally, I’d rather have tea with Obama, but I’d rather the 
other bloke becomes president. It’s to do with the way John McCain reminds 
me of  Richard Nixon.
First published in The Australian, 27 February 2008.
International Relations 103
How so? Let’s start with this simple proposition: for Australia the 
most important relationship in the world is the one between Beijing and 
Washington. Australians assume that we can build an ever closer relationship 
with China while remaining a close ally of  the US. That can happen only if  
the US and China get on okay.
They have been getting on fine so far thanks to a deal that was struck 
35 years ago. China would accept US leadership in Asia, and the US would 
accept the legitimacy of  the communist government in Beijing and prevent 
Japan from posing any kind of  military threat to China.
This deal has worked perfectly and given Asia the most peaceful and 
prosperous 30 years of  its history. The question is, can it last? Much has 
changed since that deal was done. China was poor then; today its economy 
on some measures is second only to the US and rapidly closing the gap.
With wealth goes power. If  China’s economy keeps growing strongly—
and you would be brave to bet that it won’t—the pressure to renegotiate 
the old deal to concede more power and influence to China will become 
irresistible. China thus poses a direct challenge to US strategic primacy in 
Asia. It will need adroit handling.
Give Beijing too much and you risk encouraging a Chinese bid for 
hegemony in Asia. Give it too little and you risk undermining the old deal 
and being drawn into a new and bitter strategic competition with China.
So far US political leaders, distracted by the war on terror, have mostly 
responded to this challenge by pretending it isn’t there. It has hardly been 
mentioned in the presidential campaign so far. But China has quietly been 
moved to the centre of  US military planning and Washington has begun to 
build a coalition of  democracies—including Japan, Australia and India—
to support them in resisting the Chinese challenge. These moves look 
threatening to China and amplify the growing sense of  strategic competition 
between them.
Of  course, both sides have everything to lose by accelerating this slide 
into strategic competition and everything to gain by preventing it. No one 
on either side of  the Pacific is dumb enough to want it to happen. The 
question is whether everyone on both sides is smart enough, and strong 
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enough, to prevent it. Which brings us to Nixon. For all his faults, the cold 
warrior had the vision and strength to go to Beijing in 1972 and make the 
deal. It was a breathtakingly bold stroke, breaking deep-seated political and 
policy taboos.
For Australia, the most important thing about the next president is how 
he handles China. Will he be another Nixon? To do that he will need to 
make some concessions to Beijing.
He will need to recognise the legitimacy of  its growing power, including 
its military power. He will need to accept that China’s views need to be 
respected even when they do not coincide with those of  the US. He will 
need to persuade Americans that they should accept China as an equal, as 
long as China refrains from acting like a hegemon.
All this will make big demands on whoever wins in November. Like 
Nixon, they will need to break a lot of  taboos in the US to do it. Which of  
the candidates would have a better shot?
It may be Obama. His most famous foray into foreign policy has been 
to say that he would be prepared to visit Tehran to break the impasse in 
relations with Iran. That idea has a commendably Nixonesque flavour to 
it and it’s probably essential to rebuilding a sustainable US position in the 
Persian Gulf. It suggests Obama has the flair and vision to do what’s needed 
on China.
But has he the strength? That question has two elements, one personal 
and the other political. Of  the first we know next to nothing. The campaign 
so far has shown Obama to be eloquent, inspiring and imaginative, but 
we know little about his personal ability to take and hold tough positions. 
Of  the political element we know more. As a Democrat, issues touching 
national security will always be a weak spot. Any Democrat would find it 
virtually impossible to take the steps needed to build a new durable modus 
vivendi with China. Making concessions to Beijing would play to traditional 
voter suspicions about Democrats being wobbly on national security and 
naive in the conduct of  foreign policy. Only Republicans can do such things 
and survive. It was Ronald Reagan who at Reykjavik in 1986 came closest to 
abolishing nuclear weapons and it was Nixon, the arch anticommunist, who 
International Relations 105
opened the US to China in 1972. As a Republican, McCain starts way ahead 
as the candidate likelier to be able to lead the US to a new understanding 
with China.
But there is more to it than that. As we have seen during the past sad 
seven years, Republicans can be weak, foolish and irresponsible on foreign 
policy. So we need to make a judgement about McCain’s personal strengths, 
too, and we have a lot more data to go on than we do with Obama.
McCain’s record is not perfect, by any means, but it does show strength 
and determination, and it gives him immense credibility on national security 
issues that, should he choose to use it, may enable him to persuade Americans 
that it’s time to go to Beijing again. On that basis he’d get my vote.
24 March 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
STUART HARRIS
Australia must tread carefully in Iran, US 
confrontation*
The consensus judgement of  all United States intelligence agencies in their 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of  November 2007 was that Iran 
halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and probably, as of  mid 2007, 
had not restarted it.
For the US administration, the assessment moved back substantially from 
the high level of  rhetoric President Bush and Vice-President Cheney in 
particular were using, drawing largely from earlier intelligence, that Iran was 
pursuing an active nuclear weapons program. President Bush initially said 
First published in Canberra Times, 24 March 2008.
106 Capturing the Year — 2008
he disagreed with the US intelligence report but subsequently the White 
House said he endorsed the ‘full scope’ of  the report. For many observers, 
this meant that the threat of  a US attack on Iran, mooted for a considerable 
time, was not now likely.
The sudden resignation last week of  Admiral William Fallon, head of  the 
US Central Command (Centcom), which covers the Middle East including 
Iran, has raised fears that the optimism that followed the intelligence agencies’ 
latest consensus view was unwarranted and an attack by the US could be 
intended. Admiral Fallon’s sudden resignation, thought to be under White 
House pressure, came following a profile article in Esquire which implied 
that he differed with some aspects of  the approach of  President Bush and 
Vice President Cheney on Iran. Fallon had earlier angered the White House 
with his statements on Iran.
Other factors feeding the current speculation include: the gradual build 
up of  coalition naval strength in the Gulf  and the replacement of  one Aegis 
guided missile destroyer off  the Lebanon coast by two ships, another Aegis 
guided missile destroyer and an Aegis guided missile cruiser; the warm 
welcome that President Ahmadinejad received on his visit to Iraq—the 
first Iranian president to visit its one-time bitter enemy; and Vice-President 
Cheney’s proposed visit to the Middle East later this month.
There are groups in Washington, particularly supporters of  Israel, who 
would like to see a war with Iran. Given the history, however, of  how the US 
justified its invasion of  Iraq, together with the intelligence conclusion, the 
likelihood of  a US unprovoked attack seems limited and would be unpopular 
generally in the US. Nevertheless, in an increasingly tense situation, a 
conflict could come from provocative acts by one or other side or from 
miscalculations.
There have also been several risky incidents in the Gulf, most recently 
the clash between the US Navy and Iranian speed boats in January this year, 
made more hazardous by differences over definitions of  international water 
boundaries and hoax messages. And the Republican Guard presumably has 
lost face domestically given the National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion 
about Iran’s nuclear weapons program, although the recent Iranian election 
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results suggest President Ahmadinejad’s popularity may not have been 
adversely affected.
Contributing to increasing tensions in the fraught long-term relationship 
between the US and Iran have been extreme rhetorical statements from 
President Ahmadinejad, including an intention to ‘wipe Israel off  the map’. 
Israel, which describes Iran’s nuclear threat as an ‘existential threat’, rejected 
the US intelligence community’s conclusion. The Israeli foreign minister, 
Tzipi Livni, is currently on a speaking tour of  the US with a central focus 
on the Iran threat. The Iranian president’s successful visit to Iraq will have 
worried Israel as well as the US as it indicates that politically Iran is gaining 
a stronger international profile in the region. In certain circumstances, such 
as a renewed Hezbollah provocation argued to be linked to Iranian backing, 
a strike by Israel against Iran could quickly bring in the US in support. Thus 
the risks of  conflict would seem to have increased.
In such an event, given its earlier participation in Gulf  patrolling, 
Australia could expect to be asked to contribute again. Yet such a war would 
be clearly against Australia’s interest. Australian support for any US action 
would not be welcomed by some of  our Asian neighbours including China 
and, notably, Indonesia. Indonesia abstained on the latest Security Council 
vote on sanctions against Iran, and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
recently completed a successful visit to Iran.
More generally, a US–Iran conflict would add further to instability in the 
Middle East, push oil prices through the roof, particularly if  there were 
any blockage of  the Strait of  Hormuz, add further to inflationary pressure 
and other adverse economic consequences not limited to Australia and, 
if  anything, stimulate a resumption of  Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
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CANBERRA TIMES
RIkkI kERSTEN
Big-picture thinking must prevail*
This week the prime minister will strut the stage in China, where his much-
vaunted China-literacy will be under considerable scrutiny. While the media 
and the opposition will be on the lookout for rapid and tangible outcomes 
from this visit, the real task will be only just beginning. Behind the scenes, 
Prime Minister Rudd will have to begin defining Australia’s role in the era 
of  global power transition and Northeast Asian power realignment, a region 
where Australia’s vital interests are entrenched for the long term. It is a 
process that he is remarkably well equipped to lead.
This is not a matter of  bilateral feel-good diplomacy. Instead, Australia 
must articulate and execute an intelligent, nuanced strategy that navigates 
between moving targets. This strategy will need to combine the development 
of  bilateral networks, with Australia taking on the role of  independent, 
trusted intermediary between the big three. The desirable outcome will be a 
new set of  regional institutions that Australia helps to shape, that provides a 
badly needed forum for the current and rising regional powers to engage on 
the basis of  emerging instead of  superseded power realities.
Power transitions between the United States, China and Japan directly 
impact on Australia. Together these countries comprise Australia’s three 
largest trading partners. Australia has a developed military alliance with the 
US and a developing one with Japan. Both relationships enable potentially 
greater interoperability between Australian, Japanese and US military 
forces. It is no secret that China is a central entity in most regional security 
scenarios, whether this involves the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait or 
the East China Sea. These are the nations who will determine the economic 
Published as ‘We have middle power’, Canberra Times, 9 April 2008.
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and security context for Australia, the region and the world in the coming 
decades.
It is disturbing that all three key players are concurrently experiencing 
domestic uncertainty, which has the demonstrated potential (in some 
cases already realised) to disturb global equilibrium. The US is in a crisis 
of  financial confidence due to the subprime issue and deepening budget 
deficits, at a time of  imminent leadership transition. China is basking in 
the glow of  sustained rapid growth, but the Olympic spotlight will also 
lay bare the environmental and social costs of  this miraculous growth to a 
global audience. Japan is teetering towards another crisis of  confidence as 
its exposure to both US and Chinese strategic fortunes coincide with the 
tortuous continuity of  domestic political stalemate. Having lost control of  
the upper house and with it the smooth passage of  legislation, the ruling 
coalition is at the mercy of  a ruthless opposition. Yet another change of  
government in Japan before the end of  the year is highly likely.
Relations between these three regional powerhouses are also in a state of  
flux and moving towards a competitive stand-off. China’s establishment of  
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization mobilises cross-regional countries 
into a bloc that may be seen as designed to counter US influence in the 
Northeast Asian region.
Japan is moving in two directions simultaneously. On the one hand, it is 
seeking closer alignment with the US global strategy in military terms while 
at the same time trying to outflank China in ASEAN (especially through 
concluding multiple bilateral free trade agreements with ASEAN members). 
On the other hand, Japan’s economic integration with China drags both 
nations into regular uncomfortable confrontation with the hypersensitivity 
that permeates political relations between them. Japan’s active commitment 
to the US ballistic missile defence initiative only makes it more difficult to 
engage China without suspicion and ties Japan ever more closely to the US 
globally.
The US has a mixed reaction from regional countries, which seem torn 
between acknowledging their need for US regional engagement while 
simultaneously seeking to establish regional bodies that exclude the US (for 
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example, the East Asia Summit). The US has maintained its ‘hub and spokes’ 
pattern of  bilateralism in the region, resisting whole-hearted commitment to 
regional multilateralism. With APEC limited to discussion of  economics and 
the ASEAN Regional Forum confined to confidence-building without hard 
security engagement, there is no forum where shifting powers can engage, 
retune and refine a holistic regional strategy as equals. This silo model of  
diplomacy will only ultimately exacerbate tensions, precisely because it 
eschews the fact of  comprehensive security in a multilateral landscape. The 
self-focused bilateralism of  the US, keeping each relationship separate and 
allowing only one ‘hub’, does not meet the demands of  power realities in 
Asia today.
What can Australia do? To date Australia has been firmly aligned with 
the US global strategy, as our commitment to the war in Iraq clearly 
demonstrated. The 2007 security declaration signed between Australia and 
Japan is in danger of  being subsumed within a US-centric trilateral orbit, 
and the suggestion of  a quadrilateral forum including India would have only 
assisted the perception of  antagonistic bloc formation between China and 
the US. China containment or counterbalancing may be a legitimate security 
objective, but without a political counterweight that promotes confidence 
building and cooperation, it threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Australia is beautifully positioned to be the honest broker between these 
three jousting powers in constructing a new regional architecture. But this will 
only be possible if  Australia can forge equally strong, trust-based relations 
with all three of  them. Australia’s relations with the US and Japan are mature 
and solid, despite recent alarm concerning the prime minister’s ‘passing’ of  
Japan. Until the US rethinks its regional engagement and locates both China 
and Japan in a manner that reinforces both countries, Australia can perform 
the function of  lubricant between its three great partners, involving all three 
in institutional creation and driving the process from a benign yet pivotal 
position. Call this middle-power diplomacy if  you will, but it is the creative 
strategy that should be driving Kevin Rudd’s regional, and global, agenda.
Integrating China in regional institution building in a constructive manner 
is something that Australia is in a better position to achieve than either of  
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its great friends Japan and the US. Kevin Rudd’s China literacy is not just a 
party piece. It could well be the key to constructive great power management 
in our region.
13 June 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
HUGH WHITE
PM flubs chance to fix Tokyo ties*
Kevin Rudd had both a real diplomatic challenge and a big opportunity 
when he visited Japan this week. The challenge was not just to soothe 
Tokyo’s displeasure that he had not visited them sooner, but to bridge the 
very serious gulf  that is opening up between Australia and Japan over how 
we deal with China.
His opportunity was to start promoting a vision of  our region’s future 
that will serve Australia’s interests in the complex strategic changes that are 
already underway in Asia. But he has failed the challenge, and he let the 
opportunity pass.
Instead, his visit focused on two strangely meaningless ‘big initiatives’: his 
idea of  a European Union for Asia and the new crusade to rid the world 
of  nuclear weapons. No one could disagree with these noble objectives, 
but no one seriously believes that such ill-considered and underprepared 
announcements offer any hope of  achieving them. They simply confirm 
that Australia’s new government has not yet found its feet in foreign policy 
and still fails to understand the difference between a real policy and a press 
release.
First published in The Australian, 13 June 2008.
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This jejune diplomacy makes us look silly, it irritates the serious players 
in Asia and achieves the very opposite of  the ‘middle-power activism’ to 
which Rudd committed himself  a few months ago. But the real loss is the 
missed opportunity to start a serious conversation with Japan about our 
future relationship.
On this subject he had a very important message to deliver. He needed to 
tell Japan that Australia wants a vibrant strategic relationship with a strong 
and active Japan, but we also want the same kind of  relationship with China. 
The Japanese would welcome the first part of  this message, but not the 
second. They would prefer Australia to join them in resisting China’s claim 
to a growing say in Asia’s strategic affairs.
Japan sees China very differently from Australia. They are deeply anxious 
that China will use its growing regional influence to push Japan into a 
permanently subordinate place under China’s strategic thumb.
China does nothing to assuage these fears. A recent mild warming in their 
diplomacy has not changed China’s fundamental disdain for Japan. However 
justified historically, Beijing’s relentless evocation of  Japan’s wartime crimes 
suggests that they will never accept Japan as a legitimate regional power in 
its own right. Instead they seem to expect that as their power dilutes, and 
perhaps eventually eclipses, US primacy in Asia, they will exercise some kind 
of  hegemony over Japan. No one in Japan could accept that.
That is why Japan is keen to build, with America, a coalition in Asia to 
resist China’s challenge to American primacy. It very much wants Australia 
to be part of  this coalition. In the competition for spheres of  influence in 
the new Asia, Australia is seen as a bit of  a prize. For some years, Japanese 
observers have been dismayed by Australia’s growing enthusiasm for 
China. They were therefore delighted last year when John Howard moved 
sharply back in Tokyo’s (and Washington’s) direction. He signed a security 
agreement with Japan and keenly welcomed closer security talks involving 
Tokyo, Washington and even New Delhi.
And that is why Tokyo was always worried about the Mandarin-speaking 
Rudd. They see relations with China in zero-sum terms, and they feared that 
Rudd’s closeness to China would reverse Howard’s recent rebalancing and 
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take Australia even further into the Chinese camp.
That is why they were concerned when Kevin Rudd went to Beijing 
in April without a counterbalancing gesture towards Japan. It seemed to 
confirm Rudd’s tilt to China. They saw the same tilt in what they regarded 
as the anti-Japanese tone of  Canberra’s response to last summer’s whaling 
controversy—which Rudd in populist mode seemed happy to continue in 
Tokyo yesterday.
The problems in Australia–Japan relations therefore go much deeper 
than petty scraps over travel plans or populist posturing over whales. Behind 
these lies a difference over the shape of  the new Asia which could not be 
more serious, both for Japan and Australia.
Rudd needed to address this issue straight on in Tokyo this week. He 
should have assured Tokyo that we see a strong, active, respected and 
responsible Japan as essential to the future peace and stability of  Asia, and 
that, after sixty years of  exemplary international citizenship, we believe Japan 
deserves to be trusted as a major power.
He should have said that Australia understands Japan’s anxiety about how 
China might use its growing power. But he also needed to explain that, from 
Australia’s perspective, Japan’s approach to Asia’s future seems untenable. 
Terrified that better Sino–US relations may leave them unprotected, Japan 
now believes that its security depends on suspicion and hostility between 
Washington and Beijing. But the US and China are also Japan’s two biggest 
trading partners, and a peaceful and stable relationship between them is as 
vital for Japan as it is for everyone else in the Western Pacific, especially 
Australia.
Finally, Kevin Rudd needed to make clear to his hosts in Tokyo that 
Australia sees things differently. For us, there is no alternative but to work 
towards a new political and strategic order in Asia based on the maximum 
convergence between Washington and Beijing. But that new order must also 
provide a substantial and secure place for Japan. To reach that, Washington 
will need to concede some increased power and influence to China, and 
China will need to concede more power and influence to Japan.
It is far from clear whether this new order can be achieved, and if  so how, 
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but it is clear that it offers the best hope for a peaceful and prosperous Asian 
century. The alternative—Tokyo’s vision of  a regional alliance to constrain 
China—carries immense risks for all of  us. But events are already trending 
that way. Without a major change of  heart in Tokyo, Washington and 
Beijing, the drift towards a more divided and contested Asia may become 
unstoppable. Here then is the issue Rudd should have had at the top of  his 
agenda this week. He flubbed it. Perhaps next time.
Summer 2008
CHINA SECURITY
PETER vAN NESS
Adapting to a changing world*
How can Goldman Sachs and economists like Albert Keidel continue to 
predict such a rosy economic future for China when the world is changing 
before our eyes? Linear projections based on China’s performance since 
1978, and expectations that the Chinese economy will overtake America’s by 
the end of  the next three decades are very likely to be wrong. Our world is 
changing in fundamental ways. Escalating oil prices, a growing food crisis, 
rapid climate change and now the failure of  the Doha round of  international 
trade negotiations are remaking the world we live in. China, like the rest of  
the world, will be shaped by these fundamental structural changes. Linkages 
among them appear to multiply their impact. How China adapts to these 
challenges will be a key factor determining its future role in the world.
Climate change is one of  the most serious challenges, and China is 
the world’s largest emitter of  greenhouse gasses. International pressure is 
An earlier version of  this article appeared in China Security, vol. 4, no. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 
24–26.
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growing on China to agree to emission limits and to reshape policy in order 
to control spiralling patterns of  water and air pollution in China, where 
the World Bank estimates that pollution causes up to 750,000 premature 
deaths each year. Chinese acid rain pours down as well on Korea and Japan, 
and even affects the air quality far across the Pacific in the United States. 
Environmental degradation, compounded by serious problems of  water 
scarcity in north China, is not only the most likely obstacle to China’s ability 
to sustain high rates of  economic growth, but it also makes China a repeated 
target of  criticism for those countries that are determined to respond to the 
dire outlook for climate change.
How will the Chinese leaders respond? So far, China and other developing 
countries, like India, have refused to accept emission limits until the rich 
countries that have produced the bulk of  residual world pollution take 
responsibility for what they have done.
But climate change is only one of  the major structural changes pressing 
upon China, and in fact it is the least immediate with respect to its major 
impact. More immediate for China is the need to import more oil to fuel 
its burgeoning economy. Decisions about how to compete or cooperate to 
sustain such an urgent national priority will have serious global consequences. 
Expected to be the world’s largest energy consumer by 2010, China already 
imports more oil than Japan and uses it much less efficiently than most 
industrialised powers. The United States, the world’s largest petroleum-
consuming country, currently imports nearly 70 per cent of  its oil, and 
competition among the US, China, Japan and other oil-importing nations is 
already reshaping their strategies for maintaining energy security.
Projects for producing biofuel link the energy problem to yet another 
even more immediate dilemma: the food crisis. To the extent that food crops 
are used to produce biofuel, that makes the food crisis even more severe, 
combining with other factors like flood or drought in grain-exporting 
countries, dietary changes to more meat consumption requiring increased 
grain to feed farm animals and global price speculation by hedge-fund 
managers. The direct impact of  escalating food prices affects the world’s 
poorest countries most urgently. Famine and growing poverty have already 
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caused riots in several countries (for example, in Haiti, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Cameroon).
Walden Bello in the current issue of  GlobalAsia argues that previous 
neoliberal trade agreements, often insisted upon by the IMF and World 
Bank as structural adjustment conditions for loans and grants, have made 
domestic food producers in the developing world vulnerable to competition 
with large-scale and heavily subsidised corporate agriculture in the United 
States and Europe. The result has been that domestic food production in 
many developing countries, especially by small-scale farmers, has sharply 
declined, and some of  the poorest countries have become heavily dependent 
on imports to feed their people.
When the global price of  food increases, as it has over the past several 
months, the global poor are in serious trouble. Those of  us in rich countries 
may at a pinch have to revise our diets in response to the increasing price of  
food, but for the poor the effects can be life threatening. India and China 
in the Doha round have stood against further tariff  reductions that might 
increase the vulnerability of  domestic agriculture in developing countries.
In India, the situation is dire, marked by a sharp increase in suicides by 
small producers who are no longer able to compete. China, by contrast, is 
largely self-sufficient in food, and its grain reserves and government price 
supports for domestic grain producers have cushioned the impact of  global 
food price rises. Nonetheless, China has chosen to side with India against 
the rich countries of  the West to try to protect the poorest countries in the 
world against additional exposure.
It is impossible to predict how these fundamental structural changes will 
influence China’s future foreign policies. For example, a US war with Iran 
might spike oil prices to levels likely to bring on a world depression. The 
question is whether the major world powers can agree to cooperate and work 
together to meet these challenges, or whether they will instead compete for 
advantage at each other’s expense. A battle of  zero-sum games played out 
by the world’s biggest countries over global energy resources, food stocks 
and the responsibility for climate change could make the world a much less 
happy place for everyone.
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Some scholars, like David Kang in his book, China Rising, suggest that 
China has demonstrated a firm commitment to multilateral cooperation 
and is likely to want to cooperate with the other major powers to work 
out mutually beneficial arrangements to deal with this changing world. 
However, others, especially realist thinkers, foresee confrontations or worse 
as the major players face up to the new challenges. China’s great economic 
success of  the past three decades, and its achievement of  annual growth 
rates of  more than 9 per cent, may not be a helpful guide to what is likely to 
happen in the next 30 years. Like the rest of  us, China’s leaders looking to 
the future should expect the unexpected. How China and the other major 
powers respond to the new challenges will tell much of  the story.
23 August 2008
THE ECONOMIST
JON FRAENkEL
Fiji and the Pacific Islands Summit*
Frank Bainimarama, Fiji’s globe-trotting coup leader, has just come back 
from visiting the Beijing Olympics, the Pope in Rome and the United 
Nations in New York. But he missed this week’s annual summit of  the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Niue, one of  13 island microstates which, 
with Papua New Guinea (PNG), Australia and New Zealand, make up 
the PIF. Mr Bainimarama blames his no-show on New Zealand’s refusal 
to give him more than a transit visa to pass through Auckland airport 
(enforcing a travel ban imposed after the coup in December 2006). More 
likely, Mr Bainimarama stayed at home to avoid rebukes for reneging on the 
Published as ‘Asia: not being Frank with us; Fiji and the Pacific Islands Summit’, The 
Economist, 23 August 2008.
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commitment he made at last year’s PIF summit in Tonga to hold elections 
by March 2009.
The absence of  Mr Bainimarama was a relief  to Australia and New 
Zealand. It made it easier to persuade other PIF leaders to agree to threaten 
Fiji with suspension from the forum unless the election is held as scheduled. 
In other ways, too, the gulf  between the region’s minnows and its two big 
fish seems to be narrowing. The PIF’s ambitious ‘Pacific Plan’ for enhanced 
regional integration, announced with great gusto in 2005, no longer evokes 
much enthusiasm. Pressure to free merchandise trade is seen as benefiting 
Australia and New Zealand, which run big trade surpluses with the rest 
of  the region, rather than the small island states that trade little with each 
other.
For the poorer countries of  Melanesia, where bulges in the populations 
of  young people threaten social unrest, the freer movement of  labour is 
more enticing. New Zealand began a guest worker scheme last year, but 
John Howard, Australia’s prime minister at the time, flatly rejected opening 
the doors to unskilled Pacific labour. But since taking office last December, 
Australia’s new Labor government has announced a seasonal labour scheme 
for the fruit-picking industry, to be open to PNG, Vanuatu, Kiribati and 
Tonga. Fiji, however, is to be excluded.
Another reason for Mr Bainimarama to stay at home is that he has just 
taken over the finance ministry, after sacking the incumbent, Mahendra 
Chaudhry. The economy contracted by 6.6 per cent in 2007 and still looks 
weak. And the departure of  Mr Chaudhry, the leader of  Fiji’s ethnic Indians, 
raises political questions. Until now, the army takeover has been strongly 
opposed by indigenous Fijians, who make up 57 per cent of  the population, 
but largely backed by the Indians (38 per cent). Mr Chaudhry’s departure 
leaves Mr Bainimarama with even fewer allies, at home and abroad.
Nuclear Power
8 December 2007
THE AUSTRALIAN
RON HUISkEN
Rogue nuclear states fight change*
Iran and North Korea are providing an increasingly graphic indication of  
how drastically the nuclear non-proliferation paradigm will have to change if  
the whole enterprise is not to become a lost cause. The leakage of  technology 
and materials seems unstoppable, and the profound dissonance that now 
characterises the international community seems to preclude the kind of  
prompt, unanimous censure that might give even the most recalcitrant 
leadership pause.
North Korea cannot feed itself  or generate enough electricity to make 
even its capital visible to satellites at night but it detonated a nuclear device 
in October last year, the eighth country to do so.
Iran is perhaps five to ten years behind North Korea in stockpiling 
material for a bomb. Still, most observers would agree that Iran poses the 
greater danger to stability and peace.
First published in The Australian, 8 December 2007.
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The cocktail of  circumstances surrounding Iran’s quest to at least become 
a near-nuclear weapon state is growing steadily more lethal. Iran is a nation 
of  substance with a population of  over 80 million and very large reserves of  
oil and gas. It is adjacent to the lion’s share of  the world’s oil and gas reserves 
and has serious aspirations to pre-eminence over its Arab neighbourhood. It 
is committed to the destruction of  Israel and provides substantive support to 
major terrorist groups operating against that country. It has had a poisonous 
relationship with Washington for nearly 30 years.
Throughout this time, neither has wasted any opportunity to damage the 
interests of  the other. Iran is fuelling that animosity through compounding 
the American nightmare in Iraq. Apart from close Iranian ties to Iraq’s Shi’ite 
community, Washington in recent months has openly alleged that elements 
in Iran are providing arms (especially advanced road bombs) that are killing 
American troops in Iraq (and, possibly, Afghanistan).
At the centre of  this cauldron of  issues is Tehran’s uncompromising 
pursuit of  its ‘right’ under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to acquire 
all the capacities, including uranium enrichment, for a peaceful nuclear 
program. Iran was caught red-handed doing this secretly, after nearly two 
decades. Tehran insists that as it had not actually achieved any capabilities 
banned under the treaty, it had no case to answer. If  others were suspicious 
that was not Tehran’s problem.
The Bush administration has steadily escalated the rhetoric directed at 
Iran’s leadership. Anonymous officials have fed a stream of  press articles on 
well-developed US plans to use force and at least set Iran’s nuclear program 
back by a decade or more. And the administration has just imposed a package 
of  unilateral sanctions targeted specifically at Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
and the elite Quds (Jerusalem) force within the guard.
As to North Korea, there is at least a glimmer of  hope. The downward 
spiral of  events has been arrested, although Pyongyang continues to skilfully 
salami-slice every step forward. And all these steps remain prospective: 
nothing of  substance has yet transpired. The big change is that Washington 
and Beijing are now more nearly on the same page.
A ‘roadmap’ was agreed in February, and progressively refined over the 
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months since. In July, Pyongyang shut down its nuclear reactor and was 
rewarded with 50,000 tonnes of  fuel oil paid for by South Korea. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), together with US, Chinese 
and Russian experts, have been invited to North Korea to discuss the 
technical details of  the steps to follow. These include a full declaration from 
Pyongyang concerning its nuclear facilities. This is expected to total about 11 
known facilities, but the issues of  key interest are whether Pyongyang gives a 
plausible account of  the amount of  plutonium it has stockpiled and how it 
deals with US allegations (confirmed by Pakistan’s master proliferator, A. Q. 
Khan) that it at least attempted to build a secret uranium enrichment facility 
in 2002 in violation of  the 1994 nuclear freeze deal in place at the time.
If  we get past this declaration unscathed, the roadmap calls for the 
‘disablement’ of  the declared facilities. This awkward term is not a translation 
error. It took North Korea about two months to reverse the ‘freeze’, while 
rebuilding dismantled facilities would take about five years. Disablement is a 
halfway house, estimated to take one to three years to reverse.
Disablement is still to be defined in detail, but the agreed objective 
is to implement this step before the end of  2007. Along the way, North 
Korea expects timely and proportionate rewards: further allocations of  the 
remaining 950,000 tonnes of  fuel oil (or its equivalent in economic aid); 
being removed from the US list of  state sponsors of  terror; progress toward 
‘normal’ relations with both the US and Japan; and possibly setting up a 
negotiating forum to replace the current armistice from the 1950–53 Korean 
war with a permanent peace agreement.
There is lots of  scope for the process to run off  the rails, and nobody 
is saying anything about when Pyongyang might be asked to hand over its 
remaining plutonium. In addition, in September Israel bombed a facility in 
northeastern Syria, apparently after sharing its motives with Washington. 
Secrecy about the raid has been tight but leaks and informed speculation 
are pointing to a Syrian effort, with North Korean assistance, to construct a 
small nuclear reactor.
Syria has since removed every trace of  construction activity at the suspect 
site. The Six-Party process, which last met at the end of  September, remained 
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(surprisingly) insulated from this event, but one would not expect this to 
last. Washington will surely want Pyongyang’s declaration to include details 
of  all its nuclear cooperation activities with external agencies and for such 
activities to stop.
28 January 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
RON HUISkEN
Nuclear disarmament: from the loony left to the 
realist right*
Something curious is afoot. Nuclear disarmament might be on the verge of  
being thought about in the corridors of  power. With the possible exception 
of  the very early years of  the nuclear age, the abolition of  these defining 
weapons of  mass destruction has been the objective of  idealists and do-
gooders who neither understood the real world nor had any responsibility 
for advancing the national interest while protecting the peace. For those 
who walked, or aspired to walk, the corridors of  power, any association 
with the nuclear disarmament movement was the kiss of  death, a really bad 
career move.
Nuclear weapons were the decisive instrument of  power, a technological 
miracle that had reshaped the international environment. Aspiring to be a 
competitive global power was unthinkable without nuclear weapons. As the 
nuclear age matured, the view solidified that nuclear weapons had made 
hegemonic war—that is, war between major powers to directly transform 
An edited version was published as ‘Realist right’s nuclear move’, Canberra Times, 28 January 
2008.
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the distribution of  power in the world—too costly. In the recent past, the 
industrial revolution had made such wars catastrophically destructive, but 
they still happened. Nuclear weapons were credited with a key positive role, 
not changing the nature of  the international system or the character of  the 
elites that make it up, but of  transforming hegemonic war into an utterly 
intimidating abyss and compelling major powers to be ‘better people’.
Even for hard-headed realists, however, circumstances have shifted. For 
some of  the most respected realists—the likes of  Henry Kissinger and 
George Shultz—the balance of  considerations on whether to take a closer 
look at nuclear disarmament or keep it at several arms’ length has tilted 
toward the former.
Two linked pennies have dropped. First, it is now clear that reliably 
preventing any state from acquiring the materials and technology to make 
the bomb is a thing of  the past. If  North Korea—which ranks 157th out of  
196 states in terms of  GDP per capita—can do it, pretty much anyone can. 
Each instance of  proliferation lights the nuclear fuse in neighbouring states. 
The fuse may be long or short, and it may burn quickly or slowly, but the 
fallout is a new bunch of  states in which nuclear weapons transition from an 
academic interest to a political concern that has consequences for resource 
allocation. Second, if  prevention must give way to dissuasion or voluntary 
abstinence as the primary non-proliferation tool, the authority of  those 
urging restraint is crippled if  the existing nuclear weapon states convey the 
impression that they really have no intention of  giving them up.
One can look at the nuclear proliferation record and view it as a 
considerable success: in the six decades since the Trinity test in July 1945, 
eight new countries got the bomb (with one, South Africa, subsequently 
erasing its capacity). That’s a bit more than one a decade on average. But, 
together with the near certainty that business-as-usual means more nuclear 
aspirants, this has been enough to lead to serious concerns about the 
prospects of  maintaining stability and protecting the taboo on the use of  
these weapons as the number of  disparate centres of  political power in 
command of  nuclear arsenals expands.
This tilt in perceptions about the value of  nuclear weapons and the 
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outlook for proliferation has been turbocharged by the advent of  al-Qaeda-
style mass casualty terrorism. The states that possess nuclear weapons have 
all found that the toughest thing about extracting some political utility 
from them is to generate credibility about the will to actually use them. 
These weapons are literally ‘powerful beyond purpose’ and self-deterrence 
has been the order of  day. The concern is that for some contemporary 
terrorist groups—those disposed to define objectives so fantastically 
disproportionate to their strength that it ‘legitimises’ unlimited tactics—may 
not be prone to self-deterrence. The link to proliferation is unsophisticated 
but compelling. We can be confident that such groups cannot produce the 
fuel for a bomb but every location in every state in the world where this 
material (or the bombs themselves) is manufactured, stored or deployed 
constitutes a potential source. The greater the number of  such locations 
the higher the probability that someday, somehow, terrorists will succeed in 
penetrating whatever security barriers are in place and equip themselves to 
attempt a nuclear strike at the target of  their choice.
The non-proliferation regime—a complex of  treaties, formal and informal 
institutions, innumerable resolutions on aspirations and moral standards—is 
in disarray. One need look no further than Iran and North Korea. These two 
states have been utterly disdainful of  the regime so painstakingly constructed 
to preclude new nuclear weapon states, yet they never encountered the kind 
of  spontaneous and resounding ‘stop’ from the international community 
that might have registered with their political leaders. From the Security 
Council and the General Assembly in the UN to the IAEA and the Six-
Party talks it proved impossible to get everyone on the same page, giving 
these states ample room to feint, prevaricate and continue to develop their 
nuclear capabilities.
Can we rebuild the integrity of  the non-proliferation objective? Of  course 
we can. It will not be easy or quick. If  the past is any guide, some credible 
state, or small group of  states, will have to commit considerable political 
and diplomatic energy and display both creativity and dogged persistence in 
pressing the several sides of  this agenda forward simultaneously in all the 
relevant forums. We will need to draw some lessons from the past. For one 
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thing, the US and, to a lesser extent, Russia, have a crucial leadership role 
but we should not stake everything on them doing everything by themselves 
for an indefinite period. We need to provide for regular reaffirmations 
of  restraint and, as appropriate, concrete new obligations from all the 
other nuclear weapon states. And, this time, Israel must become a player. 
For another, we should resist the temptation to aim directly for complete 
nuclear disarmament. We need an interim vantage point that offers a more 
uncluttered view of  what a world without nuclear weapons would look like 
and what needs to be done to go safely to zero with confidence that we can 
stay there. This is difficult to do from our present vantage point atop some 
30,000 nuclear weapons, many still on high alert, and with arsenals still sized 
by scenarios for their actual use. Thirdly, the community of  states without 
nuclear weapons will have to shift collectively to display zero tolerance 
on proliferation, including exploring arrangements that would allow the 
current ‘right’ to nationally owned capacities to manufacture nuclear fuels 
to be given up. These several ‘fronts’ are interdependent and need to be 
pushed forward simultaneously. In managerial jargon, we must aspire to a 
program that provides for 360 degree reinforcement and encouragement. 
In the national security business, the instinct to be safe rather than sorry is 
particularly powerful, especially so in the case of  something as potentially 
decisive as nuclear weapons. Keeping these instincts in check will be 
formidably difficult.
Australia could consider playing a prominent role in this crucial endeavour. 
We have the resources, a strong reputation in the arms-control field, a 
‘special’ relationship with the US and a compelling interest in the outcome. 
The demand for our uranium is an agony because the non-proliferation 
regime looks so unstable. And we should remember that proliferation is not 
just defined by Iran and North Korea at the present time. It is a problem for 
all time. If  it is not tackled decisively Australia must expect to eventually face 
compelling pressures to also become a nuclear weapon state.
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13 June 2008
THE AGE
ROBERT AYSON
Will the world say no to nukes?*
It’s too easy to be cynical about Kevin Rudd’s new nuclear commission. 
After getting low marks for ignoring Tokyo’s place in regional affairs, the 
prime minister needed a big initiative during his visit to Japan. What better 
than to launch a new campaign for nuclear disarmament in the only country 
to have experienced the catastrophe of  a nuclear attack?
With his government’s post-election honeymoon well and truly over, 
Rudd also needed to look prime ministerial again on the world stage. In his 
bottom drawer were plans to reinvent the last Labor government’s Canberra 
Commission, which in the early post-Cold War years had called for the 
elimination of  nuclear weapons. Dust that idea off, bring in Gareth Evans 
and, hey presto, Australia was back leading the global campaign for a world 
where nuclear weapons might one day be consigned to the history books.
A minor groundswell of  international opinion is ready to support this 
grand vision. In America, seasoned political heavyweights have been arguing 
that it’s finally time to get rid of  nuclear weapons. India has expressed a 
renewed interest in global disarmament.
Australia is a suitable candidate to help take the lead. It has strong 
credentials in arms control and non-proliferation policy and is a responsible 
exporter of  uranium for civilian uses. In the early 1990s, Canberra also 
shaped the successful international effort to ban chemical weapons.
There is plenty to be done. Even though it is nearly two decades since the 
Berlin Wall came down, the United States and Russia retain thousands of  
warheads. China, Britain and France—who round off  the five recognised 
nuclear weapons states according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
First published in The Age, 13 June 2008.
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(NPT)—have their own weapons.
It is not clear how India and Pakistan can be accommodated into the 
same treaty they refused to sign. Israel remains an obvious, but undeclared, 
possessor of  nuclear weapons in a region not known for its stability. The 
customised responses to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and to 
Iran’s flirtation with the nuclear fuel cycle remain only partial successes at 
best. Several threshold countries, including Japan, have the capacity to go 
nuclear in short order, should they so wish.
But putting the nuclear genie back into its bottle remains a perilously 
difficult pursuit. The big five are especially reluctant to forgo the security 
advantages of  nuclear possession. They use every reason in the book to 
avoid their commitments under the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament. 
They are too easily distracted by the tiny programs of  the nuclear small fry 
and concerns over nuclear terrorism.
The major powers also know that a non-nuclear world would not 
necessarily be safer than the one we have now. Australia and other countries 
that have lived under America’s nuclear umbrella know that too.
Fortunately, the Rudd commission doesn’t have to achieve a great deal 
of  disarmament for it to be worth the effort. As the 2005 NPT review 
conference was such a failure, just getting international attention focused 
back onto the nuclear question would be an accomplishment. A more 
constructive 2010 review conference would be a small but valuable prize.
But the commission will probably want to achieve more than this. The 
NPT is really a temporary solution. Its main achievement has been to help 
stop the spread of  nuclear weapons far beyond the original five: one can 
still count the number of  states with nuclear weapons on the fingers of  
two hands. For those wanting a nuclear-free world, a proper international 
convention prohibiting nuclear weapons is the ultimate mechanism.
If  the commission pushes for this ambitious agenda, realists will dismiss 
Rudd’s body as utopian. They may be right, but big dreams can sometimes 
lead to small but significant achievements. One critical ingredient will be 
required: the active participation of  the big five (and India, as the unofficial 
sixth nuclear weapons state). Barack Obama has already identified progress 
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on controlling nuclear weapons as a foreign policy priority. If  he is elected 
US president, and the Russians and Chinese come on board, Rudd’s 
announcement in Japan might just be the start of  something substantial. 
Yet none of  the great powers will relinquish their weapons without a huge 
diplomatic fight, if  at all.
Nuclear possession remains a potent symbol of  great power. Yet it is 
still possible that the world can be galvanised into real action on nuclear 
weapons. Unfortunately, this might require the event none of  us wants: the 
first use of  nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It would be 
sad if  tomorrow’s historians concluded that it took a small, but still awful, 
nuclear detonation in New York or London or Paris or Beijing or Moscow 
or Delhi to make the world sit up and take this issue seriously.
This also means we might not want to judge Rudd’s commission harshly 
if  it doesn’t live up to the hype: because things might need to get worse if  
we really want them to get better.
14 July 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
SANdY GORdON
Selling uranium to India*
The renewed possibilities of  an agreement between the US and India on 
civil nuclear cooperation again puts the issue of  sale of  uranium by Australia 
to India into Canberra’s ‘in tray’. This is a first order issue for India. Short 
of  energy and uranium and with an ambitious civil nuclear program, India is 
hungry for imported uranium.
Published as ‘India is hungry for our uranium’, Canberra Times, 14 July 2008.
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Given India has one of  the world’s lowest per capita rates of  energy 
consumption and a high economic growth rate, the country has an urgent 
requirement for additional sources of  ‘clean’ energy in order to develop 
without contributing overly to global warming.
India is working hard to develop renewable energy sources, but these 
cannot cope with the rapid rise in demand. It is therefore burning increasing 
amounts of  low-grade coal, which it has in abundance. In these circumstances, 
India regards nuclear energy as an important part of  its future energy mix.
Australian uranium is not absolutely essential to India’s civil nuclear 
program, because other countries such as Russia, France, and even China, 
would provide fuel should Australia refuse. Burgeoning Australian sales onto 
world markets will have the general effect of  loosening markets, even should 
Australia refuse to sell directly to India.
But New Delhi cannot understand why Australia has refused to sell to 
India while it has agreed to sell to China, given what India regards as China’s 
somewhat dubious reputation on horizontal proliferation and its lack of  
democratic credentials. It regards sale of  uranium as an ‘earnest of  intent’ 
in circumstances in which Australia has reiterated the importance of  the 
relationship.
All that is not enough in itself  to justify an Australian decision to sell, but 
it should be weighed up in the equation. Australia also needs to be mindful 
of  counter-proliferation demands, and Labor needs to resolve some pressing 
internal issues in relation to nuclear energy.
As to the latter, it would have been a ‘bridge too far’ for the Rudd 
government to have agreed to sell uranium to India in an election environment 
and on the back of  a decision to abandon the three-mines policy. Labor was 
also able to make electoral capital out of  the coalition’s discomfiture on 
nuclear power and the ‘not in my back yard’ syndrome. But those exigencies 
of  the election campaign have now passed into history.
So the key issue becomes: would an Australian agreement to sell to India 
significantly undermine the non-proliferation regime?
Given that the 45-member Nuclear Supplier’s Group (which includes 
Australia) and the US itself  would have agreed to free up India’s civil nuclear 
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program should current proposals proceed, it is difficult to see how an 
Australian holdout would make any difference in terms of  proliferation, 
other than helping to keep Australia’s credentials pure.
Should India be successfully inducted into the global civil nuclear regime, 
we would have what would amount to a three-tier system—one in which 
the N5 states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) would be at the top as 
‘legitimate’ nuclear weapons states; then would come India as a ‘responsible’, 
but not fully legitimate, nuclear weapons state; and beneath that would 
be Pakistan and Israel, plus any other state that acquires weapons in the 
future.
This category of  ‘responsible’ nuclear weapons states would have all 
the normal strictures against horizontal proliferation applying to it, since 
its members would effectively have acceded to the IAEA non-proliferation 
regime.
Membership of  the second tier would have the additional benefit of  
enhancing civil nuclear safety regimes. This is a very important issue for 
India, which cannot avoid constructing reactors near heavily populated 
areas.
However, the existence of  such a category could also be seen as an 
incentive to proliferate—or at least as the removal of  the existing disincentive 
built around the effective isolation from global civil nuclear trade.
Might not Iran, for example, be encouraged in its proliferation efforts by 
the possibility that one day it too could enter the second tier? And might 
not the sense that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is hypocritical 
be increased by the induction of  India while other nuclear powers are 
refused?
But on the other hand, it could also be argued that possible membership 
of  the second tier could act as an incentive for countries like Pakistan to 
behave responsibly in terms of  global counter-proliferation efforts in order 
one day to enter the second tier. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan 
perpetrated major horizontal proliferation in its role of  nuclear ‘pariah’, the 
NPT notwithstanding.
There is also a wider argument concerning India’s induction into the civil 
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nuclear regime that goes beyond proliferation and greenhouse concerns.
India’s rise as a responsible Asian power—one that contributes positively 
to Asia’s increasingly troubled strategic environment and one that has 
common cause with Australia’s democratic and regional objectives—will 
greatly depend on the relationships it forges with the US and its allies such 
as Australia and Japan in the next few years.
An India left out of  the civil nuclear regime by the US and Australia 
would be less likely to view its future in Asia as being aligned with Australia, 
the US and like-minded countries and the security objectives they would like 
to achieve.
Such an India would also be less likely to support the current NPT regime 
and its objectives. And given India’s imminent rise as an important Asian 
strategic and economic power, this could have some considerable impact on 
the regime itself.
So it makes sense for the Rudd government to support India’s induction 
into the global civil nuclear regime. And this, in turn, implies that Australia 
should eventually agree to sell uranium to India.
9 September 2008
THE AGE
ROBERT AYSON
Status quo on uranium sales the safe course*
The Rudd government’s policy on nuclear cooperation with India seems at 
risk of  disconnecting from itself. On the one hand Australia has not stood 
in the way of  India’s waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the body that 
First published in The Age, 9 September 2008.
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controls global nuclear commerce, for its nuclear deal with the US. But on 
the other hand Australia will still not sell its own uranium to India until, or 
unless, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government joins the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
This stance may sound like a grand contradiction. But there may be some 
understandable reasons for the Rudd government’s hesitancy on uranium 
sales, at least for the time being. The first is political consistency: the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) campaigned on the platform that Australia 
should retain its existing policy to sell uranium only to NPT countries. In its 
last months in office, the Howard government advocated uranium sales to 
India, partly in an attempt to wedge Rudd. The coalition is now accusing the 
new government of  missing a fine chance to improve Australia’s relationship 
with India. The Rudd team is unlikely to give its domestic opponents such a 
victory, at least not in the short term.
The second reason is party-political reality: Australia’s involvement in 
uranium mining and exportation has long been a sensitive issue for the 
ALP. Sales to India might suggest that there are now few obstacles to the 
expansion of  an industry that some state governments would oppose. Selling 
uranium to India would require Rudd to stare down opponents within his 
own party, especially at the state level. He would get there, but it could be 
an ugly fight.
The third reason is process: the US–India nuclear cooperation agreement 
still has to get approval from the American Senate which, like all other US 
political institutions, is now preoccupied by the November elections. Senate 
approval is the last piece of  a puzzle. The difficult steps along the way 
included the Singh government’s desperate, but eventually successful, efforts 
to secure support from a fractured Indian Parliament. They also included 
India’s nuclear waiver, which a few countries (including New Zealand) 
resisted to the bitter end. Given all these obstacles, the Rudd government 
could have been excused for thinking that the process would seize up entirely 
before it became a live question for Australia.
The US–India deal will help put in place the de facto non-proliferation 
treaty that is being built up around India as it is welcomed as a nearly official 
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member of  the nuclear weapons club. India will also have separate safeguard 
arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and has agreed 
to separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities. As India’s accession to 
the NPT is extremely unlikely—because the treaty does not recognise India 
as a nuclear weapons state and because India is unlikely to disarm any time 
soon—this might just be the best we can get.
And the direct proliferation dangers involved in selling uranium to India 
are few and far between. There is every chance that India would use Australian 
uranium only to fuel its civilian power supply as its rapidly growing economy 
demands additional energy sources. Also, India is extremely unlikely to pass 
on nuclear material to potential proliferators.
So what is the Rudd government’s problem? Selling uranium would 
represent Australia’s ultimate endorsement of  India’s decision to challenge 
the non-proliferation regime. Behaving nicely at the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group stretched Australia’s principled stand about as far as it could go. 
Anything more might just weaken the Rudd government’s case that it is 
an especially strong supporter of  the non-proliferation treaty. It would risk 
the criticism that while India may be an otherwise responsible possessor of  
nuclear weapons, the stage has been set for other states to join the queue.
There is no question, for example, that India’s nuclear weapons program, 
and its very public nuclear tests in 1998, helped to drive and legitimise 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. Given international concerns that 
Pakistan’s arsenal may not always remain under strict, responsible and unified 
control, a complete free pass to India might be pushing things too far for 
some in Rudd’s cabinet.
It has to be remembered that Rudd has launched an international 
commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which is 
being led by two former foreign ministers: Australia’s Gareth Evans and 
Japan’s Yoriko Kawaguchi. Anything that seriously questioned Australia’s 
commitment to the NPT might also affect the commission as it seeks to 
strengthen international resolve for the treaty’s 2010 review conference.
Australia’s cooperation on India’s nuclear waiver is already pushing the 
boundaries because the deal with the US is not universally regarded as 
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good for nuclear non-proliferation. A change in policy on uranium sales, at 
least for now, would almost definitely be a bridge too far. But the issue will 
resurface and it may get harder and harder for the Rudd government to keep 
saying no.
defence and  
Security
21 December 2007
THE AUSTRALIAN
PAUL dIBB
Defence policy can’t be left to doomsayers*
The harbingers of  doom are at it again. This time, some Europeans are 
claiming that climate change is an existential security threat whose effects 
will be catastrophic, like global nuclear war. Australian Federal Police 
Commissioner Mick Keelty has described climate change as ‘the security 
issue of  the twenty-first century’, one that could ‘pose national security 
issues like we’ve never seen before’. Then we had Lord May, a former chief  
scientific adviser to the British government, warning Australians of  the 
threat of  climate change causing armed conflicts as the world’s population 
fought over limited water supplies and other resources.
Now we have Alan Dupont, professor of  international security studies 
at the University of  Sydney, calling for a fundamental reassessment of  our 
national security because he believes climate change ‘has emerged rapidly to 
become one of  the most serious potential security challenges’.
First published in The Australian, 21 December 2007.
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Rather than spend money on new defence equipment, Dupont says ‘more 
consideration needs to be given to funding ways to meet non-traditional 
security threats’.
National security is a greatly abused concept. The definition of  serious 
threats should be restricted to events that could undermine our sovereignty, 
democratic freedoms and rule of  law, and economic prosperity.
Australia’s security interests are few in number and should be expressed 
in order of  priority. This will be a challenging task for Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd’s new national security adviser.
When it comes to climate change, it will not be good enough to evoke 
generalised threats that could simply inconvenience us. Any security 
challenges arising from climate change will take time, unlike, for example, 
a global nuclear war. Increases in temperature or water levels will not occur 
overnight.
Of  course, Rudd is right to focus on climate change as a key challenge for 
Australia’s prosperity. But it is far too early to say that a clear set of  priorities 
has emerged for the national security agenda. Populations weakened by 
famine and water shortages are hardly likely to travel across vast distances 
in their millions to get to Australia. And there is a very limited number of  
situations in which any country today will wage war in order to increase its 
water supply.
Climate change could, however, undermine the security of  some countries 
in Australia’s neighbourhood and produce failed states that will certainly 
require our assistance, but the prospect of  climate change leading to inter-
state war is unlikely. We need to be more careful about identifying parts of  
the world that will be most seriously affected by climate change in a security 
sense. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 
London, different regions will be affected in different ways but the overall 
impact is likely to increase the vulnerability of  areas that are already prone 
to conflict, poverty and disease.
According to the IISS, there will be moderate but below-average declines 
in rice yields in South and Southeast Asia over the next few decades, with 
large but average declines by the last quarter of  the century. The monsoon 
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is likely to become, on average, warmer and wetter.
In East Asia rice, the dominant regional food crop, will experience small 
and below-average declines in yield in the next 20 to 30 years, with moderate 
but nonetheless below-average declines later in the century. There will be 
a small increase in available water resources in the next few decades and 
moderate increases later in the century.
The population at risk of  coastal flooding is expected to increase 
significantly, particularly in China, but this is mostly because of  population 
growth rather than the effects of  climate change.
Australia is expected to experience below-average declines in wheat yields, 
and water resources are expected to increase marginally overall, though 
southern areas will be hardest hit where drought does occur. The IISS 
observes, however, that Australia is especially vulnerable to rainfall variation, 
and there is therefore scope for extreme variations from the norm.
As a result of  increases in the sea level, the island nations of  the South 
Pacific are particularly at risk from flooding, but the threat of  submergence, 
with its profound human and political consequences, ‘will be marginal unless 
warming significantly exceeds the mean projection’.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that some parts of  the 
world, such as Africa, South America and the Middle East, are more likely to 
be seriously affected by climate change in a security sense than Australia.
There is, however, a significant degree of  uncertainty in the science 
surrounding these predictions. Regional climate change models are not well 
developed.
Of  course, it would be a different matter if  it could be demonstrated that 
climate change will fundamentally undermine Australia’s economic strength 
and, therefore, our strategic position. According to the latest Australian 
Bureau of  Agricultural and Resource Economics assessment, Australia is 
projected to be one of  the most adversely affected regions from future 
changes in climate in terms of  reductions in agricultural production and 
exports.
This brings me to the suggestion that we should cut the defence budget 
going to hi-tech equipment in favour of  funding measures against non-
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traditional security threats, such as climate change. But the proponents of  
this idea fail to make clear how they are going to combat the security threats 
of  climate change: is it with a bigger army, a larger federal police force, or 
some sort of  peace corps?
We need to be clear, however, that they risk undermining Australia’s 
military power in a part of  the world where the geopolitical balance is 
changing rapidly, and not necessarily in our favour. Successive Australian 
governments have given priority to our defence force maintaining a clear 
regional technological advantage. I expect the Rudd government to do the 
same.
11 February 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
PAUL dIBB
Razor gang must establish harsh discipline*
Treasurer Wayne Swan has reportedly refused to guarantee that he would 
not reduce defence spending in the 2008/09 budget, despite assurances of  
no cuts to defence by Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner.
But why should defence not have its budget reviewed by Kevin Rudd’s 
razor gang? It is one thing for Labor to honour one of  its election promises 
‘to (maintain) defence spending, including a minimum annual 3 per cent 
real growth’. It is another matter altogether to treat the defence budget 
as sacrosanct. Indeed, the Labor Party’s election policy for defence also 
included a commitment ‘to (ensure) that defence dollars are spent more 
effectively and efficiently’.
First published in The Australian, 11 February 2008.
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The only time a nation’s defence budget should be untouchable is when 
there is a clear and imminent military threat to the country. Evidently, that 
is not the case now. That is not to argue there are no credible threats to 
Australia for which we should not prudently plan. Neither is it to deny that 
the central aim of  our defence posture must be to maintain a clear margin 
of  technological advantage in our region. But does anyone believe that there 
are no efficiency savings to be made from the huge A$22 billion defence 
budget?
It is now almost 11 years since the last defence efficiency review was 
undertaken in the early days of  the Howard government, That review 
was confident that mature annual savings of  at least A$770 million were 
achievable, with good prospects of  reaching annual savings of  about A$1 
billion, or about 10 per cent of  total defence expenditure. Corresponding 
staff  reductions were expected to be about 4,700 military personnel and 
3,100 civilians, with most of  the military positions expected to be recreated 
in the combat force, while the civilian positions would be lost. A further 
12,900 positions would be subject to market testing.
Remember that this was more than a decade ago. So, scaling up to 
present-day values, what is wrong with the proposal that a new Rudd defence 
efficiency review should have as its aim finding cost savings of  at least 5 per 
cent of  the defence budget and mature savings of  10 per cent? That would 
amount to initial savings of  about A$1 billion a year with mature savings of  
A$2 billion a year.
These are serious amounts of  money at a time when the federal 
government is reportedly looking for overall savings in the order of  A$18 
billion. Savings of  this magnitude would instil serious discipline into the 
management of  the defence budget.
I would further argue that while the Howard government was very good 
to defence, increasing the defence budget by 47 per cent in real terms, it 
was not good at enforcing cost savings after the defence efficiency review. 
Indeed, over time it encouraged the single service chiefs to believe that they 
could pretty well have whatever they wanted: Abrams tanks, the region’s 
biggest amphibious assault ships and largest transport aircraft, and of  course 
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the Super Hornet fighters.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Mark Thomson has pointed 
out that, as a result of  these and other initiatives, about A$250 billion 
of  taxpayers’ money is slated to be spent on defence during the coming 
decade.
However, this does not include serious shortfalls to cover the operating 
costs of  the many new advanced technology capabilities due to enter service 
over the next few years, such as airborne early warning and control aircraft, 
armed reconnaissance helicopters, the new generation air warfare destroyers 
and fighter aircraft, as well as more than A$11 billion to harden, network 
and expand the army by about 4,400 personnel.
As taxpayers, we simply do not know how much more money will be 
needed to deliver existing plans for the defence force and sustain escalating 
operating costs and through-life support costs.
Then there is the bureaucracy. As Thomson points out, in the past seven 
years the number of  public servants in defence has grown by more than 19 
per cent while permanent uniformed personnel have grown by less than 3 
per cent. What’s wrong with the razor gang focusing on that?
The Howard government’s defence management review last year observed 
that ‘the comparative wealth of  the organisation undermines respect for 
cost and efficiency’. That is a damning observation.
In fact, defence can’t even spend the money already allocated to it. Since 
the middle of  last year, almost A$760 million has been either handed back 
because of  delays in acquisition projects or reprogrammed into future 
years. Of  course, the unremitting high operational tempo of  the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) has meant that the focus of  the senior military and 
civilian leadership has been directed overwhelmingly towards overseas 
military operations. This is undoubtedly stressing the organisation, even 
though the numbers of  personnel involved are only about 3,500 at any one 
time (or about 6.5 per cent of  the total size of  the ADF). But it must be 
also understood that funding for overseas operations is in addition to the 
approved budget: so, in that sense, the budget for military operations is 
protected.
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What is needed now is a tough-minded defence white paper that does 
what the previous government did not do: that is, establish a firm linkage 
between declaratory strategic policy and force structure priorities.
The Australian public needs to be told, for a change, what the strategic 
rationale is for each major force structure acquisition. We must put an end 
to military purchases by political (or military) whim.
In recent years we saw an increasing disconnect between what the 
Howard government said were our strategic priorities closer to home and the 
creation of  an expeditionary force for far-flung operations at great distance 
from Australia. Although, from time to time, we will need to contribute to 
coalition operations in such theatres as the Middle East, such commitments 
should not drive the ADF’s force structure.
The fact of  the matter is that Australia’s security is inextricably linked to 
our own region, which faces an uncertain future and is becoming increasingly 
well armed. This is where we can make a decisive difference, and it should 
form the basis of  setting priorities for our force structure. The defence 
budget must be tailored accordingly.
But the defence budget has got off  too lightly in recent years. It is time to 
re-establish harsh discipline over force structure priorities and the need to 
harvest serious cost and efficiency savings for the good of  our country.
142 Capturing the Year — 2008
7 June 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
HUGH WHITE
Defence white paper: what do we want the ADF to be 
able to do?*
In 2000, when John Howard’s National Security Committee (NSC) was 
considering the last defence white paper, officials summed up the key issue in 
a single PowerPoint slide. It said that ministers faced a simple choice. Either 
they could focus Australia’s future defence capabilities on stabilisation and 
peacekeeping operations, or they could build forces to meet the more remote 
risk of  a conventional war, or they could do both. In the end Howard and 
his colleagues chose the third option. It was a momentous choice, requiring 
long-term real increases in defence funding of  3 per cent per annum.
Over the next few months, as Kevin Rudd’s NSC sits down to consider 
the next white paper, they will face exactly the same choice, but this time it 
will be harder. All the issues that were on the table in 2000 are still there, but 
after eight years they look even more demanding than they did then.
In 2000 it was clear that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) would 
need to be able to deploy small contingents to support US-led coalition 
operations in the Gulf  and elsewhere beyond our region, as we had often 
done in the 1990s. But we did not expect to find ourselves with almost 
two thousand personnel deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan on stabilisation 
operations which seem likely to last indefinitely.
In 2000, following International Force East Timor (INTERFET) 
deployment in East Timor the previous year, it was clear that Australia would 
need to keep taking a more active role in supporting peace and stability in 
our immediate neighbourhood, and that the ADF would be an important 
Published as ‘Careful choices will be dictated by the costs Australia is willing to pay’, The 
Australian, 7 June 2008.
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part of  that. But we did not expect to find ourselves as deeply committed 
as we now are in East Timor and in Solomon Islands on operations which 
again, like those in the Middle East, seem likely to last indefinitely, while the 
risks of  even greater long-term commitments in Papua New Guinea and 
elsewhere have hardly lessened.
Lastly, in 2000 it was clear that the rise of  China and India posed 
important challenges to the future peace and stability of  Asia, as the Asian 
order adjusted to their rising power. But now it is clearer just how difficult 
those adjustments are going to be. Even as their economies intertwine, the 
US and China increasingly identify one another as strategic and political 
competitors, and the region may already have started to slide towards a 
future in which Asia is divided into two mutually hostile camps. All this 
brings closer the kinds of  changes to Asia’s order which would undermine 
the security Australia has enjoyed from armed attack for the past 40 years.
In this tougher world, Rudd and his colleagues will have to make very 
careful choices if  they are to design a force which can meet Australia’s needs 
at a cost they are willing to pay. The essential first step will be to define the 
things they think the ADF needs to be able to do.
Some will argue for a narrow view that would limit the core roles of  
the ADF to defending the continent from local threats and stabilising our 
immediate neighbours. That would help keep the defence budget under 
control. But some argue that it would expose Australia to real risks if  Asia’s 
order breaks down and we find ourselves over the next few decades facing 
the possibility of  major Asian powers projecting forces towards Australia 
and its close neighbours. They ask whether we can simply assume that the 
US will rescue us if  that happens: shouldn’t we build forces that would allow 
us to help ourselves? The white paper will need to confront this question 
head-on.
Likewise, ministers will need to consider what kind of  contribution 
Australia might want to make, if  any, to help the US should Washington go 
to war with China over an issue like Taiwan. And some of  the government’s 
advisers will probably argue that Australia needs to be able to do more to 
support the US in the Middle East than we have done since 9/11, pointing 
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out that our contribution has been relatively small compared with other US 
allies. Do we need more heavy land forces for this role?
Finally, ministers will need to consider what we really expect the ADF 
to be able to do to underwrite stability among our small island neighbours. 
Kevin Rudd, like John Howard before him, talks expansively of  Australia’s 
interests and responsibilities in the arc of  instability, but if  he really expects 
the ADF to do much about them, he will find himself  looking at a much 
bigger army than Australia has seen for many decades.
Back in 2000 it was possible for Howard and his colleagues to just say 
‘yes’ to most of  these questions. For Rudd and his colleagues, and in 2008, 
it will be much harder. But the worst thing they could do is duck them, 
because if  they cannot decide what the ADF needs to do, there is no chance 
that they can design a force to do it.
1 September 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
CLIvE WILLIAMS
Rudd’s national security alert *
It is to be hoped that Prime Minister Rudd will take the opportunity of  
his forthcoming national security statement to move beyond education and 
revolutionise the national security environment as well.
National security used to be all about the survival of  the nation state, but 
now it is more about the wellbeing of  the nation state. This broadens the 
management parameters of  national security considerably. National security 
used to be mainly the province of  defence, diplomacy and intelligence, now 
First published in Canberra Times, 1 September 2008.
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it encompasses a wide range of  government entities at federal, state and 
local levels.
Security challenges today may be internal to the nation state or external. 
They may be man-made or naturally created. They include climate change 
and extreme interpretations of  Islam, development of  a uniform and 
unbiased education system, and countering foreign intelligence collection 
and espionage.
In many ways the nation state has less capability to deal with the external 
challenges posed by globalisation and non-state actors—such as multinational 
corporations, international organisations (including transnational criminal 
networks), non-government organisations, terrorists—than it had in the 
past to deal with the threat posed by hostile nation states.
In addition, wealthier nation states, like Australia, are expected to take some 
responsibility for the national security needs of  their poorer neighbours, 
particularly when it comes to disaster relief.
Disease poses a continuously evolving threat. HIV/AIDS is being 
contained to some extent, but still kills two million people a year. A new 
naturally evolving pandemic could have disastrous consequences for us if  
we could not deal with it effectively offshore. In the time-cycle of  disease 
recurrence, the world is overdue for a lethal pandemic.
Do we have the capacity to plan sufficiently to cope with the new 
challenges, and will our bureaucracy help or hinder in that process?
The Australian government bureaucracy is competent, but unimaginative. 
Politicians don’t mind because it makes them look progressive by comparison. 
New governments often have plans to introduce radical change, but soon 
become mired in everyday business. Confidential reviews by public servants 
buy time, but rarely lead to revolutionary change.
What we need in Australia is a rigorous examination from outside the 
system of  our national security requirements looking ahead to 2050. It 
should result in substantial cuts to parts of  the Australian Public Service. 
Like the Americans, we are good at building bureaucracies, but weak at 
downsizing them when needs change.
My national security Masters students have, as one of  their final 
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assignments, to make an assessment of  credible threats to Australia, using 
as variables: the scale of  the threat and its proximity in time and geography.
Students usually judge the most immediate threats to national security 
as pandemics (because they can kill large numbers of  people at short 
notice), terrorism and border security issues. The serious national security 
implications of  climate change are recognised, but related issues—like 
unregulated population flows to Australia—are a prospective national 
security problem rather than a current one.
They then have to prepare a national security budget allocated between 
defence, homeland security (which includes policing, protection of  offshore 
resources, quarantine, immigration), and foreign aid, intelligence and 
diplomacy. To some extent, treating intelligence separately is artificial because 
defence contains the most costly half  of  the intelligence community. But 
this is deliberate, to make students think about intelligence as a separate 
entity. Capability lead times are also taken into account.
Traditionally, about two-thirds of  the national security budget goes 
to defence. This is primarily because of  the high cost of  new air and sea 
platforms needed to project hard power. Today hard power has less utility, 
although US strategic policy could still lead to hard-power confrontations—
as with the Bush administration’s miscalculation in Georgia or its bellicose 
policy towards Iran.
Notwithstanding the traditional budget allocation mentioned, students 
(including from government), after working through the 30 or so credible 
challenges and threats, usually allocate about 35 per cent of  the national 
security budget to defence, give the same amount to homeland security, and 
about equal amounts from the 30 per cent remaining to intelligence, foreign 
aid and diplomacy.
Overall though, it does not mean that our national security needs will cost 
taxpayers more than they do now. A credible-threat based approach suggests 
that our defence assets either need to be reoriented to focus more on 
homeland security issues and humanitarian relief—or we need to downsize 
defence to provide additional funds to other areas.
Soft power provides us with considerable affordable flexibility to deal 
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with the kind of  external national security problems Australia faces and will 
face in the future in our region. (Soft power is the use of  strategies such as 
diplomacy, foreign aid, economic levers, psychological warfare, intelligence 
operations and reconstruction support.)
Australia will still need hard-power projection capabilities—but should 
we go for a few very expensive state-of-the-art combat platforms or more 
less expensive multipurpose platforms and more boots on the ground?
Even with a reduced budget, defence should be able to achieve a more 
substantial combat capability than it does today. The British Army, for 
example, is currently four times larger than the Australian Army, but relatively 
can field significantly more combat capability. Lieutenant General Gillespie’s 
Adaptive Army initiative is a step in the right direction. A large part of  our 
defence budget problem is a large defence bureaucracy that absorbs funds 
that should be going to materiel procurement and combat capability.
Some interesting statistics about defence in Australia: we have five times 
more star-rank military officers for the size of  force than the US military; 
for every three star-rank military officers we have an additional two civilian 
equivalents, and we rank 103rd in the world in terms of  active duty personnel 
for the size of  population (behind all of  our allies, including New Zealand, 
and just above Trinidad and Tobago).
In conclusion, we need to make radical national security-related changes 
to be able to cope effectively with twenty-first century challenges. As James 
Freeman Clarke noted, ‘A politician thinks of  the next election; a statesman 
thinks of  the next generation.’ Will Prime Minister Rudd prove to be the 
statesman we need?
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October 2008
APEC ECONOMIES NEWSLETTER
ANdREW MacINTYRE
Prime Minister Rudd’s Asia Pacific community 
proposal quietly grows
Four months ago, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd publicly floated 
an initiative to develop what he called an Asia Pacific Community, through 
which leaders of  all the key countries in the region would be able to come 
together. His proposal was greeted mostly with a mixture of  quiet puzzlement 
and outright scepticism. But this is an idea that is not going away. Over the 
course of  the next 12 months or so I expect momentum will be built for 
taking it further. As this happens, the emphasis in discussion will soon shift 
from whether or not this initiative will proceed to focus increasingly on the 
modalities of  how it will proceed.
Initial public responses to the proposal were wary. By far the most 
extensive discussion of  Mr Rudd’s initiative—and the most sceptical 
commentary—has come from within Australia itself. This wariness had 
more to do with Australian domestic politics than the international politics 
of  the Asia Pacific region, as Mr Rudd’s announcement of  the initiative 
came as the early ‘honeymoon’ phase of  the new Labor government 
passed and complaints were beginning to emerge about ‘initiative overload’ 
across the policy spectrum and about ‘under-organisation’ in the prime 
minister’s own office. A wide array of  Australian analysts, journalists and 
parliamentarians past and present were quick to criticise the Rudd proposal 
for being ‘half-baked’, lacking in detail and presumptuous for not having 
consulted other regional leaders in advance. These complaints were not 
without some substance—not only was the initial articulation of  the idea 
rather sketchy, with distracting references to the European Union, but even 
the distinguished former diplomat, Richard Woolcott, nominated to lead the 
regional consultation process, evidently learned about the proposal only a 
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few hours before it was announced.
But none of  these issues was decisive and, as Richard Woolcott himself  
has said, the circumstances were much the same nearly 20 years earlier when 
then Prime Minister Bob Hawke tasked him with leading a similar initial 
consultation process on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Much 
more important than the flurry of  debate within Australia has been the 
reaction within the Asia Pacific region. Some commentators were sceptical 
or even dismissive of  the proposal, with most government spokespersons 
expressing polite, non-committal interest in hearing further details. 
Significantly, no head of  government spoke decisively against the proposal.
In the world of  multilateral diplomacy, that constitutes a positive outcome. 
It is very rarely the case that proposals for large-scale multilateral engagement 
engender clear and strong enthusiasm—almost always the benefits are too 
diffuse for this to be the case. Much more telling is whether they generate 
clear and strong opposition. And that has not been the case.
The real diplomatic action—which for the most part does not appear in the 
newspaper headlines—is now underway. Mr Rudd’s special envoy, Richard 
Woolcott, has undertaken a first consultative foray into the region, focusing 
on key Southeast Asian countries. Subsequent rounds will see him working 
his way around the wider region. There have been no official statements 
from Rudd about progress, but informal indications are encouraging. This 
will help to build momentum.
Ultimately, the reason some version of  Rudd’s proposal is likely to succeed 
is that there is an underlying need for it. There is real scope for improving on 
the current situation of  regional consultation arrangements to the advantage 
of  all. Notwithstanding the variety of  existing frameworks for regional 
engagement along various dimensions—most prominently ASEAN, the 
ASEAN+3 framework, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC—
the inescapable problem is that none of  these arrangements brings all the 
main players from South Asia to the Americas together. It makes no sense 
that there is no framework which also includes both India and the United 
States. While all existing frameworks serve some specific purposes, none 
adequately meets the needs of  the region as a whole. There is no particular 
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virtue in preserving the status quo for its own sake; more than anything else 
it is inertia and the inherent difficulty of  taking multilateral diplomacy into 
new areas that preserves it.
Leadership to overcome these problems could come from almost anywhere 
in the region, but as a middle-sized player Australia is one of  a handful of  
countries that is well placed to offer it. And with Rudd’s quiet persistence it 
is quite likely that we will see results. Increasingly, the issue that is coming 
into focus is the modalities of  just how a comprehensive framework for 
regional engagement might be developed from the status quo.
There are several broad possibilities. One is that it could evolve by 
adapting one of  the existing frameworks. For instance, the membership 
of  the East Asian Summit might be expanded eastward across the Pacific. 
Or the membership of  APEC could be adjusted and expanded westward 
to South Asia. A second broad possibility is that a special gathering could 
take place on the coat-tails of  an existing forum. Here, too, there are 
several imaginable variants, but, by way of  illustration, an appropriately 
comprehensive gathering of  leaders could be engineered at the same time as 
the ASEAN or APEC summits, and evolve over time from there. Or third, 
an entirely new framework could be purpose-built from scratch.
None of  these broad possibilities is clearly superior to the others. Each 
has distinctive pros and cons. In the end, it is likely to be the path of  least 
resistance that prevails. And it may be that a one-off  and more limited 
gathering of  pivotal leaders is needed to start the process and help cut 
through some of  the initial complications.
To succeed, Rudd’s initiative will need to evolve into something much 
broader than just another proposal from a regionally activist Australian 
leader. At least some countries and some other leaders will need to come to 
view it as advancing their interests. This is quite likely to happen and in the 
process the character and form of  the initiative will evolve as ‘authorship’ 
widens. Indeed, that is what happened with all previous efforts to build 
frameworks for regional engagement, from ASEAN and APEC onwards.
The absence of  a vocal chorus of  public support for Rudd’s initiative 
might be thought of  as telling evidence of  a lack of  demand or even interest. 
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It is not. Frameworks for multilateral regional engagement—whether in the 
Asia Pacific region or any other—are not essential elements of  international 
engagement. That is why there is almost never overt demand for them. But 
they can be very helpful, even if  in quiet and low-profile ways. There was no 
great demand for ASEAN at the time of  its birth, but all Southeast Asian 
countries place value on it now. Similarly, for all its limitations, heads of  state 
continue to invest time and effort in the APEC process.
Kevin Rudd’s proposal has already evolved somewhat since his first speech 
in June. It will continue to do so as momentum gradually builds behind it 
and as an informal coalition of  leaders willing to support its development 
emerges. It is an idea whose time is coming.
November 2007
APEC ECONOMIES NEWSLETTER
JOHN RAvENHILL
The turn to preferential trade in the Asia Pacific
Since the turn of  the century, the Asia Pacific has become the most active 
region for the negotiation of  preferential trade agreements (PTA). The 
proliferation of  agreements represents a dramatic transformation from a 
few years ago. Before the East Asian financial crises of  1997–98, only one 
preferential trade agreement of  any substance existed in East Asia—the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. None of  East Asia’s major economies—
China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan—were parties to a preferential agreement.
In the five years following the crisis, most East Asian countries jumped 
aboard the PTA bandwagon—and the Australian government and others 
that had been similarly sceptical of  such agreements in the past joined suite. 
Today, more than 80 PTAs involving East Asian economies are either being 
implemented, negotiated or the subject of  study groups.
We now have a substantial database from which we can begin to draw 
conclusions about the move to preferential trade in the Asia Pacific region. 
Inevitably, such conclusions will have to be tentative. The number of  
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agreements that are actually being implemented is still relatively small; many 
of  them have only entered into force in the last couple of  years; and several 
contain provisions that will not be fully implemented for some considerable 
period. Nonetheless, some clear patterns have begun to emerge.
The first is that marked differences exist among the agreements both in 
their scope and in the motivations of  the parties in negotiating them. By far 
the most comprehensive agreements are those initiated by the United States. 
These go substantially beyond existing WTO commitments on issues such 
as intellectual property, investment and trade in services. At the other end 
of  the spectrum are the agreements involving China and ASEAN, which 
typically have very selective coverage of  trade (primarily in goods), flexible 
schedules for implementation and few aspirations for ‘WTO Plus’ ‘deeper’ 
integration.
Differences in the content of  the agreement are in part a reflection of  the 
range of  motivations that governments have in entering these negotiations. 
These typically are a combination of  both economic and political factors—
but the balance varies from country to country, and from one agreement 
to another. While the United States has used PTAs to reward allies and to 
pursue accelerated trade liberalisation, China has used the agreements to 
stake its claim to regional leadership and to attempt to improve the security 
of  its access to resources. Japan has been playing catch-up with China 
on both regional leadership and resource security, but has also pursued 
agreements that have levelled the playing field for its exporters in markets 
such as Mexico, where competitors already enjoyed preferred access.
What are the main outcomes of  the agreements and to what extent have 
they lived up to the claims that proponents and opponents have made for 
them?
(1) Overall Trade and Investment Flows: To date, the agreements have had 
little impact, belying the often wildly optimistic predictions made in some 
economic modelling. This is hardly surprising given the existing low levels of  
applied tariffs and the presence of  other arrangements, such as the WTO’s 
Information Technology Agreement, duty-drawback schemes and free trade 
zones in many East Asian countries, that all enable components to move 
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around the region tariff-free.
With the proliferation of  schemes, the advantages enjoyed by any one 
country often prove to be transitory. Preferences are also frequently offset 
by other factors, particularly movements in exchange rates. Moreover, 
private sector actors often decide that the benefits from preferences are not 
sufficient to outweigh the costs of  complying with rules of  origin. Non-
tariff  barriers (NTB) are now the principal obstacles to trade, but few PTAs 
address these (except in the area of  services trade).
(2) WTO Plus? Although most of  the PTAs negotiated in the Asia Pacific 
region contain some ‘WTO Plus’ elements, these provisions—with the 
exception of  the agreements involving the United States—are often very 
shallow. The typical reference is to ‘cooperation’ or to ‘facilitation’ on matters 
such as competition policy. The provisions on the environment are no 
stronger than vague commitments that states will not lower environmental 
standards in their efforts to attract foreign investment. Labour standards are 
seldom mentioned.
(3) Promotion of  Domestic Reform: Proponents have argued that by increasing 
external and domestic pressures for liberalisation, the negotiation of  PTAs 
will help promote structural adjustment. But such claims have been largely 
belied by the practice of  carving out sensitive domestic sectors, particularly 
in agriculture, from the agreements.
(4) Who Concedes Most? It is now well established that in PTA negotiations 
between parties of  unequal size, smaller economies make more concessions. 
Most PTAs in the Asia Pacific region follow this pattern, for example, those 
involving Japan and the United States. One significant exception exists: in 
its PTAs with ASEAN and with Hong Kong, China made the lion’s share of  
concessions, a reflection of  the political objectives it was pursuing.
(5) A Strengthening of  Regionalism? More than two-thirds of  the agreements 
negotiated by East Asian states are with countries from outside the region. 
Rather than strengthening regionalism, the new PTAs have tended to 
undermine it. Some ASEAN countries now give more extensive preferences 
to extraregional partners than they provide within ASEAN itself.
(6) Who Participates? The low-income economies of  the region participate 
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in few PTAs—a reflection of  the fact that they typically have relatively 
little to offer partners (although Indonesia is an exception given its natural 
resources). Their low participation also reflects their lack of  negotiating 
capacity and partners’ concerns about the lack of  state capacity to enforce 
any agreement reached.
PTAs are unlikely to have significant effects on aggregate flows of  trade and 
investment. They are most important for individual firms seeking particular 
advantages or attempting to level the playing field. They are important also 
in the services sector where a host of  NTBs prevail. Whether the benefits 
of  PTAs justify the resources being devoted to them is questionable. They 
tend to distract not only from talks at the global level but also from domestic 
reform efforts, both of  which hold the promise of  generating larger returns 
than those achieved through preferential agreements.
June 2008
APEC ECONOMIES NEWSLETTER
JENNY CORBETT ANd EvI FITRIANI
Australian perspectives on the road map towards 
East Asian economic integration
The Australian economy and East Asia
For thirty years, Australia has attempted to find a balance between its 
traditional ties with Europe, its vital links with the United States and the 
emerging possibilities of  a fast-growing Asia. Australia sees the advantage 
of  its unique location in Asia and the Pacific. However, since it is committed 
to supporting both the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
process along with the East Asia Summit (EAS) process as mechanisms for 
promoting greater integration of  regional economies, there is potentially a 
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tension in its policy position.
East Asia is Australia’s main regional trading partner. Australia’s exports 
of  natural resources and the Australian domestic market are vital to the 
continued economic growth of  East Asia. Increasingly, Australia’s economic 
interest lies not only in maintaining the resource, energy and manufacturing 
trade opportunities in East Asia, but also in expanding its role in the financial 
sector and other service sectors and in encouraging the opening up of  those 
sectors in the region.
There are conflicting views on the recent proliferation of  preferential trade 
agreements (PTA) in East Asia. Some argue that because of  increasingly 
complicated rules of  origin, the trend is likely to distort and derail, rather 
than encourage, broader and deeper economic integration. Others believe 
that the proliferation of  PTAs is a natural way to promote region-wide 
integration, which will be built on the clusters of  bilateral PTAs. Whichever 
view one takes, the empirical evidence is clear that the wider the membership 
of  these agreements the larger the gains.
There are also different views emerging on which regional architecture 
will drive closer integration. Increasingly, the convention is to acknowledge 
the role of  ASEAN as the driving force in East Asian regionalism. This 
position was reiterated in May by Japan’s Prime Minister Fukuda in a 
significant policy speech on the region. That speech was in some measure 
an attempt to respond to the challenge laid down by the Secretary-General 
of  ASEAN at the December 2007 launch of  the new think-tank, Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia or ERIA, when he asked for 
a Fukuda-II doctrine for Japan in the region. ASEAN itself  has taken new 
initiatives directed at formalising its structures and these should add to its 
credibility in a regional role.
Importance of  financial integration
From Australia’s perspective, financial integration is as important and 
as necessary as trade arrangements. The lessons learned from the Asian 
financial crisis clearly underline the importance of  financial cooperation in 
the region. With underdeveloped financial markets, countries in the region 
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have fewer opportunities to fund investment and lack mechanisms to allocate 
capital more efficiently.
From the Australian perspective, strengthening the domestic financial 
markets is the first step toward regional financial integration. With a wealth 
of  experience in financial reform and strong capital markets, Australia 
could play a more active role in the development of  East Asia’s financial 
integration. Indeed, in 2006 the Howard government said publicly that, 
‘if  invited by ASEAN+3 members, Australia would be willing to make a 
financial and practical contribution to the Chiang Mai Initiative’. Australia 
has also taken an active part in developing the modalities underpinning the 
Asian Bond Markets Initiative. The Rudd government can be expected to 
strengthen Australia’s regional focus.
A roadmap and challenges to East Asian economic integration
Current East Asian economic regionalism is underpinned by two seemingly 
contrasting trends: the increasing interest in ‘financial integration’ in the 
broad sense and the growing numbers of  bilateral and subregional PTAs. 
The latter can be matched with the former only if  preferential trade initiatives 
are structured to be the building blocks of  economic integration. While 
PTAs in East Asia contain many similar provisions, they also contain many 
differences, and it is not clear that they can be used as the single foundation 
for stronger region-wide institutional cooperation. Several recent studies 
have questioned whether any of  the existing PTAs in the region are truly 
consistent with and build on the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).
The underlying goal of  regional economic integration is to strengthen 
regional cooperation in East Asia and to help the economies in the region 
avoid a financial crisis and other similar catastrophes in the future. But this 
presupposes certain common understandings about the underlying features 
of  market economies.
East Asian economies face challenges such as domestic reform, the 
need for realistic and concrete strategies to move toward integration, lack 
of  a regional authority to help control financial volatility, underdeveloped 
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financial markets, and the existence of  competing regional architectures. In 
addition, competition between China and Japan for leadership in the region, 
the role of  the United States and the region’s diversity in many respects pose 
politico-economic challenges.
The likely solution is to opt for something akin to the earlier APEC 
notion of  ‘open regionalism’, designing institutions and agreements that can 
flexibly be extended to incorporate additional members. Moreover, realistic 
and plausible views are needed in designing a framework for regional 
economic integration.
It is important to set attainable targets within realistic timetables so that, 
gradually, progress can be expected and observed. Due to the different 
nature and conditions within each nation, East Asian economic integration 
should be ‘a hybrid regionalism’, a regional arrangement that is beyond the 
influence of  Japan, China or any other single country. Australia can act as a 
valuable counterweight to encourage constructive engagement by all major 
countries, including the United States.
To accelerate trade liberalisation and integration, it is necessary to enhance 
free trade and factor mobility across the region; to recognise that unilateral 
trade liberalisation is usually in the interests of  each country; to minimise 
security risks of  cross-border transactions; and to improve competitiveness 
through structural reforms in domestic markets.
To foster financial integration, it will be necessary to build a more concrete 
framework that may include, but is not limited to, provision of  peer country 
assistance in financial reform; coaching and training to achieve consistent 
application of  policies, legal and regulatory standards across the region; 
improvement of  accounting standards and skills; clarification of  tax rules; 
upgrading of  corporate governance standards; greater transparency and 
peer surveillance of  macroeconomic policymaking; better understanding of  
how closer trade and financial integration imply macroeconomic linkages 
that will need to be managed.
To ensure access to vital energy supplies, which are both economically 
indispensable as an engine of  growth and for which Australia is a major 
supplier, cooperative approaches are necessary. Although potentially divisive 
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and also strategically sensitive, energy issues have already been discussed in 
the EAS in which Australia participates.
To harmonise PTAs in the region, ASEAN as a whole and as individual 
countries should set and maintain a common standard of  practice in trading 
arrangements. In addition, long-term impacts and benefits should be 
considered against short-term gain when deciding on the common standard 
of  practice for the PTAs.
To further develop the studies of  regional economic integration, the 
recently established Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia 
(ERIA), involving all the EAS members, could be used as a regional think-
tank to provide broad-based, empirical analysis on the trends, challenges 
and opportunities of  regional integration, and to suggest practical 
recommendations to policy makers. More rigorous analysis is needed of  
factors that impede regional integration as well as the factors that can 
potentially accelerate it. The research agenda for ERIA should include both 
the non-economic as well as economic aspects of  the integration. Greater 
interaction between policymakers and researchers, and high quality, policy-
relevant research, will be of  critical importance. So research should also 
focus on planning and designing realistic mechanisms that inform future 
policies for the region.
4 June 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
TREvOR WILSON
Should Australians worry about donating to Burma?*
Apparently Australian NGOs are concerned about the low level of  donations 
they have been receiving from Australians for cyclone relief  in Burma. They 
recently spoke of  their worries to foreign minister Stephen Smith. It seems 
that normally generous and empathetic Australians are distrustful when it 
comes to giving to a country run by a military regime with such an appalling 
reputation. They have, of  course, been influenced by the saturation media 
coverage of  tardy, uncaring and inappropriate responses by the military to 
the plight of  the cyclone victims. But is this reaction justified?
There is no lack of  evidence of  the Burmese military regime’s inadequacies 
in responding to the cyclone. But the persistent focus of  the media and 
foreign government spokesmen on the issue of  access for foreign aid workers 
has somewhat clouded understanding of  what relief  is actually happening 
Published as ‘Don’t punish the people for crimes of  Burma regime’, Canberra Times, 4 June 
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and the question of  whether donations of  assistance from abroad will reach 
victims. While reports confirm that aid has not yet reached all victims in 
certain difficult-to-access areas of  the Irrawaddy Delta region, there is 
overwhelming evidence from journalists and international officials that aid 
donations received are getting through.
Another donor concern is presumably that, because of  corruption by 
the Burmese authorities and their determination to force victims away 
from roads and other access points, the military regime is actively blocking 
assistance. Although there have been a few colourful reports of  aid being 
diverted by the military regime, hard evidence of  this is not yet to hand.
In fact, major Australian aid organisations have been able to deliver their 
relief  via their local staff  from the outset, although not in the volumes they 
would have liked. Aid organisations with years of  experience working in 
Burma, such as World Vision and CARE, are accustomed to operating 
effectively and with proper accountability.
Yet quite astonishing and unprecedented things are happening in the 
relief  effort, things which should encourage those Australians thinking of  
donating. One of  these is the response of  private Burmese to the cyclone 
disaster. There have been innumerable reports of  local individuals and 
groups not normally involved in such activities turning their whole attention 
to collecting relief  goods and delivering these to the affected areas. Reports 
of  the authorities sometimes trying to block such efforts do not seem 
to have stemmed the flow of  supplies going out through these private 
channels, according to communications from some of  the groups involved. 
And last week the regime’s official newspaper actually praised such activities, 
describing them as more important than government or international aid, 
and proclaiming that citizens had the right of  access to the affected areas 
for these purposes.
A different perspective would suggest, therefore, that we are witnessing 
a grassroots popular response to make up for the failings on the part of  the 
military regime, a response which has some parallels with the spontaneous 
mass demonstrations in September/October 2007 protesting against fuel 
price increases. But it would be wildly optimistic to predict that Cyclone 
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Nargis will lead to the fall of  the military regime. Rather, some observers 
are concerned that it may well lead to further human rights abuses by the 
authorities against this vulnerable and weakened population. At the same 
time, it would be unwise to underestimate the ingenuity and generosity 
of  Burma’s largely Buddhist population, who are sometimes very adept 
at avoiding government controls and who may also sense weakness in the 
mistakes by the military regime in their cyclone response.
There is every reason for Australians to open their pockets to help 
the Burmese people at this time. Not only are there enormous needs for 
emergency rescue and relief, but there are major requirements for medium-
term rehabilitation and recovery of  livelihood. Australians have a wide choice 
about how they channel their donations, ranging from international agencies 
to Australian-controlled humanitarian organisations big and small. But it is 
even possible to contribute funds directly from Australia to support these 
new community-based Burmese support activities. Because of  the financial 
sanctions that Australia and Western countries have imposed against the 
regime since 2007, it is regrettably not possible to transmit donations 
through the conventional banking system. But although the means of  
transmitting relief  funds directly to Burma may seem unusual, they are in 
fact well-established channels, with a reputation for being reliable, quick and 
generally inexpensive.
As someone who has received many messages from Burmese people 
inside the country about the terrible state of  affairs and about the drastic 
need for help, I would encourage Australians to consider the desperate 
situation of  the Burmese people, and not to be distracted by the behaviour 
of  the government they played no part in putting in power.
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CANBERRA TIMES
TREvOR WILSON
Election secrecy fails to instil vote of confidence*
On 23 September Burma’s military regime, in a move not widely reported 
in Western media, announced an amnesty for 9,002 prisoners ahead of  the 
general election planned for Burma (Myanmar) in 2010. Although Burma’s 
military rulers have a tradition of  declaring amnesties for significant 
occasions, and although they have released several hundred prisoners in the 
past few years, this is by far the largest, the most dramatic and unexpected 
release we have seen.
Several significant political prisoners were among those granted an 
amnesty, notably the former prominent journalist Win Tin, winner of  a 
UNESCO award for press freedom in 2001. They included a number of  
other members of  the National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma’s 
leading opposition group and winner of  the largest number of  seats in the last 
election in 1990. Most of  those released were ordinary prisoners, and some 
2,000 political prisoners are still believed to be in detention. (This number 
is higher than the figure of  1,300 that obtained for many years, because of  
the large numbers arrested during and after the mass demonstrations of  
2007.) Most of  those released this week were probably nearing the end of  
their prison terms.
One of  the unusual aspects of  this release is that the regime’s 
announcement actually stated that the release was intended to enable those 
released to participate in the 2010 elections. This is unprecedented as a 
statement of  support for new elections, but is unlikely to convince many 
about the quality of  the election process, which most observers expect to 
be found wanting. The announcement was accompanied by other items in 
the officially controlled media which made heavy-handed references to the 
First published in Canberra Times, 6 October 2008.
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duty of  citizens to always show loyalty to the state. This may be an accurate 
reflection of  the regime’s narrow view of  how the people of  Burma should 
behave in their world of  ‘disciplined democracy’, but it does not square with 
the way most Burmese view their future.
What to make of  all of  this? Pro-democracy spokespeople predictably 
dismiss the regime’s move as cynical manipulation of  public opinion and as a 
crude attempt to retain support in the United Nations. It is hardly surprising 
that the military regime hopes to deflect international criticism, given 
increased pressure on them at this year’s UN General Assembly. But the 
military leadership has also listened to international demands that it should 
release prisoners, even though many observers argue that international 
opinion has no impact on the regime. This amnesty was welcomed by the 
UN Secretary-General and other foreign leaders, who insisted that the 
regime release all political prisoners, especially NLD leader Aung San Suu 
Kyi whose continued detention under house arrest many are saying is now 
illegal.
In fact, the regime seems to have no intention of  allowing a ‘free and fair’ 
election. It maintains its relentless pressure on the NLD, apparently intent 
on destroying it as an effective political force. NLD members continue to 
be detained for low-key, peaceful political activities, or forced to resign from 
their party, which though legal is denied the most basic tools of  a political 
organisation (telephones, facsimile machines, mobile phones and printing 
presses). Emerging political leaders, such as those belonging to the ‘Group 
of  88’ students’ movement have also been detained for long periods with the 
apparent goal of  limiting their political influence. Buddhist monks involved 
in protests in 2007 have been arrested or restricted in their non-religious 
activities. All opposition political leaders are denied freedom of  movement 
and assembly and access to any media.
Meanwhile, the military regime promotes its own surrogate political 
organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, in the 
apparent expectation that it will put forward its own candidates in the 
elections. Rather than educate and inform the people about what is involved 
in the first election in 20 years, the authorities maintain absolute secrecy about 
all the details. Presumably, it will be a repeat of  the May 2008 constitutional 
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referendum which was held without most of  the population having access 
to copies the document. Perhaps the international community could help 
by using international communications to disseminate factual information 
about the elections for the people of  Burma.
If  the military regime really wishes to keep the international community 
guessing, they should release Aung San Suu Kyi immediately. Even if  she 
were still restricted in her movements, it is essential that she have free 
access to her own party members and foreign representatives, as she has on 
some occasions in the past. Moreover, it is clear that there are no grounds 
for her further detention. Other leaders of  the opposition must also be 
released, including leading Buddhist monks, whose only ‘offence’ has been 
to peacefully express their dissent. Without their being freed, any election in 
Burma would be meaningless.
18 March 2008
THE AGE
JOHN POWERS
A place of their own*
Once again, images of  maroon-robed Tibetan monks taking to the streets 
to protest Chinese rule are appearing in news media around the world. And 
once again, they are accompanied by images of  Chinese troops beating the 
demonstrators. The current disturbances are the largest since 1989, when 
thousands of  Tibetans called for greater autonomy and respect for human 
rights, but there have been ongoing anti-Chinese protests in the restive 
region since troops first entered the country in 1949.
Prior to that Tibet was a de facto independent country, with an archaic 
but functioning theocratic government, legal system, currency and army, 
none of  which derived either authority or funding from China. Nonetheless, 
China claimed Tibet as an integral part of  its territory and continued to do 
so even after all Chinese were expelled by the Tibetan government in 1911.
After the Communists led by Mao Zedong captured the region by armed 
First published in The Age, 18 March 2008.
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force in the early 1950s, they set up a government parallel to the Dalai Lama’s 
administration. He tried to work with the Chinese in the now-inevitable 
transition to foreign rule, but moves to transform the country led to growing 
resentment among Tibetans. On 10 March 1959, thousands took to the streets 
to demand that the Chinese leave their country and restore indigenous rule. 
The response was a brutal crackdown in which hundreds died. This event is 
viewed by Tibetans in exile as the first battle in a ‘war of  independence’ and 
is celebrated every year with demonstrations and nationalistic speeches. The 
present round of  protests began with 10 March events, but unlike previous 
years they have escalated and involve both monks and significant numbers 
of  lay people. There have been reports of  Chinese-owned businesses being 
demolished and civilians being attacked by angry mobs.
Why now? And why have these demonstrations developed a violent 
aspect? There is no single answer to these questions. The region has been 
effectively subdued by military force, but during my visits most of  the 
Tibetans I met told me of  their profound dissatisfaction with Chinese rule. 
In 2002, every employed person I met was Chinese. All businesses I visited 
were owned and staffed entirely by Han Chinese. At tourist venues Tibetans 
begged foreigners for money.
The Chinese government proclaims that the Tibetan economy is booming 
and that it is investing billions of  dollars in the region, but the indigenous 
population has scarcely benefited. Every year, over three thousand Tibetans 
escape to an uncertain fate in exile, often traversing some of  the world’s 
highest passes in winter to avoid Chinese patrols. If  conditions were as good 
as the government claims, there would not be such desperation to leave.
The main precipitating dynamic for the present demonstrations is most 
probably a combination of  two factors: the upcoming Olympics in Beijing 
and the newly completed train from Beijing to Lhasa, Tibet’s capital, which 
daily brings hundreds of  new Chinese tourists and settlers. Tibetans became 
a minority in their own country about ten years ago, and rail service has 
brought a sharp rise in immigration from neighbouring provinces. Increasing 
marginalisation has led to a sense of  urgency, and with the eyes of  the world 
focused on China in the lead-up to the Olympics, this probably seemed like 
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an opportune time to draw international attention to the situation in Tibet.
When China was awarded the Games, the authorities promised greater 
respect for human rights and acknowledged that there would inevitably 
be protests. They stated that peaceful demonstrations would be tolerated 
and, despite the violence of  the past several days, security forces have been 
comparatively restrained. Foreign observers have been shocked by scenes of  
brutality against peacefully protesting monks, but by all accounts violence 
has been on a significantly smaller scale than in the past. Chinese authorities 
are aware of  foreign scrutiny and deeply sensitive to criticisms of  human 
rights abuses, but at the same time feel they are walking a thin line: fostering 
a positive public image while also maintaining order.
Many Chinese are puzzled by this restraint and want the government to 
teach the protestors a lesson. Ordinary Chinese overwhelmingly accept the 
government’s claims that Tibetans have benefited from the introduction 
of  Chinese civilisation and that they should be grateful. These attitudes 
closely parallel those of  Europeans in Australia during the early period of  
settlement who proclaimed that aboriginal Australians had been civilised by 
the foreigners and received the gifts of  their superior culture, language and 
religion. A recent survey of  Chinese blogs cites expressions of  anger, shock 
and bewilderment. Tibetans should be thanking their Han ‘big brothers and 
sisters’ who have liberated them from the Dalai Lama’s repressive regime 
and given them the opportunity to become more like Chinese; they say the 
protests are outrageous and a sign of  insufferable ingratitude.
Few Tibetans expect that China will ever voluntarily quit their country, 
and the Dalai Lama is officially committed to the position that Tibet is a part 
of  China. He has publicly stated that China ‘is good for Tibet’ because it has 
introduced technological progress and eliminated some of  the inequalities in 
the old society. He calls for ‘genuine autonomy’, which means that Tibetans 
would control internal affairs. Since the imposition of  Chinese rule, no 
Tibetan has ever held a position of  real authority; all decisions are made by 
Communist Party leaders in Beijing, and their representatives in Tibet are 
all Chinese.
Chinese authorities would do well to take him at his word. Maintaining 
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a massive military presence in Tibet represents an enormous annual 
expenditure, and the repression needed to prevent full-scale rebellion 
tarnishes China’s international image. Autonomy is compatible with China’s 
real interests in Tibet: a stable Tibet with Tibetans in charge of  internal 
affairs and ultimate Chinese overlordship could satisfy both Chinese security 
concerns and Tibetan aspirations. The Dalai Lama has stated that he is 
willing to talk any time and without preconditions, but future Tibetan leaders 
may not be so conciliatory. A new generation of  radicalised Tibetans has 
grown up in exile, and many are fed up with the Dalai Lama’s ‘middle way’ 
approach. Increasingly they call for direct action and the sort of  violence 
often seen in other liberation movements, which brings great suffering but 
often yields better results.
The present riots may be a foretaste of  things to come, and a pragmatic 
assessment of  the situation should lead Chinese authorities to rethink their 
policies. Australia could conceivably play an important role in this process. 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is viewed by Chinese leaders as someone who 
understands them and is sympathetic to Chinese sensibilities. A peaceful 
and stable Tibet is in everyone’s interests, and if  he were to press the case 
for autonomy during his upcoming visit it might be better received than if  it 
came from foreigners who are perceived as biased against China.
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FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REvIEW
BEN HILLMAN
Rethinking China’s Tibet policy*
Both official Chinese and exile Tibetan responses to the protests that broke 
across Tibet last month followed a familiar, worn-out script. For the Tibetan 
exiles and their international supporters, this was a last gasp for independence 
by the victims of  cultural genocide. For the Chinese government this was 
premeditated mayhem orchestrated by the ‘Dalai clique’ and ‘criminal 
elements’ bent on splitting China. Both sides have it wrong.
Certainly, Tibetan exile flags and ‘free Tibet’ slogans were features of  
Tibet’s biggest and most violent protests in decades, but it is simplistic to 
see the widespread discontent on the Tibet Plateau as a bid for freedom by 
an oppressed people. Protests in Lhasa began with Tibetan monks using 
the anniversary of  the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile (10 March 1959) to 
peacefully demonstrate against tight religious controls, including patriotic 
education campaigns and forced denunciations of  the Dalai Lama, but they 
were soon joined by ordinary Tibetans who used violence against non-
Tibetans and their property. Victims included Muslim traders as well as Han 
Chinese.
As an initial media blackout turned into a media avalanche focused on 
the violence, many Chinese became confused and angry. Some enraged 
Chinese bloggers demanded Tibetan blood in return, but most Chinese 
were simply baffled by what they saw as Tibetan ingratitude for years of  
central government financial transfers that have resulted in rapid growth in 
the region’s economy and a surge in incomes.
Indeed, state transfers to Tibetan areas in recent years have been 
Revised and expanded version of  ‘Money can’t buy Tibetans’ love’, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, April 2008, pp. 8–12. Reprinted from The Far Eastern Economic Review © 2008 Review 
Publishing Company Limited. All rights reserved..
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astronomical in proportion to the size of  the local economy. Before 
completing the world’s highest railway in 2006, China announced 180 other 
major infrastructure projects for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
worth 77.8 billion yuan (around US$10.2 billion) to be constructed during 
2006–10. The scale of  these investments becomes apparent when measured 
against the TAR’s GDP, which was 29.1 billion yuan in 2006. In fact, state 
subsidies account for around 75 per cent of  the TAR’s GDP.
Giant injections of  state capital in major infrastructure projects have been 
driving growth in Tibet in recent years, with GDP rising an average of  12 per 
cent per annum since the launch of  China’s Western Development Scheme 
in 2000. This plan is to expand infrastructure (and markets) to redress 
growth imbalances between China’s eastern seaboard and the impoverished 
hinterland, including Tibet. In 2007, the TAR’S GDP grew at a staggering 
14 per cent over the previous year. Reportedly, incomes have been rising, 
too, with double-digit growth recorded in household incomes for both rural 
and urban residents.
Because of  the rosy picture painted by official statistics and the state 
media, most Chinese are unaware that Tibetans have been among the big 
losers in the course of  China’s economic miracle, and that within Tibetan 
areas (both the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures in the neighbouring provinces of  Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan), 
the pace of  economic modernisation has polarised Tibet’s economy. While 
a minority of  Tibetans have been rewarded with state jobs, the majority of  
Tibetans, who are poorly equipped to access new economic opportunities, 
have been marginalised.
Tibetans are mostly subsistence farmers and herders. They make a living 
in an upland rural economy that is much less diversified than other parts of  
rural China. Further gains in the productivity of  staple crops are unlikely 
without major technological innovation. The already fragile mountain 
ecosystem is under further pressure from a population that has doubled 
since the 1950s.* In response to these pressures, the state has imposed tough 
*  Family planning policies since the 1980s have not been applied as strictly in Tibetan and 
other ethnic minority areas as they have been in majority Han Chinese areas.
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new environmental laws restricting traditional practices such as grazing, 
hunting and, for a time, logging, all cutting sharply into Tibetan incomes.
Despite the boom in investment, most Tibetans have very limited access 
to off-farm employment. Unlike China’s eastern regions, surplus low-skilled 
rural labour is not readily absorbed by secondary industry. Distance and 
isolation make landlocked Tibetan areas a poor choice for the industrial 
activity that has been the engine of  growth in other parts of  rural China. 
This is true not just for the Tibet Autonomous Region, but for much of  
China’s western hinterland, including areas populated by Tibetans.
Most of  the off-farm employment opportunities created by the boom 
in state investment are concentrated in the service sector (for example, 
administration and tourism) in addition to construction. This has attracted 
large numbers of  economic migrants, who are increasingly free to travel 
under China’s liberalised labour migration policies. Economic migrants 
to the cities include Tibetans from rural Tibet, but most are Han Chinese 
migrants from other provinces.
Most Han Chinese migrants stay only for a few years, save money and 
return home, but since the 1990s there has been a constant stream of  new 
arrivals. In Lhasa the non-Tibetan population now outnumbers the Tibetan 
population. Even Tibetan employers in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas 
admitted to me that they hire non-Tibetans because they are more skilled 
and more willing to work regular hours for a wage. Many Han Chinese have 
worked in other Chinese towns before trying their luck in Tibet’s booming 
urban areas.
So while there is no state-sponsored migration of  non-Tibetans to dilute 
Tibetan culture as Tibetan exiles sometimes claim (more than 80 per cent 
of  Tibetans live in rural areas that have attracted almost no non-Tibetan 
migration), increasing numbers of  Han Chinese are out-competing Tibetans 
in urban labour markets. Not surprisingly, unemployed rural Tibetan 
migrants are reported to have been behind some of  the worst violence of  
the protests.
New air and rail links to Tibetan areas have made possible explosive 
growth in tourism but, even when this tourism is largely based on growing 
China 173
interest in Tibetan culture and Tibetan Buddhism, it has not necessarily 
translated into opportunities for Tibetans.* In one large hotel in an ethnically 
Tibetan area outside the TAR, hotel managers reported that over 90 per cent 
of  their staff  was non-Tibetans recruited from other areas. When I asked 
for an explanation, the managers cited Tibetans’ dearth of  skills, lack of  
experience in working fixed hours, and a cultural disposition not inclined 
to obediently comply with hotel guests’ wishes. Even in the housekeeping 
department, more than 80 per cent of  staff  was hired from outside the 
Tibetan autonomous prefecture.
In a more striking example of  how the boom in tourism is bypassing 
Tibetans, when I visited Lhasa’s Potala Palace a few years ago, I was 
surprised to find a young Han Chinese man dressed in Tibetan costume 
selling tickets. When I queried him, he laughed and said, ‘tourists don’t know 
the difference anyway’. In some places ‘Tibetan’ song and dance troupes 
sometimes consist of  non-Tibetan performers. Tourists might not know the 
difference, but Tibetans do, and daily experiences like these are sources of  a 
deep and growing resentment.
The reasons why Tibetans are being left behind by the rapid pace of  
economic development are complex, and do include cultural and language 
differences. Non-Tibetans have access to wider networks, capital and 
better information. But there is no systematic discrimination of  Tibetans 
by employers—in fact Tibetans are accorded preferential treatment in state 
jobs.† The labour market, however, operates according to market principles 
*  Han Chinese patrons are an important and growing source of  financial support for 
Tibetan Buddhist temples and sacred sites. For more detail on the growing interest in 
Tibetan culture among Han Chinese, see Ben Hillman and Lee-Anne Henfry, ‘Macho 
minority: masculinity and ethnicity on the edge of  Tibet’, Modern China, vol. 32, no. 
2, April 2006, pp. 251–72. Since the protests, Tibetan areas have clearly fallen out of  
favour with Chinese tourists. Tour operators in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
in Yunnan Province report that arrivals in May, one of  the busiest times of  the year, are 
only one third what they were one year ago.
†  In Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province, law requires senior 
heads of  local government to be ethnic Tibetans and, while it is an unwritten rule, local 
officials acknowledge that heads of  major government agencies are mostly reserved for 
Tibetans.
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and the most skilled people are getting the jobs regardless of  ethnicity. My 
frequent contact with service industry leaders in Tibetan areas indicates 
that local employers (Tibetans and non-Tibetans alike) would happily hire 
Tibetans if  they could do the job. Unfortunately, most Tibetans, especially 
rural Tibetans, simply do not meet employers’ needs.
A central problem is the high rate of  illiteracy among Tibetans. While 
rates vary between the TAR and other Tibetan prefectures, and between 
urban and rural areas, ethnic Tibetans remain among the most illiterate in 
China. While enrolments have been rising, only a small minority of  the total 
Tibetan population has some degree of  secondary education. The national 
curriculum is highly academic, demands strong Chinese literacy and is poorly 
adapted to rural and regional labour market needs. High school drop-out 
rates reflect the grim reality that investment in education is not rewarded by 
jobs, except for a tiny elite that are clever enough to continue to university 
and state jobs. More than 40 per cent of  Tibetans have no formal schooling 
at all, compared with China’s national average of  8 per cent.*
State investment in primary education has increased since 2000, triggering 
an increase in literacy. But investments in rural education primarily target 
school construction and wages. The quality of  teaching remains poor, as the 
most capable teachers are reluctant to accept jobs in remote posts. Despite 
accusations to the contrary, the Chinese government has made increasing 
efforts to sponsor bilingual education, but this too is a double-edged 
sword. In many Tibetan primary schools Tibetan is used as the medium 
of  education in the first few years. But because Chinese literacy requires a 
huge investment in time, students need to switch to Chinese early to have a 
chance of  competing with other Chinese students in higher level entrance 
exams. Many Tibetans simply never catch up.
The situation is slightly better in urban areas where there are more and 
better quality schools and where more Tibetans speak Chinese. In Lhasa 
many educated Tibetans choose to send their children to Chinese-medium 
primary schools because they gain an edge in learning Chinese and because 
*  For these and other comparative education statistics in China, see the Chinese 
government’s official statistics web site, http://www.stats.gov.cn.
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students at these schools take English as a second language. At the Tibetan-
medium schools, second language studies are devoted to Chinese. Some have 
suggested that bilingual policy be extended to require that non-Tibetans in 
Tibet learn Tibetan before being recruited to state jobs. However, there has 
been little progress in this direction. It should be noted, too, that outside 
of  Tibet’s monasteries and an urban elite, levels of  Tibetan literacy among 
Tibetans can be as low as, or lower than, levels of  Chinese literacy.
Perhaps the biggest current challenge for education policy and investment 
in Tibet is the lack of  access to vocational training—the kind of  training that 
will allow Tibetans to compete with migrants from the east in construction, 
tailoring, food preparation and a host of  other jobs in the dynamic service 
sector. The underinvestment in vocational training is evident in China’s 
official statistics. While the Chinese government spends twice the national 
average per capita on education in the TAR, and teacher–student ratios are 
comparable to those elsewhere, there are half  as many secondary schools per 
capita and only one quarter of  the national average of  vocational training 
schools. While there are variations across Tibetan prefectures outside of  
the TAR, opportunities for vocational training outside of  major cities are 
similarly low or nonexistent.*
As migrants move in to take advantage of  the state-led boom, illiterate 
and semiliterate Tibetans with few skills suited to off-farm labour become 
marginalised in their own economy. This is not just a Tibetan problem. 
Across China inequality is closely linked to skills differentials, as wage 
increases among highly skilled workers outstrips increases among lower 
skilled workers. China’s Gini coefficient—a measure of  income inequality 
where ‘zero’ is perfect equality and ‘one’ is perfect inequality—stands at 0.47 
making China the most unequal country in Asia after Nepal. The figures 
reflect not only differences between skilled and unskilled workers but also 
between workers and farmers, and between rapidly developing coastal areas 
and poorer inland regions. This is a profound departure from the situation 
*  Andrew Fischer has done the most detailed analysis of  socioeconomic indicators based 
on China’s official statistics to assess the degree of  marginalisation. See State Growth and 
Social Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of  Recent Economic Growth, Copenhagen : NIAS, 2005.
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in the 1970s, when China was among the most equal countries in the world. 
Rising inequality overall has levelled off  somewhat in recent years, but it 
remains at high levels.
While recent evidence suggests that interregional inequality may be 
narrowing, inequality is increasing within many regions, especially between 
urban and rural households. According to Chinese statistics, urban incomes 
in the TAR are up to five times higher than rural incomes. Several researchers 
within China and abroad studying Tibet’s economic development over the 
past few years have observed with alarm the increased polarisation. In 2003 
I cofounded the Eastern Tibet Training Institute, a vocational training 
centre in an ethnically Tibetan region in northwest Yunnan province. The 
training centre provides job skills training for impoverished youth from 
the countryside. By designing courses in consultation with local employers 
and industry groups, the institute’s success rate for graduates finding wage 
employment has been above 90 per cent during four years of  operations. It 
confirms anecdotal evidence from local employers that Tibetans and other 
minorities can get jobs if  they have the right skills.
While the Eastern Tibet Training Institute is small, its founders hope it 
can serve as a model for the sorts of  education policies needed to achieve 
inclusive economic development in Tibet and other parts of  west China. The 
institute has received strong encouragement from local state-linked bodies 
such as the Federation of  Commerce and Industry, and it offers a model 
for fruitful vocational training. But until the Chinese government itself  puts 
serious resources behind vocational training, the impact of  the few available 
programs will be severely limited. Central government policies already call 
for more vocational training, but only limited resources are allocated to it, 
especially in rural areas, and local governments are not given incentives to 
invest in it over the long term.
Even granting Tibetans the opportunities that exist elsewhere is probably 
not enough. China does have affirmative action policies for minority 
nationalities, which afford these groups preferential access to education and 
state jobs, but it is insufficient. Because Tibetans have already fallen so far 
behind, only vigorous affirmative action can help them catch up. To reduce 
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inequality, secure livelihoods and prevent future unrest, Tibet should have 
four times the number of  vocational schools as the rest of  China, not the 
present situation of  only one quarter the national average. This demands a 
redesign of  development strategies to focus more on people, rather than 
infrastructure.
China’s policy makers have failed to appreciate the importance of  investing 
in people as part of  the Western Development Strategy. Their approach has 
been to expand markets and to encourage more ‘advanced’ migrants to lead 
the way. The policy assumption is that once Chinese migrants from central 
and eastern provinces will move into new markets, open small businesses, 
work on building sites, drive taxis (most taxi drivers in Lhasa are non-
Tibetan), Tibetans will watch and eventually copy them. That approach is 
not working.
China’s leaders need policies that foster Tibetans’ participation in economic 
development, including assistance to Tibetan enterprise and targeted 
vocational training for Tibetans. There is a potential role for international 
NGOs here, but because of  the internationalisation and politicisation of  the 
Tibet issue and the broad sympathy the free Tibet movement enjoys in the 
West, Chinese leaders are highly suspicious of  foreign activities in Tibet. In 
recent years, there have been increasing restrictions on international NGO 
operations in Tibetan areas.
China’s leaders desperately need to take a fresh approach to Tibet, and 
acknowledge that unequal development is an underlying cause of  social and 
political tension. This could serve to depoliticise the Tibet problem and 
refocus the debate on practical solutions. While the recent protests have 
exposed policy failures in Tibetan areas, there is as yet little sign that these 
protests will trigger a significant change in China’s Tibet policy. Since the last 
major protests in March 1989, the policy has been carrot and stick—state 
investment for development on the one hand and zero tolerance of  dissent 
on the other. As I returned from Tibetan areas at the end of  March, Chinese 
authorities were emphasising the second prong of  this policy. Armed police 
reinforcements were sent to all ethnically Tibetan areas, including those free 
of  protest. At the same time, the official media went on a publicity offensive, 
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attempting to convince the world that Tibetan rioters were nothing but 
violent criminals.
This publicity blitz included more than the usual heated vitriol against 
the Dalai Lama, who Beijing accused of  orchestrating the mayhem in 
order to split China. The approach worked well in China where the ethnic 
nationalist propaganda was unforgiving, and the majority of  the Chinese 
population rallied behind their government. But the approach backfired 
on the international stage. In late March, foreign journalists taken to Lhasa 
to inspect the carnage were mobbed by monks crying and begging for 
recognition of  their grievances. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership seems 
intent on hiding its policy failures behind nationalistic propaganda. The 
nationalist card is played to foster internal unity among Han Chinese, but 
it also fosters ethnic hatred. If  Chinese policy makers and media coverage 
continue to treat Tibetan protests as seditious acts by violent criminals, and 
if  they fail to understand its roots in deepening Tibetan–Han inequality, it 
will only serve to fuel the growing resentment of  ethnic Tibetans toward 
Han Chinese and of  Han Chinese toward ethnic Tibetans. China must 
also end its policy of  demonising the Dalai Lama. How will Tibetans ever 
feel at home in a country that brands their most revered religious figure an 
outlaw?
Recently, a group of  public intellectuals led by Beijing-based writer Wang 
Lixiong circulated a petition urging national authorities to engage with 
the Dalai Lama and to take a more open approach to policy deliberations 
on Tibet. Referring to the recent protests, the petition states, ‘In order to 
prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future, the government 
must abide by the freedom of  religious belief  and the freedom of  speech 
explicitly enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, thereby allowing the Tibetan 
people to fully express their grievances and hopes and permitting citizens 
of  all nationalities to freely criticise and make suggestions regarding the 
government’s nationality policies.’ This is a promising impetus for a fresh 
approach to Tibet policy. Nothing like this could have appeared in the public 
domain following the last Tibetan protests of  1989.
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APEC ECONOMIES NEWSLETTER
LIGANG SONG
China’s new challenges after thirty years of reform*
Thirty years (1978–2008) of  reform have turned China into one of  the 
largest and most dynamic economies in the world. Currently, however, China 
faces three significant and profound challenges: first, to maintain continued 
high growth amid global financial turbulence, the slowdown of  the major 
economies abroad, and some rising socially destabilising tensions such as 
growing income inequality; second, to bring its growth path in line with 
environmental sustainability; and third, to manage the rising demand for 
energy in order to moderate oil price increases and to placate heightening 
domestic and international concerns about the environment and global 
warming. How China deals with these challenges will have important 
implications for both China itself  and the world at large.
China’s task of  sustaining its rapid growth and maintaining macroeconomic 
stability is complicated by the deceleration of  the US economy, high 
international oil prices and gradual increases in costs of  production in 
China. In combination, these factors enable the Chinese economy to grow 
at a slower pace while facing a relatively high level of  inflation. The pressure 
from inflation is particularly acute because the temporary flight of  savings 
from developed countries where growth has slowed into investment in 
China raises China’s domestic aggregate demand to offset export decline, 
hence maintaining output level. This capital inflow forces China’s central 
bank to choose between appreciating the Renminbi (RMB) more quickly 
and allowing faster inflation. Despite the arguably negative impact on 
exports, a faster pace of  RMB appreciation seems desirable in the current 
This article is adapted from chapter one in China’s Dilemma: Economic Growth, the Environment 
and Climate Change, Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo (eds), Canberra: ANU E Press; 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
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macroeconomic environment, as it boosts imports, eases external pressure 
on current account imbalances and checks domestic inflation.
Increasingly, excessive income inequality is looming as one of  the most 
undesirable outcomes from China’s thirty-year-long reform. It essentially 
reflects the trade-off  between achieving the goal of  economic efficiency and 
maintaining social stability through improved equity and social justice under 
economic transition. The first thirty years of  reform put efficiency above 
everything else, which was justified by the nature of  economic transition—
namely moving from a centrally planned to a market economy. The challenge 
now is how the government alleviates income inequality while maintaining 
high growth. Apart from strengthening the redistributional functions of  
the government and building a more comprehensive social security system, 
further reform to enhance rural–urban migration will be crucially important 
for continued growth of  productivity and income.
However, success in carrying out future reform for China’s long-run 
growth and development will be crucially dependent upon whether China is 
capable of  building governmental institutions that are transparent, efficient 
and accountable, and supported by an effective legal system.
China’s present rapid economic growth goes hand in hand with increasing 
resource use and pressure on the environment as it relies on a large amount 
of  factor inputs (for example, capital and raw materials), concentration on 
heavy industries that are both energy and pollution intensive, such as steel, 
and is driven by strong pro-growth central and local governments. The 
combination of  rapid economic growth and high carbon intensity means 
that in the coming years China will have an impact on greenhouse gas 
emissions unmatched by any other country. For example, despite its low per 
capita emissions, China has already passed the United States as the largest 
emitter of  CO2, and these emissions continue to rise rapidly.
For China, a key challenge is how to minimise the negative growth impact 
from limiting its greenhouse gas emissions and improving environmental 
quality. The political economy of  emissions reduction means there are 
different reactions from the central government, local governments, 
enterprises and households to the objective of  emissions reduction. The key 
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is to design an incentive scheme that makes relevant regulations incentive-
compatible among all stakeholders. The effectiveness of  emissions reduction 
policy eventually lies in the endogenous demands for change in growth 
pattern and for a cleaner environment resulting from rising income.
China has been the world’s largest destination for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the environmental consequences of  FDI have attracted increasing 
concern as China’s environment deteriorates. Empirical evidence showing 
an inverted-U curve relationship between FDI and pollution suggests 
that continued FDI inflows would eventually reduce pollution emissions. 
However, it also implies that FDI inflows into richer regions will reduce 
pollution while FDI flows into poorer regions (mostly inland) will worsen 
their environment. Thus, China’s poorer provinces should be treated like 
the less developed countries in fulfilling their global obligations to reduce 
emissions and provided with financial means and technological support 
to comply with the toughened government emissions regulations. Inland 
regions benefit from reducing emissions, even though pollution abatement 
efforts involve additional costs, because many environmental damages are 
irreversible.
China grows food to feed 1.3 billion people but there are growing 
concerns that water shortages and reduced availability of  arable land would 
attenuate Chinese food security. Declining area of  arable land due to rapid 
urbanisation and industrialisation, the uneven distribution of  water and 
lower than normal rainfall in the recent years make this issue particularly 
acute. Water shortages may pose an immediate environmental threat to 
China’s continued high economic growth. While it is important for China 
to continue to improve its water and land management, the best hope lies 
in institutionalisation of  water (land) pricing and water (land) use rights 
policies.
China’s responses to environmental challenges are critically important in 
building a harmonious global system. In the short run, emission mitigation 
policies mainly seek to increase energy efficiency through technological 
progress and the development of  renewable energy and nuclear energy. In 
the long run, China’s policies will focus more on reducing greenhouse gas 
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emissions (through measures like emission trading schemes or a carbon tax) 
and adapting to climate change. China is heavily dependent on coal, which 
provides nearly 70 per cent of  China’s primary energy consumption and is 
the single most significant source of  pollution. For example, 85 per cent 
of  the sulphur dioxide and 60 per cent of  nitrogen dioxide emitted into 
the atmosphere in China come from coal burning. Coal’s share in China’s 
primary energy consumption is expected to remain unchanged in the next 
twenty years. It is therefore essential for China to work closely with other 
countries to develop a new generation of  clean coal technologies, which if  
successful, will unleash sustainable development in China as well as in the 
rest of  the world.
China will also readjust its economic structure towards producing goods 
which are less energy-intensive and resource-intensive. Success will depend 
upon whether China can effectively shift its pattern of  economic activity 
from energy-intensive areas (for example, specific forms of  heavy industry) 
to sectors that are knowledge-intensive and rely less on energy and other 
resource inputs; and whether it can stimulate the adoption of  advanced 
technologies that are both energy efficient and more environmentally 
benign. Achieving such an outcome is in the interests of  both China and the 
international community, so developed countries need strong measures in 
support of  such policies in China.
However, it is too early for optimism. The uncomfortable reality for 
China remains that unless ecological balance is restored within the medium 
term, environmental limits could choke further growth. Proper management 
of  the environment has now become critical if  China is to continue its 
industrialisation process. But China’s emergence as a global economic and 
political player carries with it the responsibility to balance the requirements 
of  key industries driving its development to ensure that its growth is not 
only efficient but also equitable as well as sustainable.
East Timor
20 February 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
GEORGE QUINN
Dangers ahead for East Timor*
Following last week’s armed attacks on East Timor’s President Jose Ramos-
Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, angry voices have been raised in 
East Timor slamming the performance of  the Australian-led International 
Stabilisation Force (ISF) and the United Nations Police (UNPOL), which 
includes Australian personnel. Essentially there have been two accusations. 
First, the Australians and the UN Police (so it is said) were too slow to get to 
the scenes of  the attacks and, in the words of  Ramos-Horta’s brother, were 
‘cowardly’ when they did get there. Second, some, including East Timor’s 
Defence Force Commander Taur Matan Ruak, have claimed that the ISF 
and UNPOL ignored, or did not possess, crucial intelligence that might have 
prevented the attacks from happening.
There is much that is still murky about the events of  11 February, but I think 
it is already possible to assess these charges. The first is without substance. 
An edited version was published in Canberra Times, 20 February 2008.
184 Capturing the Year — 2008
Both the president and prime minister issued explicit instructions that their 
homes were to be guarded by Timorese soldiers and their personal security 
was to be in the hands of  the Timorese police working with UNPOL, not 
Australian personnel. It is easy to see why. Images of  the country’s leaders 
under the guard of  foreigners would have violated the nation’s sense that it 
‘owns’ its newly elected leaders, and it would have damaged the credibility 
of  the government, even affected East Timor’s reputation as a sovereign 
nation.
But unfortunately neither President Ramos-Horta nor Prime Minister 
Gusmao made proper provision for their personal security. It is almost 
beyond belief  that, in a situation of  ongoing tension and political volatility, 
President Ramos-Horta regularly took morning walks along the beach near 
his home with no more than a couple of  guards to accompany him. This 
was irresponsible. In security terms he was a sitting duck. Similarly, Prime 
Minister Gusmao seems to have had minimal security at his home. Alfredo 
Reinado’s heavily armed men were able to approach the prime minister’s 
house unchallenged and knock at his front door.
What of  the actions of  Australian ISF troops once the gravity of  the 
situation became apparent? As far as I can tell from sometimes contradictory 
eyewitness reports, Australian commanders acted professionally. They did 
not gallop into combat like the proverbial cavalry, nor should they have. 
In a combat situation the prudent, cool-headed commander will assess the 
situation with care. Where an ambush has occurred (and there were two 
ambushes on 11 February), he will not expose his men to the danger of  
another ambush by instantly charging into the combat zone.
Bear in mind, too, that after the failed attack on Reinado in Same last 
year, the International Stabilisation Force was under instructions from the 
East Timorese government not to pursue Alfredo Reinado and his men. 
Clearly the ISF has had to walk a very fine line between implementing the 
brief  given to them by the East Timorese government and responding 
vigorously to immediate security threats. I would guess that the ‘slow’ 
response (if  indeed it was slow) may have been an expression of  respect by 
Australian commanders for orders previously issued by the East Timorese 
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government.
On the face of  it, however, there is more substance to the allegation that 
Australian personnel did not have adequate intelligence, or failed to heed 
intelligence that was conveyed to them. Little can happen in Dili that goes 
unnoticed or unreported, and the city is a hotbed of  rumour. The difficult 
task facing a foreign peacekeeping force is to make assessments of  claims 
and counterclaims, reports and rumours, without relying wholly on local 
assistants and informants. To maintain the independence of  judgement that 
is essential to the gathering of  good intelligence requires operatives with 
high-level local language skills and close familiarity with local society.
It is well known that very few Australian personnel in East Timor, 
whether in the ISF or in UNPOL, have more than basic survival skills in 
Tetum, Indonesian or any other locally used language. Certainly, the really 
sophisticated language skills needed to make independent assessments of  
raw intelligence and to independently gather intelligence are in short supply. 
This is a major weakness in Australia’s operations.
The weakness is not just an issue of  military intelligence, it is a public 
relations issue. During his visit to East Timor last Friday, Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd committed Australia to a long-term security presence in the 
nation. But since 2006 antiforeign sentiment, including explicitly anti-
Australian sentiment, has been on the increase. If  our forces are not to 
become targets of  growing popular resentment a really well-resourced 
program of  training in local languages and cultures is essential.
Fortunately there is an excellent model to follow. The Australian Defence 
Forces’ Major Michael Stone has done wonders for the image of  Australian 
soldiers, and Australians in general, in East Timor. A fluent, sophisticated 
speaker of  Tetum, he has even hosted his own spot on East Timor television 
and is currently a military affairs adviser to President Ramos-Horta. But one 
man can’t do it all. Dozens of  Michael Stones are needed if  Australia’s long-
term presence in the troubled nation is to be professional in intelligence 
terms and effective in public relations terms.
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CANBERRA TIMES
STEvEN SENGSTOCk
Reinado to live on as vivid figure in Timor folklore*
A month has passed since the death of  Alfredo Reinado in a fire-fight at 
the home of  East Timor’s President Jose Ramos-Horta. There has been no 
backlash from his supporters, and in the past week many rebel soldiers have 
surrendered peacefully.
Nevertheless, the power Reinado might wield over the populace in 
death should not be underestimated. Reinado’s many admirers helped him 
remain at large for almost two years, and it was they who helped him to 
appear suddenly and unexpectedly at Ramos-Horta’s front door. They are 
the volatile, disenfranchised masses of  East Timorese society who feel they 
can find neither voice nor representation in either the new government of  
Xanana Gusmao or Mari Alkatiri’s Fretilin opposition.
They are the young Timorese who, before Reinado’s death, would draw 
you close and whisper, ‘Did you know Alfredo has very strong connections 
with the people of  Manufahi? They say he’s blessed with the spirit of  Dom 
Boaventura.’
Boaventura was the king, or liurai, of  the Manufahi region in the rugged 
hills south of  Dili. He died almost 100 years ago but his tenacious spirit lives 
on. He is the man many see as the father of  East Timorese nationalism. In 
Timor there is an almost Arthurian sense of  legend and mythology attached 
to his name. He is remembered as the archetypal Timorese warrior king 
in a country where archetypes rarely emerge from a complex cultural and 
ethnolinguistic puzzle.
Last year, just days before international troops launched their abortive 
attack on Reinado’s hideout in the hills above the town of  Same in Manufahi, 
First published in Canberra Times, 17 March 2008.
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rumours fanned out across the country that Reinado had been involved in 
a rare ritual ceremony. During the ceremony, presided over by Manufahi 
elders and described by some as a coronation, Reinado was said to have been 
endowed with the late Boaventura’s supernatural powers.
Late in 1911, Boaventura had united many of  East Timor’s indigenous 
kingdoms in revolt against the repressive and exploitative Portuguese 
colonial administration. Employing guerilla tactics akin to those used by 
Xanana Gusmao in the struggle against the Indonesian Army 70 years later, 
at one stage Boaventura came close to overrunning Dili. But the military 
odds were against him and ultimately he was forced back into the remote 
hills around Manufahi.
His resistance came to a dramatic and tragic end in August 1912. 
Surrounded and besieged on a mountain top, Boaventura led a courageous 
breakout. On horseback at the head of  his warriors he plummeted towards 
Portuguese lines in a charge that one awestruck historian described as ‘a great 
avalanche down the side of  the mountain’. The warrior king escaped, but 
most of  his estimated three thousand followers did not. They were rounded 
up by the colonial forces and systematically slaughtered over ‘two nights and 
two days’ of  concentrated killing.
Boaventura led a people suffering the exploitation of  a colonial 
administration whose true authority projected little outside of  Dili. Reinado, 
too, claimed to represent a growing population of  youth and common 
folk disillusioned with a government struggling to extend its judicial and 
administrative reach beyond the same city limits. And just as Boaventura 
relied on the support of  influential kingdoms in central and western East 
Timor, Reinado and his men, too, moved freely about the same regions.
Boaventura enjoyed far less support in the east of  the country, and 
Reinado could not venture there for fear of  death. Both were known for 
their daring escapes and, as legend would have it, were impervious to the 
bullets of  foreigners.
Nonetheless, Reinado’s early 2007 attempt to draw parallels between his 
plight and that of  Boaventura invited heavy criticism. Pointing to Reinado’s 
part-Portuguese heritage, some said he was trying to appropriate a heroism 
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and history that was not rightfully his. Others judged it a cynical manipulation 
of  sacred traditional beliefs and memories with the objective of  winning 
over an ill-informed and vulnerable support base.
In fact, for many in East Timor, there will be little to lament in the passing 
of  the fast-talking, handsome rebel leader. From the chaos of  East Timor’s 
crisis of  mid 2006, the former military police major emerged as a serious 
embarrassment to East Timor’s government and the international forces it 
had invited to stabilise the country. By the time of  his death Reinado had 
destroyed his relationships with almost all political factions, his notoriety 
growing with each of  his anti-establishment stunts and daring escapes.
The innocent villagers who suffered from Reinado’s destabilising 
presence in the mountainous interior will also have little to lament. Even 
in the western districts where Reinado was most popular, the arrogance 
and heavy-handedness of  his men drew frequent complaints. His rebellion 
placed an incalculable burden on the East Timor economy, causing fear-
induced delays to development projects and distracting officials from the 
crucial mission of  rebuilding the conflict-riven nation.
Boaventura’s ultimate fate has never been established. The colonial record 
has him facing court proceedings in the years after his rebellion but has 
nothing clear to say about his death. Nor did foreign bullets bring Reinado 
down. By all accounts his escape from last year’s assault on his base in the 
interior city of  Same was nothing short of  miraculous and, in the end, it was 
a Timorese bodyguard and Timorese bullets that killed him.
Ultimately, only in death may Reinado find a true parallel with the warrior 
king. Just as the name Boaventura is revered in far more corners of  the 
country today than he could have hoped for in his day, so the spectre has 
now appeared of  a Reinado who, despite his failings, may live even more 
vividly in popular memory than he ever did in real life.
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CANBERRA TIMES
GEORGE QUINN
Time to soothe East Timor’s wounds*
The report of  the joint Indonesia–East Timor Commission of  Truth and 
Friendship (CTF) has been greeted with hoots of  scorn across the world, 
some of  it in the pages of  the Canberra Times. The report may indeed be 
flawed but it is not a ham-fisted attempt to cover up the crimes of  1999 
and it is very far from valueless. In fact the scorn is not justified, and here’s 
why.
The commission was strongly backed by East Timor’s president and 
prime minister. Both are figures of  significant moral stature who have shown 
commitment to the ideals of  forgiveness and reconciliation. President Jose 
Ramos-Horta was a joint winner of  the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 and 
has played a crucial role in resolving East Timor’s many post-independence 
tensions.
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao is a nationally and internationally 
respected figure, often called East Timor’s Nelson Mandela. Neither can be 
accused of  moral turpitude or whitewashing.
The establishment of  the commission in 2005 was partly influenced 
by the success of  South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
set up under the presidency of  Nelson Mandela. True, the commission 
does not have anything like the powers that the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission had, but the two processes, and their revered 
backers, are similar in their commitment to reconciliation rather than to 
punitive justice.
The idea of  acknowledging institutional responsibility for crimes and 
moving towards reconciliation without a punitive judicial process is a powerful 
A slightly edited version was published in Canberra Times, 17 July 2008.
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one. In Australia, the Rudd government’s apology to the stolen generations 
was such a gesture. It was applauded nationwide and worldwide.
Arguably, it is also starting to have a real pragmatic effect, setting in motion 
new processes of  practical collaboration in addressing immediate problems 
in our aboriginal communities. There are those who argue (and I would be 
one) that amid the endless tangle of  tit-for-tat violence and institutionally 
inflicted injustice that marks the Israel–Palestine conflict a resolution that 
involved punitive justice would be an impediment to an overall settlement. 
In Palestine reconciliation rather than punitive justice is quite simply the best 
pragmatic way to go (if  only the parties could muster the courage to do it), 
and so it is for East Timor.
Behind the rhetoric of  collective remorse and reconciliation lies an 
expectation that both Indonesia and East Timor can benefit in a practical 
way from abandoning punitive justice. East Timor has a lot to gain from 
a comprehensive rapprochement with Indonesia. The pay-off  is not only 
important in diplomatic or security terms. It could have an invigorating effect 
on the lives of  many thousands of  ordinary people for whom improved 
living standards are the best form of  justice.
Take, for example, the East Timorese currently living in Indonesia. During 
the Indonesian occupation around 30,000 East Timorese fled abroad, most 
of  them to Portugal and Australia. Now there is a new diaspora, and it is 
substantially bigger than the old one. Political correctness has suppressed 
the reality that around 40,000 East Timorese (some say as many as 60,000) 
currently live in Indonesia.
Like almost all East Timorese this expatriate community nurtures a strong 
attachment to their place of  origin and a longing to be reunited with their 
families. But since independence most of  these ‘unseen’ people have been 
unable to visit their families and their sacred uma lulik, or origin houses, 
in their home villages. Many are former civil servants or army and police 
personnel who fear hostility, even arrest, if  they visit East Timor.
A renewed reconciliation process between the two countries, and the 
abandonment of  punitive justice, may make it possible for many of  them to 
return home permanently, bringing their expertise with them and reuniting 
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broken families.
Prime Minister Gusmao has said that East Timor’s secession from 
Indonesia and its independence is justice enough. After nine years of  a 
flawed, largely unsuccessful punitive justice process, it is time to look to 
the future and strive for a better, more immediate kind of  justice for the 
impoverished mass of  the population.
In Indonesia, East Timor is already the country’s ‘conscience’. The events 
of  1999 have made a big contribution to improving awareness of  human 
rights and curbing the excesses of  the military in Indonesia. The joint 
acknowledgement of  responsibility and remorse made by the presidents of  
the two countries in Bali last Tuesday has sunk with scarcely a ripple in the 
usually stroppy Indonesian mass media. Clearly, there is little public stomach 
for a renewed punitive justice process.
In short, in the imperfect compromised world of  international relations 
and cross-border justice, the commission’s report—with all the shortcomings 
in its terms of  reference and content—is by far the best option that the 
peoples of  East Timor and Indonesia have to move forward together into a 
more prosperous and secure future.
Indonesia
31 October 2007
THE AUSTRALIAN
JAMIE MACkIE
‘Recalibrating’ Australia–Indonesia relations*
In an important speech he gave in Sydney during the APEC Leaders’ Summit 
in September, Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY, as 
he is generally known) spoke encouragingly about ‘recalibrating’ Australia–
Indonesia relations after the strains that had arisen over Papuan asylum 
seekers in Australia in 2006. That is easier said than done, unfortunately. The 
gulf  between popular opinion in Australia about Indonesia and the thinking 
of  well-informed observers of  the country is wide—and apparently getting 
wider.
The head of  The University of  Melbourne’s Asian Law Centre (and 
chairman of  the Australia-Indonesia Institute), Tim Lindsey, has remarked 
that ‘the relationship is managed mainly by its supporters, but judged by 
its sceptics and opponents…flipping back and forth between stability and 
Published as ‘An important relationship on the brink of  maturity’ in The Australian, 31 
October 2007.
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collapse, between warm embrace and freezing hostility, although at its base it 
is, in fact, relatively stable’. Those who have a direct interest in it are inclined 
to see it as ‘important, resilient and strong’, whereas most Australians seem 
to regard it as ‘difficult, tense and ultimately disposable’.
The gulf  between well-informed and popular ideas about Indonesia and 
its relationship with Australia needs to be reduced drastically. But that is 
bound to be a long-term process. There are no quick fixes in sight. Problems 
and frictions are sure to arise from time to time—as the controversy over 
the fate of  the Bali Nine, accused of  drug smuggling, keeps reminding us.
Why does Indonesia matter to Australia? The answers often tend 
to be given in terms of  the negatives involved rather than the positives, 
of  Hansonite prejudices and pettiness rather than the opportunities and 
potentialities worth pursuing creatively. Terrorists and Muslim extremists 
come to mind, or the malign influence of  the army (read authoritarianism 
and militarism), or worries about that large population—‘too many, too 
close’, as one wit has put it—and limited cultivable land. Yet we worry far 
less these days about China, with roughly six times as many people and huge 
environmental problems, because it is so lucrative a market.
We can safely forget about most of  those apprehensions and supposed 
threats. The population of  Indonesia is about 230 million, but its rate of  
growth is falling rapidly. It will almost certainly stabilise at about 280 million 
some time after 2050. And in a steadily industrialising, urbanising economy, 
the need for additional land is no longer as pressing a problem as we used 
to think it was.
We worry about Muslim radicals and the few terrorists among them as 
a potential threat because of  our obsession with the global war on terror 
and because of  a tendency to conflate (quite wrongly) Islam and terrorism. 
Yet only a tiny fraction of  Indonesian Muslims embrace terrorism, which 
creates equally great concern for the mainstream Islamic organisations that 
oppose the advocacy of  violence and are far more directly threatened by 
it. Moreover, the effective cooperation that has developed between the 
Australian Federal Police and our intelligence agencies with their Indonesian 
counterparts in recent years has been most successful in constraining the 
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terrorists.
The basic reasons Indonesia matters to us have little to do with security 
but mainly with the international politics of  our region. Jakarta’s assistance 
and cooperation with us in regional affairs can be helpful to us—and have 
been on several occasions—whereas its opposition or antagonism can make 
things awkward for us. The other members of  ASEAN would be unlikely 
to side with us against Indonesia in any conflict situation, as we found over 
the East Timor crisis in 1999. At times even the US has refused to lean our 
way in opposition to Indonesia. That is simply a negative reason, although 
a potentially compelling one, hopefully remote, so long as we avoid serious 
divergences from Jakarta on key regional issues.
Our national interests are broadly congruent with Indonesia’s on the more 
important problems we both face, so our foreign policies should reflect 
that. Above all, our thinking about our bilateral relationship with Indonesia 
must form part and parcel of  our broader regional policies. It cannot be 
subordinated to single-issue concerns about Islamic jihadis or human rights 
violations or independence for provinces such as Papua.
We rarely give much thought to the key question of  just what our national 
interests really are with regards to Indonesia. A dozen or more of  the most 
desirable objectives we would like to see attained there can easily be listed, 
some not at all congruent with others. I have listed them in my recent Lowy 
Institute paper, Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects (pp. 
40–1), and others might well be added. So we have to determine priorities 
between them and keep them in balance in our policymaking processes. 
Juggling them is the name of  the game for any government in Canberra, as 
with so much else in politics. But the processes involved need to be much 
more transparent and explicit than they usually are, and better understood 
by the Australian public as well as in Jakarta. 
As an important step towards improving relations we should aim at 
flattening out the ups and downs in the relationship in all the ways we 
can, not allow them to be aggravated by scaremongering headlines and the 
ignorant malice of  shock jocks. And we should not delude ourselves that 
cordial personal relations between our leaders will always be sufficient to put 
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things right between us.
Above all, in the words of  the old song, let’s accentuate the positive, 
eliminate the negative, in all this. Most Australians are unaware of  the breadth 
and depth of  our contacts with Indonesia. We have a solid corps of  very 
well-informed Indonesia specialists in our universities, some government 
agencies, our armed services and federal police, parts of  our media and many 
scientific institutions that is probably unmatched anywhere else in the world. 
It is an invaluable national asset that we need to keep strengthening instead 
of  letting the underlying language skills atrophy, as the Howard government 
has been doing. A good start would be a less timorous attitude towards those 
absurdly overcautious travel advisory notices, which are making it almost 
impossible for our younger students to visit Indonesia to enhance their 
knowledge of  the country and its language—and of  its supposed dangers.
There are estimated to be nearly 40,000 Australians residing in Indonesia, 
many of  them with jobs there of  diverse kinds, a figure close to the number 
of  Indonesians in Australia. More than 200,000 Australian tourists visit 
Indonesia every year (mostly just to Bali, admittedly, but many later go to 
other parts of  the country), with that sort of  come-and-go greatly broadening 
our mental horizons and awareness of  our largest near neighbour.
The potential for long-term business cooperation and much closer 
relations is huge now that Indonesia is achieving GDP growth rates of  
nearly 7 per cent as in the early 1990s, and democratising dramatically after 
the bleak authoritarianism of  the Suharto years. 
People in both countries are increasingly becoming aware of  what we can 
sell or exchange or give to each other, not only material goods but also more 
inchoate products of  the mind and spirit.
It will all take time, of  course, to have much effect; several generations, 
probably. But, in the long run, our efforts to achieve closer engagement 
with Asia more generally are likeliest to prove successful if  we can first build 
stronger, more constructive relations with Indonesia. And we will rarely 
have a better or more sympatico president to deal with in Jakarta than SBY.
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APEC ECONOMIES NEWSLETTER
ROSS H. McLEOd
Pioneering public sector reform in Indonesia*
Indonesia’s recent economic performance has been impressive, 
notwithstanding severe challenges posed by rising global food and energy 
prices and by all-too-frequent natural disasters. But there remains much 
room for improvement in the policy and regulatory environment for 
private sector business, on which economic growth depends. For example, 
Indonesia ranks only 123rd of  178 countries on ease of  doing business in 
the World Bank’s Doing Business 2008 report, and 143rd of  180 countries 
in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007. A 
bureaucratic reform pilot project now in progress in the Ministry of  Finance 
is therefore of  particular interest.
The ministry has offices spread throughout the archipelago, and employs 
around 62,000 civil servants. When minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati took up 
her position in December 2005, she decided to push forward vigorously 
with reform, clearly signalling her intentions by replacing the heads of  
the notoriously corrupt tax and customs and excise directorates-general 
within the first four months. Her most spectacular action to date was to 
remove some 1,200 individuals from the customs office at Jakarta’s port, 
Tanjung Priok, and replace them with about 850 officials regarded as more 
trustworthy.
The aim of  reform is to create a civil service whose personnel are ‘clean’ 
(non-corrupt), professional and accountable, and which is efficient and 
effective in carrying out its functions. Thus it is recognised that reform 
does not merely entail bringing corruption under control (seemingly the 
president’s principal focus), but also involves improving the capacity of  the 
This article draws on the author’s ‘Survey of  recent developments’, Bulletin of  Indonesian 
Economic Studies, vol. 44, no. 2, August 2008.
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bureaucracy to design and implement government policies.
The most important component of  the reform effort concerns the way 
human resources are managed. The changes being implemented are far-
reaching, reflecting the need to clear away decades of  policies and practices 
that hinder efforts to optimise performance of  the bureaucracy. They include: 
preparing detailed job descriptions for each position; grading each position 
on the basis of  its scope, the competencies required and the risks that need 
to be managed by incumbents; determining a structure of  remuneration that 
reflects this grading; and developing a system for monitoring performance 
and rewarding or penalising individuals accordingly.
The ministry has compiled a set of  guidelines for improving discipline 
among its officials, together with a code of  ethics for all top-level officials. 
More important in practice is the decision to introduce a more coherent, 
market-related structure of  remuneration. Breaking from past practice, 
employees are now to be remunerated on the basis of  the job gradings just 
mentioned: the greater the skill requirements and responsibilities of  the 
position, the higher the level of  remuneration.
A specialist multinational consulting firm commissioned to advise on 
official levels of  remuneration in the ministry found that pay at lower levels 
was comparable with that in the private sector, but that the increase in 
remuneration with increasing levels of  responsibility lagged behind. Formal 
remuneration of  officials at the highest levels was far below that of  top 
executives within the private sector, which was seen as detrimental to the 
goal of  optimising the performance of  such officials—and thus the ministry 
itself. The pattern of  remuneration has now been brought more closely into 
line with that in the private sector through the payment of  special allowances 
over and above the standard basic salaries.
Reports that overall remuneration has increased fourfold mean little, 
because the allowances have not been applied evenly across all levels. In 
keeping with the heavy emphasis on differentiating between positions and 
tying remuneration to their grading, proportionately much higher allowances 
are paid at higher levels. Officials at the highest grading now receive a special 
allowance of  around US$60,000 annually. This still leaves them well behind 
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their private sector peers, but this is a dramatic departure from established 
practice, nevertheless.
A further important and closely related change concerns the filling of  
vacancies. Whereas in the past individuals waited patiently until seniority 
brought them to the top of  the list of  those eligible for promotion to higher 
positions, under the new arrangements vacancies are advertised internally, and 
anybody within the ministry who meets the job specifications is encouraged 
to apply. Still in its initial phase, this shift to merit-based competition for 
promotions is currently limited to Echelon II positions. Since promotions 
previously have depended heavily on seniority and also on the backing of  
one’s superiors, the new approach is experiencing some opposition from 
Echelon I officials—uncomfortable, presumably, with losing their capacity to 
dispense patronage to (and thus ensure the loyalty of) their subordinates. In 
order to minimise favouritism, the ministry is emphasising ‘key performance 
indicators’, to differentiate between applicants for vacant positions.
More generous remuneration levels should provide a stronger incentive 
to employees to work hard, and to act with integrity and discipline. New 
regulations stipulating sanctions that can be imposed on those that do 
not live up to these expectations might not have much impact, however, 
in an organisational culture averse to imposing them. Conscious of  this, 
the ministry has enlisted outside assistance to suppress corrupt behaviour. 
At its request, the Corruption Eradication Commission raided the Tanjung 
Priok customs office at the end of  May 2008, discovering quantities of  cash, 
presumed to be bribes, hidden in the desk drawers of  a number of  customs 
officers. Nevertheless, the reported 48 per cent year-on-year increase in tax 
collections during January–May 2008 strongly suggests that reforms are 
having the desired overall effect.
Apart from the understandable reluctance of  the ministry to push 
remuneration even closer to parity with the private sector, the other obvious 
shortcoming of  the reforms is the unwillingness to open job vacancies 
to applications from the private sector, except for limited hiring to fill 
‘functional’ positions—that is, those that require specific technical skills. 
The bureaucracy would certainly benefit from an influx of  individuals with 
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private sector experience and with certain skills in critically short supply in 
the civil service.
Minister Mulyani’s recent appointment to the additional post of  
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs reflects the high esteem in 
which she is held. It is to be hoped that the reforms she is implementing will 
be followed in other ministries, although this is unlikely to occur until after 
the presidential elections in 2009.
Japan
18 September 2007
CANBERRA TIMES
TESSA MORRIS-SUzUkI
Why the senate should pass the comfort women 
motion*
On 19 September the Australian Senate will vote on a motion urging the 
Japanese government to apologise and pay compensation to former comfort 
women—women who suffered institutionalised sexual abuse in Japanese 
military brothels (so-called ‘comfort stations’) during the Asia-Pacific War. 
The resolution also calls on Japan to provide education about the history of  
these events in schools.
The Senate vote comes at a particularly crucial moment. Hawkish Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe has just resigned, and now seems likely to be replaced 
by the more liberal conservative Yasuo Fukuda. More broadly, Northeast 
Asia is in the midst of  a major transformation, centring on moves towards a 
resolution of  the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Recent statements 
and actions by Japanese prime ministers on issues of  history have heightened 
Published as ‘Comfort women still thorny issue’, Canberra Times, 18 September 2007.
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tensions between Japan and its neighbours and have run the risk of  pushing 
Japan into a more isolated position in current regional developments.
Now is the perfect moment for Japan to mend relations with its regional 
neighbours and to embark on an active and dynamic role in promoting 
future Northeast Asian integration.
The Australian Senate motion follows a similar resolution passed 
by the US Senate in July. Critics of  these resolutions argue that they are 
unnecessary, since Japan has already apologised for its role in the comfort 
women issue. However, matters are more complex than this. Between 1991 
and 1993, the Japanese government did indeed conduct its own enquiry into 
the issue, amassing almost two thousand pages of  historical documentation 
on the tens of  thousands of  women who were recruited to work in military 
‘comfort stations’ during the war.
On the basis of  these findings, then Chief  Cabinet Secretary Yohei 
Kono admitted the responsibility of  the Japanese military, stating that ‘the 
recruitment of  the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters 
who acted in response to the request of  the military. The government study 
has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, 
through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military 
personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at 
comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.’ He also expressed the 
government’s sincere apology and remorse and promised that Japan would 
use the study and teaching of  history to ‘forever engrave such issues in our 
memories’.
Unfortunately, though, this was never followed up by government 
compensation to victims. Instead, the Japanese government approved the 
creation of  a compensation fund to which ordinary Japanese people were 
invited to contribute if  they wished. This fund has recently been dismantled. 
Meanwhile, a group of  right-wing parliamentarians has been energetically 
lobbying the Japanese government to rescind the Kono apology. Worse still, 
a concerted campaign by the right totally undermined the government’s 
promise to teach future generations about the issue. In 1996, all Japanese 
junior high school history textbooks began to include some mention of  the 
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comfort women, but in response to the revisionist campaign, one text after 
another dropped the issue, and by 2006 just one out of  the eight official 
school history textbooks contained a single footnote reference to comfort 
women.
These trends have caused great concern amongst Japan’s neighbours, and 
former Prime Minister Abe’s confused and disingenuous response to the 
issue did nothing to allay these anxieties. Although Abe did not explicitly 
renounce the Kono apology, he sought to argue that the recruitment of  
comfort women had not been ‘forcible in the narrow sense of  the word’, 
since the ‘comfort station’ system did not involve ‘officials forcing their way 
into houses like kidnappers and taking people away’. This piece of  sophistry 
played to the right-wing argument that the Japanese government has nothing 
to apologise for, since comfort women were recruited by civilian brokers, 
not by the military or government officials.
It is, however, a specious argument: historical evidence shows that comfort 
women were recruited in many ways, in some cases by brokers, in others by 
soldiers themselves. It also clearly shows that the Japanese military and state 
were centrally involved in the management and authorisation of  this system. 
The state has no grounds for evading responsibility.
Another argument put forward by opponents of  the Senate resolution 
is that Japan is a country friendly to Australia, and criticism of  this facet 
of  its history would at best be churlish, and at worst could be construed as 
heavy-handed meddling in the affairs of  another country. I would argue, on 
the contrary, that the Senate should pass this resolution precisely because 
Australia is a friend of  Japan.
Recent statements by Japanese politicians on historical issues including 
the comfort women issue give the world the impression the Japanese are a 
people with little sense of  historical responsibility. This is not the case. An 
opinion poll taken earlier this year showed that an overwhelming 85 per cent 
of  Japanese people believed that Japan should remember and feel contrition 
for its colonial expansion and wartime invasion of  Asia. In Japan itself  
there are many scholars, journalists and activists who have worked tirelessly 
in difficult circumstances to persuade the government to compensate the 
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former comfort women. The recent stance of  the Abe government does 
these citizens a disservice, and above all reflects the uncomfortably close 
relationship between sections of  the ruling elite and vocal minority right-
wing interest groups.
Now Japan has a chance to take a different line. The Australian Senate 
should urge the Japanese government to do so, in a spirit of  friendship, 
and in the hope for a new mood of  cooperation between the countries of  
Northeast Asia.
14 November 2007
THE AGE
TESSA MORRIS-SUzUkI
Japan and North Korea: time for a new approach to 
the abduction issue*
When Yasuo Fukuda steps onto US soil later this week for his first official 
visit as Japan’s prime minister there will be a profoundly emotional issue 
at the top of  his agenda: the fate of  Japanese citizens kidnapped by North 
Korea during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Just as 9/11 transformed America, so Japan changed forever on 17 
September 2002: the day when the North Korean government admitted that 
its agents had been responsible for the kidnapping of  13 Japanese citizens, 
of  whom five were alive and the rest (according to Pyongyang) were dead. 
Soon after, the five survivors returned home, and from that moment on the 
Japanese media have been unremittingly consumed by the abduction issue.
Published as ‘Japan needs a new approach to North Korean abductions’, The Age, 14 
November 2007.
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The heat generated by the issue, however, has not always been accompanied 
by light. The fury of  the Japanese media towards North Korea is entirely 
understandable. The abductions were a bizarre and cruel violation of  human 
rights, not to mention of  Japanese sovereignty. But outrage in Japan quickly 
hardened into a political orthodoxy that has smothered domestic debate and 
failed to produce any significant progress in resolving the tragedy.
The orthodox version insists that all 13 victims whom North Korea 
admits to abducting (as well as others whose existence it has not admitted) 
are still alive, and that absolutely no progress can be made in normalising 
relations between Japan and North Korea until all have returned home. This 
is the line taken by the abductee support groups, and it was also the line that 
former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a central plank in his agenda.
This approach has gained such a hold on the media that few Japanese 
mainstream newspapers or TV programs have the nerve to question it. In 
private, many Japanese journalists will readily admit that no one actually 
knows whether the remaining kidnap victims are alive or dead. To discuss 
this fact in public, however, would invite a backlash that media organisations 
are reluctant to risk.
The problem with orthodoxy is that it produces rigid politics. Alternative 
approaches to the abduction issue have not been pursued, and indeed 
have barely been debated. Japanese demands to ‘send them all home’ have 
been met by bland insistence from the North Koreans that the problem 
has already been resolved. The result is stalemate with no end—and no 
closure for the victims’ families—in sight. Meanwhile, the issue threatens 
to become a major impediment to the current easing of  tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole.
Alternative approaches to the abduction issue certainly exist. One of  
the more obvious would be to move cautiously towards normalisation 
of  relations with North Korea, while also pressuring Pyongyang to let a 
Japanese or international investigation team into the country to gather 
further information. Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly obvious that 
the issue needs to be addressed in a broader framework; for although the 
plight of  the Japanese kidnap victims and their families is terrible, it is not 
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the only bitter fruit of  this last remnant of  the Cold War.
In South Korea hundreds of  families await news of  relatives who were 
kidnapped by North Korea over the decades since the Korean War. In Japan 
tens of  thousands of  ethnic Koreans live in constant anxiety about the fates 
of  family members who migrated from Japan to North Korea during the 
1960s and 1970s as part of  a mass resettlement scheme agreed upon between 
the North Korean and Japanese governments. Although this scheme was 
labelled a ‘repatriation’, almost all of  those involved originally came from 
the southern half  of  Korea, and most had lived in Japan for decades. North 
Korea pushed this ‘mass repatriation’ for its own economic and political 
reasons, promising migrants a happy future in the socialist paradise. But it 
is now known that Japanese politicians and bureaucrats energetically and 
secretly promoted the scheme, which they saw as reducing the size of  an 
unwelcome ethnic minority.
Around 150 survivors—out of  over 90,000 who participated in this 
resettlement—have managed to escape from North Korea and make their 
way back to Japan, and many more would certainly like to join them. Those 
I have spoken to tell of  the misery, poverty and discrimination they and 
their families experienced during decades of  life in North Korea. Though 
North Korea bears direct responsibility for these sufferings, the Japanese 
government bears a large share of  the responsibility for the process that sent 
them there in the first place. Only a process of  dialogue between the two 
countries can find ways to relink these divided families and start to address 
this long-neglected human tragedy.
With the departure of  the Abe administration and the creation of  the 
Fukuda administration, the time is ripe for a new, more flexible and much 
more wide-reaching approach to break the deadlock in Japan–North Korea 
relations.
korea
November 2007
ASIAN CURRENTS
HYUNG-A kIM
A review of Roh Moo-hyun’s leadership: in light of 
Korea’s state of democratic consolidation*
On his presidential victory in December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun was seen as 
a symbol of  grassroots democracy, born of  a ‘revolution’ led by progressive 
democratisation forces and supported especially by the younger generation. 
Some claimed that Roh’s rise to the presidency signalled Korean democracy 
entering its ‘second generation’, marking the end of  the politics of  the 
‘Three Kims Era’, which focused on bossism and regional favouritism, 
and commencing a new era of  open competition between the younger 
and older generations, and the progressive ‘reformists’ and anticommunist 
conservatives. Ironically, however, ordinary Koreans quickly deserted Roh’s 
‘Participatory Government’, asking ‘Does democracy feed us?’
This is an abridged version of  a paper delivered at the 2007 Korea Update http://
koreanstudies.anu.edu.au/update.htm. First published in Asian Currents: The Asian Studies 
Association of  Australia’s e-bulletin, November 2007.
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Why are the Korean people so disillusioned with their democracy under 
the Roh government? One key reason is Roh’s leadership style, which is seen 
by many as politically divisive, ideologically ambiguous and economically 
incompetent. His government has performed poorly in introducing policies 
which could enhance ordinary people’s livelihoods.
Politically, Roh relied on a binary populist tactic—known as the ‘Roh 
Moo-hyun code’—akin to the ‘us-versus-them’ approach. This was 
especially evident in his appointment of  presidential staff. But faced with a 
critical shortage of  experienced people around him, Roh also had to recruit 
many professional bureaucrats, creating a two-layered grouping within his 
office which, in effect, also divided Korea’s powerful state bureaucracy. To 
his credit, however, Roh made a significant contribution in restoring the 
autonomy of  the judiciary, while also putting an end to illegal money politics, 
risking even his own impeachment. He also expanded mass participation at 
both public and state-governance levels which, ironically, added to Roh’s 
political constraints.
Ideologically, Roh’s leadership style showed ambiguity. This was evident 
in his pursuing a conciliatory ‘Sunshine Policy’ toward North Korea, which 
focused on peace and prosperity, while also seeking a revision of  Korea–US 
relations aimed at restoring Korea’s defence autonomy. From the beginning, 
however, Roh and his government were ignored by the Bush administration’s 
decision-making radar, especially in the course of  the Six-Party talks on 
North Korea’s nuclear program involving the two Koreas, the US, China, 
Japan and Russia. Despite the Six-Party Talks Agreement, signed on 13 
February 2007, and the signing of  the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, 
among others, Roh’s relations with the Bush administration improved very 
little.
Roh’s leadership failure is most widely criticised for his government’s 
incompetent economic management and for failing to meet expectations 
that it narrow income disparity. Social polarisation in Korea was recently 
ranked the third largest among 20 of  the 30 OECD member countries, while 
there is an overall erosion of  the middle class. According to the National 
Statistical Office, the top 20 per cent of  urban households earned 4.98 times 
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more than the bottom 20 per cent in the second quarter of  this year, an 
increase on the previous year. Another critical problem is the rapid increase 
of  casual workers, who now number 8.4 million. Systematic discrimination 
against female casual workers has also become a major social problem. So, 
despite notable improvement in political openness and transparency, many 
Koreans claim Roh’s failed leadership to be the cause of  the ‘hijacking’ of  
Korean democracy.
12 May 2008
SYdNEY MORNING HERALd
TESSA MORRIS-SUzUkI
The looming famine in our near north*
My friend in Japan can tell you what it feels like. First the bowls of  gritty 
corn mixed with a few grains of  rice get smaller and smaller. To satisfy your 
aching stomach, you boil the grains in a big pot of  water, making a grey 
watery gruel which silences your hunger for a little while. But then the grain 
diminishes until the gruel is little more than hot water.
You start to get cold and tired. Any effort seems too difficult. When you 
go out into the street, you see the bodies lying like bundles of  rags beside the 
road. No one does anything much about them. Everyone is too exhausted 
by the struggle to survive.
That was North Korea in 1995–1997, during the famine that the authorities 
euphemistically call the ‘Arduous March’. Conservative estimates suggest 
that between 600,000 and one million North Koreans died of  starvation 
along the way. My friend survived, mainly because she happened to live near 
Published as ‘…and another disaster looms in North Korea’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 
2008.
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the Chinese border and (risking her life) slipped back and forth across the 
border to trade on the black market. Then, one day, she decided to stay on 
other side of  the frontier. Now she lives in Japan, but many of  her relatives 
and friends are still in North Korea.
And now the nightmare is beginning all over again. Only this time, the 
border between North Korea and China is much more tightly controlled, 
and black market activities have become even more dangerous than they 
were in the 1990s. In a bulletin released in April, the well-informed South 
Korean aid NGO Good Friends reported that a second Arduous March 
was beginning and warned that ‘it will difficult to stabilise the situation if  
nothing is done by the end of  April’. At the start of  May, when nothing had 
been done, the NGO began reporting deaths from starvation particularly 
around the town of  Yangdeok, northeast of  Pyongyang.
The origins of  this disaster lie in the distinctive brand of  Marxism 
pursued by North Korea from the 1950s onward. The dream was to convert 
their cold and mountainous country into a self-sustaining granary. To that 
end, new high-yielding rice strains were developed, fertiliser factories built 
with Soviet aid, and chemicals poured onto the land to raise its productivity. 
Mountain forests were felled, and the mountainsides turned onto terraced 
fields of  maize.
But the North Korean climate and terrain has never been suited to large-
scale rice production, and the consequences in retrospect seem horribly 
inevitable. Deforestation produced massive flooding: a major cause both of  
the 1990s’ and of  the present food crisis. With the collapse of  the Soviet 
Union, North Korea lost access to cheap fuel imports needed to sustain 
fertiliser production, and without fertilisers the ‘high-yield’ rice plants 
withered and died. North Korea’s growing isolation from the rest of  the 
world has made the situation far worse, and soaring global food prices have 
added a further toxic ingredient to the mix.
The erratic behaviour of  North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has tested 
the patience even of  the country’s closest ally, China. The new conservative 
government in South Korea has also announced its intention to take a 
much tougher stance on aid than its predecessors and has failed to give the 
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fertiliser which the previous government provided during North Korea’s 
rice planting season, further imperilling this year’s harvest. Meanwhile, the 
rest of  the world seems oddly indifferent.
North Korea’s media restrictions mean that we do not see the vivid human 
images of  hunger that have emerged from places like Ethiopia and Darfur. 
In the Ethiopian famine of  the mid 1980s, or in Sudan more recently, we 
gave aid whatever we thought of  the country’s government, because we 
could see the naked, desperate face of  human need. In the case of  North 
Korea, we rarely see anything more than images of  state leaders or military 
parades, making it all too easy to ignore the fate of  hungry people. In the 
worst case, some western commentators even engage in a chilling calculus 
which reckons a few hundred thousand deaths from famine as an acceptable 
price to pay for long-term political and strategic ends.
This approach is not only morally bankrupt, but does not even make 
sense in strategic terms. Political transformation in North Korea will take 
place, though how this will happen still remains unclear. But the poorer 
and more chaotic North Korea is, the more difficult it will be to reintegrate 
the country into the region and the world. A chaotic society of  starving, 
desperate people will be a source of  instability for Northeast Asia for 
decades to come.
In their careful analysis of  the catastrophe of  the 1990s, Famine in North 
Korea, US scholars Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland are scathingly 
critical of  the North Korean regime for its failure to call on international 
help more quickly, its food distribution policies and its diversion of  foreign 
aid. But they also note that foreign aid, which finally began to flow into 
the country after a delay of  about a year, was crucial in preventing an even 
greater catastrophe. Even aid which did not flow through official channels 
often had a positive effect, because it ended up being sold on street corners, 
increasing the supply of  food and stimulating the growth of  the market.
My friend in Japan survived not only because of  her brave night-time 
journeys to and fro across the border, but also because, around the beginning 
of  1996 and after many deaths, the food aid finally did begin to arrive. She 
still remembers the joy of  seeing those sacks of  maize with their strange 
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foreign symbols in the streets of  her town.
Australia has diplomatic relations with North Korea and excellent 
relations with the other countries of  the region, and has been a generous 
contributor to World Food Program projects in North Korea. The Australian 
government is therefore excellently placed to play a strong leadership role in 
drawing global attention to this rapidly worsening crisis and encouraging a 
coordinated international response.
If  we fail to act now, how many more will die waiting in vain for the sacks 
of  food that never arrive?
4 July 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
HYUNG-A kIM
Cyber-savvy Koreans take their beef to president*
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s government is in crisis in the face 
of  popular candlelight demonstrations against its resumption of  US beef  
imports. The protests have continued for more than 50 consecutive days.
The street demonstrations appeared to dwindle for a while when the 
government negotiated an ‘additional’ agreement with the US to ensure 
imports of  beef  older than 30 months were banned, thus introducing a 
so-called Quality System Assessment program and Specified Risk Materials 
regulation, as well as strengthening inspection measures. Any meat-packing 
producers who violated the quality program twice would be banned from 
exporting their products to Korea. Similarly, any product without the required 
certification from the program would be immediately shipped back.
First published in Canberra Times, 4 July 2008.
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Meanwhile, Lee made his second public apology, admitting his 
government’s failure to communicate appropriately with the people. In his 
desperate attempt to win back public approval which has nosedived to the 
single-digit range, Lee replaced last week most of  his senior secretaries, 
including his chief  of  staff. He is yet to carry out a cabinet reshuffle. The 
cabinet has been in limbo for over three weeks since all cabinet ministers 
submitted their resignations in mid June.
Lee’s attempt to win back public approval, however, has achieved very 
little. On the contrary, the spontaneous protests have turned into organised 
antigovernment demonstrations, specifically calling for Lee’s resignation.
Noticeable violence has occurred after the government announced its 
import protocols last week that put American beef  on the Korean market. 
Many street demonstrations are against the Lee government’s key policies, 
including his plans for a grand canal and privatisation of  public works. The 
street demonstrations, in short, have paralysed the normal functioning of  
representative government with the new National Assembly several weeks 
overdue to convene. Lee appears noticeably silent while the roads to the 
presidential house, the Cheong Wa Dae, are blocked and heavily guarded, 
especially at nights.
What has gone wrong with Lee and his government? After all, Lee has 
been in office just over four months after his inauguration after a landslide 
victory with 48.7 per cent of  the vote in last December’s presidential election. 
Despite his alleged links to several widely publicised financial scandals, the 
people elected Lee hoping and expecting that he would manage the economy 
more effectively than Lee’s predecessor, President Roh Moo-hyun.
The Lee government’s public trouble began in April when the newly 
elected president announced that his government would end the existing 
ban on US beef, which had been in place after the 2003 outbreak there of  
mad cow disease. Lee’s announcement was based on the advice of  the World 
Organisation for Animal Health which had declared last September that US 
beef  was fit for consumption. Nevertheless, many Koreans, especially high 
school students and their concerned parents became extremely angry with 
the way the Lee government had negotiated the resumption of  importing 
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US beef  without regard for public concerns.
As far as these students and their parents, especially mothers, are 
concerned, their health and safety are at risk because, as a rule, most South 
Korean schoolchildren are provided lunches by government-contracted 
companies which, they fear, may or may not know whether the beef  they 
use for students’ lunches is contaminated with mad cow disease.
The high school student-led candlelight protests quickly aroused public 
emotions, especially expressed through South Korea’s extremely effective 
WiMax wireless internet and mobile networks. The effect of  these internet-
driven public protests was capable of  raising a range of  specific issues. The 
development of  this broad-based social movement has been described by 
observers, including former President Kim Dae-jung, as a new form of  
‘direct democracy’ or ‘cyber democracy’. Others describe it as the ‘second 
democratisation’ since 1987, when Korea began its democratic transition 
after almost 26 years of  military rule since 1961.
No one seems to know exactly how these populist candlelight 
demonstrations will shape the character of  Korean democracy in the long 
run. What is undeniable, especially in terms of  this digital populism, is that 
the Korean public can now wield their ‘collective power’ in national and 
state affairs. In this sense, behind the candlelight demonstrations against 
US beef  lie the Korean people’s collective fury at Lee and his government’s 
‘irresolute leadership’. In fact, the Lee government is tarnished by the image 
of  its ‘millionaire cabinet’ which is seen as lacking humility.
Even the influential Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice, with a long 
history of  political activism since the 1970s, publicly spoke out against the 
Lee government when, on Monday, it convened an outdoor mass in front 
of  City Hall. They said ‘We gathered Monday to admonish the current 
administration for its lack of  humility.’
Pacific
29 October 2007
CANBERRA TIMES
kATERINA TEAIWA
Ignorance rife about Islander Australians*
When it comes to the prominent Australian rugby player, it’s pronounced 
Lote, not ‘Lotty’, and Tuqiri is pronounced Tunggiri, and not ‘Tukiri’. Pacific 
communities are some of  the fastest growing and visible members of  the 
Australian population but what do Australians really know about Pacific 
Islanders beyond the stereotypes of  characters such as the reluctant student 
Jonah from the popular TV show Summer Heights High? Is Oceania out there 
or right here in our major cities?
From rugby league and rugby union, to Australian Idol and Big Brother, 
Pacific Islanders are visibly contributing to the expansion and diversity of  
Australian popular culture. But unlike in New Zealand, a country that now 
describes itself  as a ‘South Pacific nation’, prominent Pacific people here 
are rarely identified by their island heritage. There are plenty of  potential 
role models in Australia, but if  heritage holds no social cachet, it doesn’t 
First published in Canberra Times, 29 October 2007.
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help young people struggling with identity issues. A young woman I spoke 
to in Sydney, concerned with her Fijian boyfriend’s snobbish attitude to all 
things from the land of  his heritage, described this to me as the ‘anglicise 
me’ syndrome.
Many Pacific Islanders feel pressure to assimilate and forego their cultures 
in exchange for acceptance. The choice impacts particularly on young island 
men as stereotypes of  the violent, unruly Polynesian male continue to 
circulate in the popular imagination.
Recently in a lecture a student asked me what I thought of  the high-rating 
series Summer Heights High, the final episode of  which aired on ABC this 
week. The incredibly clever and disturbingly funny serial created by Chris 
Lilley, was flagged because it is one of  the few on-air with a star Polynesian 
character. Thirteen-year-old Jonah Takalua, who is Tongan, is the epitome 
of  delinquency, obsessed with breakdancing, drives his teachers up the wall 
and has a violent father. The year 7 b-boy crew, The Aussies, rivals Jonah 
and his Islander mates and allegedly tags their lockers with: ‘Go home FOB’ 
(fresh off  the boat); ‘We grew here you flew here’; ‘Get back on the boat’.
In episode 6, the Polynesian Appreciation Day featured an ambiguous 
Pacific dance followed by a Poly-rap video illustrating two of  the strongest 
forces shaping young Pacific migrant lives: tradition and African-American 
popular culture. One is rooted in the strength of  culture in the home island. 
The other is a strategy for maintaining a sense of  efficacy and pride in the 
urban metropoles that continue to attract Pacific families searching for 
better opportunities.
What is striking about Pacific Islander migrants and the strategies that 
help them thrive in the diaspora, is the way in which they can build on 
tradition. Jonah isn’t just obsessed with dancing because he’s too stupid to 
learn. Most Islanders come from strong oral and embodied cultures and so 
excel at sports and the arts for good reasons.
Let’s look at a select list of  Pacific Islander icons in Australia:
Lote Tuqiri (Fijian, rugby league and Wallaby), Petero Civoniceva (Fijian, 
rugby league), Paulini Curuenavuli (Fijian, pop and R&B singer), Trevor 
Butler (Fijian, winner of  Big Brother 4), George Smith (Tongan, Wallaby), Mark 
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Gerrard (Tongan, Wallaby), Mo’onia Gerrard (Tongan, Australian netball), 
Wycliff  Palu (Tongan, Wallaby), Willie Ofahengaue (Tongan, Wallaby), Mal 
Meninga (South Sea Islander, rugby league), Jay Laga’aia (Samoan, actor), Jai 
Turima (Maori, Olympic long jumper).
The numbers of  both Tongans and Fijians featured in this line-up is 
fascinating when put into the context of  Tongan representation in Summer 
Heights High and Australia’s stance on affairs in coup-riddled Fiji.
Aside from Meninga and those with Anglo surnames, all other Pacific-
Australian icons have their names regularly mispronounced or strategically 
shortened. Civoniceva is ‘Thivonitheva’, and Laga’aia is ‘Langa’aia’, with a 
soft ‘ng’ like ‘sing.’ A small thing like getting this right goes a long way in 
helping Pacific youth feel like they can be proud to be both Australian and 
Islander. It also goes a long way in the perception of  people in the islands 
who see Australia as culturally insensitive and bossy.
The Howard government’s approach to the region has been of  the distant 
and hard ‘Big Brother’ variety, focused on security, with aid tied to the 
mantra of  ‘good governance’. The Pacific, in the imagination of  journalists, 
policymakers and scholars, is strangely both paradise and nightmare and 
regularly focused ‘out there’. In the meantime the number of  Pacific 
Islanders is swelling in New South Wales and Queensland. Maori numbers, 
in particular, are growing so much that on 1 October Pita Sharples of  the 
Maori Party in New Zealand requested the creation of  a new electorate for 
the one in seven Maoris who now live in Australia.
So numbers grow, Fijians and Tongans are scoring the Australian tries, 
Australian museums and galleries are hankering for Pacific art and artifacts, 
and there is a strange and simultaneously increasing gap in understanding 
the islands in the streets, classrooms, sports fields, media and halls of  
government. With economic giants like China and India occupying the 
minds of  students, business leaders, scholars and politicians alike, what is 
assumed to be the ‘tiny Pacific’, in fact a region that covers one-third of  
the surface of  the planet, has slipped from the centre to the margins in the 
Australian consciousness.
Pacific Islanders must become Australian if  they move here but is it the 
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case that Australia no longer needs to educate itself  on the Pacific? For a 
region of  incredible historical, economic and political significance, such a 
situation is of  great concern.
A 2003 Senate report that never received a formal reply from the 
government made a passionate call for more education in Australia about 
Pacific cultures, lest Australia suffer a ‘dramatic loss’ of  influence in the 
region.
As the Howard government ignored many of  the sensible suggestions 
in this report, I can only hope that if  Labor wins they will take a new and 
fresh approach to Oceania and the talented Pacific Islander communities 
that help make Australia the diverse and prosperous nation we know it will 
continue to be.
7 January 2008
SYdNEY MORNING HERALd
CYNTHIA BANHAM
Building a real rapport with Pacific Islanders*
It is time to reappraise Australia’s role in the South Pacific. A new government 
here, and in the Solomon Islands—a country with which Australia until very 
lately had a fractious relationship—affords such an opportunity.
Why is such a reappraisal needed? For one thing, John Howard left 
behind a rather mixed legacy in the Pacific. When it came to substantive 
policy, Australia had a good record in the last decade: a string of  successful 
law-and-order interventions, a generous aid budget, a real willingness to help 
out with disaster relief  and great efforts in combating the scourge of  HIV/
First published in Sydney Morning Herald, 7 January 2008.
218 Capturing the Year — 2008
AIDS, so prevalent in some of  the island states.
But when it came to style—diplomatic style—the Howard years were 
seriously lacking, and as a result Australia has been left with quite an image 
problem in our neighbourhood. Howard and his foreign minister, Alexander 
Downer, treated their Pacific Island counterparts with contempt, choosing 
to air complaints about them in press conferences and open letters to the 
public, rather than doing as they would with, say, the president of  the United 
States or the prime minister of  Japan—and pick up the phone.
Imagine Australia’s foreign minister publicly saying this of  dealing with 
Indonesian politicians: ‘You don’t want to do so from a position of  weakness, 
you don’t want to look weak and you don’t…want to look compliant.’ Yet 
that’s exactly what Downer said—about Pacific Island leaders—in a national 
debate before the election, which was broadcast on ABC’s Radio Australia 
throughout the region. Moreover, imagine some other nation saying it of  us. 
There would be outrage.
Yes, the Pacific Island states have their problems. But Howard’s and 
Downer’s regular public disparaging of  their leaders as corrupt smacked, to 
Islanders, of  double standards. It’s not as if  the Howard government itself  
was immune from criticisms of  poor governance—it did, after all, preside 
over the AWB kickbacks scandal. If  Australia’s prime minister and foreign 
minister treat political leaders of  the South Pacific poorly, such behaviour 
can only seriously undermine the efforts of  our diplomats on the ground, as 
well as Australia’s influence in the region.
Kevin Rudd has shown signs he is willing to take a fresh approach. He 
has already met Sir Michael Somare, the Papua New Guinean prime minister 
who was banned from travelling to Australia by the Howard government 
over his alleged role in the Julian Moti affair. If  only out of  self-interest from 
the point of  view of  Australia’s strategic interests, a thaw in relations with 
our Pacific neighbours could not come any sooner.
The more fractured those bilateral relationships have become over the 
past few years, the more Pacific Island states have looked to the north for 
support—to China and Taiwan in particular. China, which unlike Australia 
does not place conditions on its aid, is now pouring hundreds of  millions 
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annually into the Pacific Island economies.
As a result Australia faces a real risk of  the Pacific Islands becoming 
staging posts for aggressive larger nations—something the Rudd government 
is acutely aware of  and intends to make a focus.
During the election campaign Rudd announced two new initiatives in the 
Pacific. One is the Pacific Partnership for Development and Security to tackle 
underlying structural weaknesses in education, health care, infrastructure, 
youth unemployment, as well as good governance and security. The other 
is an idea of  the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Mike Kelly, a former 
military man. It’s an Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation. 
If  there’s one common complaint among senior defence figures, it’s that 
too much responsibility has been placed on the military in past security 
operations in the Pacific, with not enough emphasis on nation-building 
and training other arms of  government in this role. This centre is meant to 
address that.
But is it enough to solely blame the politicians for Australia’s image 
problem in the Pacific? What about Australia’s education system? Despite 
having the island states on our doorstep, there is little teaching about Pacific 
cultures. There is therefore nothing to move Australia beyond the ‘us 
and them’ mentality that underpins our Pacific policy and the patronising 
behaviour of  some of  our politicians.
One policy initiative which could help to dispel such a mentality and 
help the Pacific Island nations in a way that will have long-term benefits in 
terms of  bolstering local economies and developing a mutual understanding 
between Australia and its neighbours is that of  labour mobility.
Allowing Pacific Islanders into Australia on short-term working visas, as 
their leaders have pleaded for and the World Bank has urged, was an idea 
rejected by the Howard government, and supported by Labor in opposition. 
Now the Rudd government, amid concerns voiced by unions, will not 
commit to such a proposal, only saying it will examine a trial visa scheme 
being conducted by New Zealand.
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9 February 2008
THE ECONOMIST
JON FRAENkEL
Bougainville: explosive mines*
Rows about minerals sparked the decade-long civil war between Bougainville 
and Papua New Guinea. Now Bougainville’s politicians are hoping mining 
revenues will allow them to repair destroyed infrastructure and raise living 
standards. But this has brought them into conflict with PNG about the 
terms of  the autonomy arrangements that ended the war in 1997, and raised 
questions about the rightful ownership of  the mineral deposits secreted 
under the island’s towering, rainforest-covered mountain ranges.
PNG’s prime minister, Sir Michael Somare, and his influential deputy, 
Puka Temu, visited Bougainville in late January for negotiations. They 
acknowledged the need to transfer supervisory powers over mining to the 
Autonomous Government of  Bougainville (ABG), but Mr Temu argued that 
‘the state’, that is, PNG, should remain owner of  all the resources. Joseph 
Kabui, president of  the ABG since 2005, strongly disagrees. He argues that 
if  his government were to accept PNG’s ownership of  the resources, it 
would lose all support and there would be a serious danger of  the rebellion’s 
beginning again.
That rebellion, which some claim cost 15,000–20,000 lives, was sparked 
by landowner disputes centred on the distribution of  revenues from the 
vast Panguna copper mine operated by a Rio Tinto subsidiary. When the 
PNG government sent in the army to quash the rebellion it escalated into an 
independence struggle, led by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). 
PNG’s soldiers withdrew after a 1990 ceasefire. But the embattled island then 
endured a long and debilitating conflict among the Islanders themselves.
The peace agreement eventually reached between BRA leaders and 
Published as ‘Asia: explosive mines; Bougainville’, The Economist, 9 February 2008.
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PNG politicians in 2001 entailed the PNG government’s accepting greater 
autonomy for Bougainville and a referendum on independence, to be held 
at some point between 2015 and 2020. In the intervening period, powers 
were to be devolved to the ABG. The latest dispute centres on the first big 
transfer of  powers under the new arrangements. That this devolution of  
authority concerns mine ownership and regulation reinforces its sensitivity.
Mr Kabui and his ministers argue that the mine-ownership issue matters 
little to the national government but is of  pivotal significance to Bougainville. 
The formula for the division of  royalties already gives 20 per cent to the 
landowners and 80 per cent to the local government, leaving nothing to 
the central government. The biggest source of  mining revenue is company 
taxation, the distribution of  which Mr Kabui agrees must be negotiated with 
the national government. But the PNG government is worried, regardless of  
the financial implications, that the inexperienced ABG will be hoodwinked 
by the unscrupulous international mining companies waiting in the wings. 
That may indeed be a real danger, but a peace settlement that provides for 
autonomy should leave room for Bougainvilleans to learn to handle tough 
negotiations by themselves.
3 May 2008
THE ECONOMIST
JON FRAENkEL
Tonga: unsteady as she goes*
The faltering transition in Tonga from monarchy to democracy took another 
step forward with an election on 24 April. This was the first poll in the islands, 
Published as ‘Asia: unsteady as she goes; Tonga’, The Economist, 3 May 2008.
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where 108,000 people live, since 2005, when popularly elected politicians for 
the first time joined the royal government. One, Feleti Sevele, later became 
prime minister. In November 2006, Tonga was rocked by pro-democracy 
protests and riots, leaving much of  the capital, Nuku’alofa, in ashes. But the 
leading pro-democracy parliamentarians who were accused of  orchestrating 
those riots swept back into office on the main island of  Tongatapu and 
those nearby. ’Akilisi Pohiva was the top-scoring candidate on Tongatapu. 
He and several other pro-democracy leaders face sedition charges. If  found 
guilty they will lose their seats.
Ministers in the royal government had hoped voters would punish the 
radicals for the destruction of  Nuku’alofa, and back the cabinet’s gradualist 
reform agenda. The new king, George Tupou V, who acceded to the throne 
in 2006, soon declared that he no longer wanted to appoint the ministers 
and predicted a popularly elected majority in Parliament. Last year the 
government agreed to increase the number of  people’s representatives from 
nine to 17 at the next elections in 2010, while retaining nine seats for ‘nobles’ 
and reducing the number of  ministers nominated by the king from 15 to 
four.
Mr Pohiva says that the 2008 electoral results demonstrate support for a 
speedier transition to full democracy. He is right that ordinary Tongans are 
suspicious of  the government’s promises of  reform and that expectations 
have been raised by the pro-democracy politicians, with hopes that reform 
could reverse economic decline; GDP shrank by 3.5 per cent in 2007. 
Electoral loyalties on Tonga’s scattered islands are largely determined by 
kinship as well as the education, wealth and community service of  candidates. 
But ideology also matters, particularly on Tongatapu and neighbouring ’Eua. 
Tongans often praise the 177-year-old monarchy in public, but in the privacy 
of  the polling booth plump for radical change.
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FIJI TIMES
BRIJ v. LAL
The road from 1987*
For all sad words of  tongue or pen 
The saddest are these: ‘It might have been.’
14 May 1987. The news, when it finally came, was as stark as it was startling. 
‘The Royal Fiji Military Forces has taken control of  the Fiji government to 
prevent any further disturbance and bloodshed in the country,’ Radio Fiji 
told its bewildered listeners. Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, the coup 
leader, until then unknown outside military and rugby circles, had gone to 
the Government House to see the president, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, to 
seek his blessing for the coup. The news was repeated throughout the day 
amidst sombre, funereal music.
As the news of  the coup (invariably pronounced ‘coop’ by a puzzled 
populace) spread, Suva moved into panic mode. Frightened shoppers clogged 
the supermarkets buying emergency food supplies. Wooden shutters went 
up in the city as overflowing buses screeched out of  town. Commandeered 
government vehicles armed with soldiers began patrolling the city and 
balaclava-wearing snipers appeared on top of  strategic buildings.
I didn’t know it then, but as dusk descended on an eerily silent Suva, 
the city cowering in the gathering darkness, an era in Fiji’s modern history 
had been brought to a cruel end. The bayonet had overturned the verdict 
of  the ballot box, sadly not for the last time. The legacy of  that fateful day 
continues to haunt twenty-one years on. We are still paying penance for the 
mistakes of  the past.
A whole new generation has come of  age in a culture scarred by coups. 
They would have no idea of  the alternative possibilities we dared to imagine, 
First published in Fiji Times, 13 May 2008.
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the sense of  innocence with which the nation conducted its business a 
generation ago. Indeed, that whole world would appear incomprehensible 
to today’s generation. There was no television then, no personal computers, 
no email, no mobile phones. The fax machine was the latest, and much-
heralded, invention. That whole pre-1987 world has almost vanished beyond 
recall.
None of  the problems which beset Fiji a generation ago have really been 
resolved. The land problem continues to fester, the Agricultural Landlord 
and Tenant Act (ALTA) being as contentious then as it is now. The sugar 
industry continues to face an ailing, uncertain future. Race relations are as 
fraught now as they were then, perhaps more so. And the debate continues 
about what kind of  political culture is appropriate for Fiji’s multiethnic 
society. The more things change, the more they remain the same.
But some things have changed. In 1987, for the first time in our history, the 
military marched out of  the barracks and got embroiled in national politics. 
It is still embroiled in politics. It now seeks for itself  a larger, more public 
role in the nation’s affairs. That is reflected in its latest reassertion of  power. 
The military does not any more see itself  simply as another instrument of  
the state under civilian control.
Rather, it sees itself  as an equal partner in the management of  the affairs 
of  the state, disciplined, dedicated and determined, better at running things, 
in its own estimation at least, than wicked politicians given to pandering to 
the whims of  the gullible masses.
The military is there for the long haul. It may retreat to the barracks 
under certain conditions, but it is unlikely ever to retreat from the line it has 
drawn in the sand about what it will, and will not, tolerate. How to tame this 
‘monster’ will test the skills of  the nation’s future leaders.
The protection of  indigenous rights was a big, emotional issue in the 
1980s. The claim was that the Fijians were the minority community ‘in their 
own homeland’ whose fundamental interests, particularly their rights to 
land, were placed in jeopardy by the election of  a government whose main 
constituency was the Indo-Fijian tenant community.
If  Fijians were not careful, their leaders told them, they might end up 
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like other dispossessed indigenous communities, such as the Maori, the 
Aborigines of  Australia and the Indian tribes of  North America. ‘Blood will 
flow’ if  indigenous interests were not paramount, was a common catch-cry 
of  the 1970s, first popularised by the nationalist firebrand Sakiasi Butadroka 
in 1975.
But now that the Fijians are an outright majority of  the population, likely 
to make up two-thirds of  the population in a decade or so, the rhetorical 
potency of  the indigenous rights claim has lost its appeal.
The question by the late 1990s was not the protection of  the ‘Fijian 
interest’ in the singular but the protection of  ‘which’ and ‘whose’ rights. 
Fijian political fragmentation, seen in the emergence of  a plethora of  
Fijian political parties in the 1990s, and the drama highlighting intra-Fijian 
rivalries following George Speight’s attempted coup, brought internal Fijian 
complexities and contradictions into sharp relief  and into the public arena.
The interim administration’s counterproductive sledgehammer approach 
to sensitive Fijian issues—reform of  the Great Council of  Chiefs, for 
instance—has united the Fijian community behind the SDL party, seen as 
their uncompromising defender. But any hope of  a permanent political unity 
under one umbrella is illusory. The political experience of  the Indo-Fijian 
community offers salutary lessons, as does the record of  the SVT party.
The massive exodus of  Indo-Fijians from the country has been one of  
the most dramatic developments of  the last two decades. Since the coups 
of  1987, more than 120,000 people have left for other shores, taking with 
them skills and talents Fiji can ill afford to lose: doctors, nurses, teachers, 
accountants, and the like.
And more will leave as the opportunity arises. Their absence is keenly felt 
in many fields, though the diasporic dollar makes an enormous contribution 
to the domestic economy of  Fiji. The disappearance of  the fear of  ‘Indian 
domination’, as the phrase went, has had a significant impact on the way 
politics is, and will be, practised in the future.
An equally significant factor in national politics has been the departure 
from the national scene of  high chiefs who dominated the political landscape 
since the Second World War, such as Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and Ratu Sir 
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Penaia Ganilau.
These high chiefs were trained by the departing British for national 
leadership, having decided early on that power at independence should be 
handed over to the Fijians. Their long presence at the pinnacle of  Fiji’s 
public life and their overarching influence fostered unity not only among 
their own people but across the nation. Their departure has left an unfilled, 
perhaps unfulfillable, vacuum and a blurred sense of  future direction.
Things have not been much better on the Indo-Fijian side. Among Indo-
Fijians, there is a dearth of  capable people willing to enter public life. The 
best and the brightest have left, or will leave. Among those still here, many 
baulk at the thought of  entering the political arena when military coups 
remain a constant spectre on the horizon.
Now, many aspiring politicians come from the ranks of  retired teachers 
and low-level former civil servants and faithful party functionaries, eager to 
make most of  the opportunity while it lasts, before the twilight sets in.
Fiji’s national boundaries are much more porous now than they were in 
1987. Television has played a role, but the main reason is the advent of  the 
internet. Information about what is happening in Fiji is relayed to the world 
in real time.
Anyone, anywhere, in the world who wants to know what is happening 
in Fiji can do so with the click of  the button. The internet will remain a 
permanent feature of  our life, which makes attempts by governments to 
control the dissemination of  information critical of  its policies self-defeating. 
It was possible in 1987, but not now.
The last two decades have also been full of  supreme irony. People professing 
a profound commitment to democracy seem to have no compunction 
supporting a regime that is anything but democratic. An unelected, titular, 
head of  state is asked to intervene in the political governance of  the country 
when similar calls, from the other side, were (rightly) decried two decades 
earlier.
A military, which was once seen as the ultimate bastion of  Fijian power, 
now finds itself  pitted against the fundamental institutions of  Fijian society, to 
much dismay and puzzlement. People who unabashedly supported previous 
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coups now proclaim themselves unyielding champions of  democracy. God 
was said to have supported the 1987 coup, but He seems to have changed 
His mind this time around. And so it goes.
Even a cursory glance at the last two decades shows what a turbulent, 
traumatic time it has been in Fiji’s recent history: military coups preceding 
and succeeding genuine attempts at constitutional engineering, disrespect 
for the rule of  law on the one hand and a complete willingness to abide by 
the verdict of  the courts on the other, bravado and brinkmanship in one 
breath, contrition and compromise in another, and hope mingling freely 
with despair. It did not have to be that way.
There was another way. The darkness which descended on Fiji at noon on 
14 May 1987 is still with us twenty years on. We as a nation have reaffirmed 
the truth of  the truism that the only lesson we learn from history is that we 
don’t learn from history.
31 July 2008
SOLOMONS STAR
JON FRAENkEL
The pros and cons of political party integrity 
legislation*
The Solomon Islands government is currently considering introducing laws 
aimed at strengthening political parties, at restricting members of  Parliament 
from crossing the floor and at halting excessive use of  no-confidence 
This article originally featured as a talk given at ‘Land, Politics and Development in 
Melanesia’, a seminar organised by The Australian National University, Solomon Islands 
government and the Solomon Islands College of  Higher Education, 29 July 2008. First 
published in Solomons Star, 31 July 2008.
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motions.
Similar kinds of  legislation have been introduced in many parts of  the 
Pacific, including Vanuatu, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The 
Samoans have legal controls on what kinds of  new parties can be formed. 
Even those from Tahiti in French Polynesia have become so frustrated with 
continual government change that they altered the electoral law hoping to 
stabilise the political order.
Several objectives can be served by political party integrity legislation. 
Sometimes, the aim is greater parliamentary stability, sometimes nation-
building, and sometimes it is driven by the view that political parties are 
an inevitable feature of  ‘proper’ democracy (although Ancient Greece, the 
‘cradle of  democracy’, never had political parties and nor do many local 
councils in the mass democracies of  Western Europe or Australasia).
Often, the real objective is to strengthen governments, rather than 
political parties. In several cases, laws against MPs’ crossing the floor have 
been introduced in the hope of  consolidating one political faction, but have 
ended up strengthening another.
That is what happened in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. In PNG, the 
government of  Sir Mekere Morauta introduced laws binding MPs to political 
parties, but Sir Michael Somare won the 2002 election and his government 
proved the beneficiary of  the new laws. In Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka’s government 
amended the constitution to prevent floor-crossing in 1997, but Mahendra 
Chaudhry won the 1999 election. The new law ensured that Chaudhry’s Fiji 
Labor Party’s 37 seats in the 71-member Parliament was an unbreakable 
majority. Rebels could not switch sides. A year later, Fiji witnessed a coup 
d’état.
In other cases, laws binding MPs to political parties have not worked as 
intended. In India, more MPs crossed the floor after 1985 legislation aimed 
at preventing floor-crossing than beforehand. In Vanuatu, Serge Vohor 
passed laws providing a ‘grace period’ during which there could not be a no-
confidence motion in 2004, but this was ruled unconstitutional by the courts 
and the Vohor government was subsequently toppled. In New Zealand, laws 
against MPs’ switching sides simply delayed inevitable political realignments, 
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and political opinion turned against their continued usage.
In PNG, the rules against floor-crossing contained in the Organic Law on 
Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) have not yet been fully tested 
before the courts. Eleven members changed political parties during Somare’s 
2002–07 government, but none lost their seats. The law was not complied 
with.
What will happen in PNG when a prime minister finds himself  politically 
isolated and unpopular? Will the law be complied with? What will happen if  
only the law prevents the fall of  a government? We do not know.
Some within the PNG judiciary suggest that, in such circumstances, 
OLIPPAC may not withstand a constitutional challenge. The courts may 
rule the law null and void because it restrains MPs’ freedom of  movement.
How does OLIPPAC work in PNG?
First, under OLIPPAC the party with the largest number of  seats after an 
election gets the first opportunity to form a government. That law helped 
Sir Michael Somare’s National Alliance to form the government a second 
time after the July 2007 elections, for this was the largest party.
Second, MPs in PNG who vote for a particular prime minister cannot 
vote against that prime minister in any votes of  confidence, budgetary votes 
and votes on constitutional amendments. There are loopholes. If  a party 
decides collectively to switch sides—in accordance with its internal rules 
and procedures—it can do so. For that reason, many Papua New Guinea 
politicians constituted themselves as one-man political parties, and so 
retained their freedom to switch to and fro.
Third, there are financial incentives to join parties, and disincentives to 
remaining as independents.
The other key part of  PNG’s package is ‘grace periods’ which were 
introduced separately as part of  the 1975 constitution, and extended in 
1992. After an election, a new government has 18 months during which 
there cannot be a no-confidence motion. And if  there is a no-confidence 
motion in the last 12 months of  the life of  a Parliament’s five-year term, 
Parliament gets dissolved and there is an early election. Since MPs always 
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want to prolong their periods in office, there never has been a no-confidence 
motion in the last year of  a PNG Parliament’s five yearly term.
That shows one interesting way of  maintaining the safety valve of  no-
confidence motions, while ensuring that these are not used in a frivolous 
manner or simply to grab hold of  ministerial portfolios or for fundraising. If  
a no-confidence vote entails a general dissolution of  Parliament and an early 
election, MPs will only take this option if  they are riding the crest of  a wave 
of  popular dissatisfaction with government. Under normal circumstances, 
as the PNG history indicates, they will not want to rock the boat if  that 
means going back to face the electorate earlier than normal.
What has been the impact of  OLIPPAC in PNG?
First, the number of  political parties has risen, not fallen. It has followed a 
wave-like motion. After OLIPPAC, the number of  registered parties rose to 
43 in 2002. It fell back due to amalgamations and deregistration of  parties 
with no seats at all to around 15 in 2006 and then rose again ahead of  the 
2007 election to 34.
Second, no MP has as yet lost his or her seat due to this law, although 
there were many breaches of  OLIPPAC. In that respect, the law was a paper 
tiger.
Third, Sir Michael Somare’s 2002–07 government was the first since 
independence to survive a full term in office. In that sense, the law brought 
stability. The prime minister did not change, but many of  the ministers 
changed regularly and there were frequent associated changes at the top 
levels of  the public sector bureaucracy.
No-confidence challenges were avoided during Somare’s 2002–07 
government not only due to the 18-month grace period and OLIPPAC, 
but also by suspension of  Parliament at critical junctures when opposition 
forces were mustering for a challenge.
There are always dangers associated with laws aimed at restricting no-
confidence challenges or binding MPs to political parties. They may stabilise 
popular governments, avoid frivolous no-confidence motions and permit 
Parliament to concentrate on law-making, but they may also remove the 
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ability to dislodge a corrupt administration or entrench an unpopular 
government.
The history of  usage of  such laws in the Pacific Islands tells us that they 
often have unexpected and even bizarre consequences.
9 August 2008
THE ECONOMIST
JON FRAENkEL
Tonga: thy kingdom gone*
Upon accession to the throne, Tonga’s kings have traditionally retired to 
a position of  revered remoteness, leaving day-to-day affairs of  state to a 
designated hau or ruler. So it is to be with King George Tupou V, who was 
crowned King of  Tonga on 1 August in an elaborate ceremony attended by 
minor royals from around the world. Since the death of  his father, the crown 
prince has divested himself  of  interests in brewing, telecommunications and 
electricity. Now the monarch’s political role is changing, too.
In 2006, demonstrations destroyed much of  the business district of  
Tonga’s capital, Nuku’alofa. The disturbances were sparked by ‘demagogues’, 
the new king said, including ‘certain politicians who couldn’t control the 
crowd’. He was referring to pro-democracy members of  Parliament, many 
of  whom are facing charges of  sedition. Most of  them swept back to power 
in an election in April. Elected members now make up nine of  Tonga’s 33 
parliamentarians. Another 15 have been appointed by the king, and nine 
selected by the country’s nobles.
Under new arrangements, scheduled to come into force for elections 
Published as ‘Asia: thy kingdom gone; Tonga’, The Economist, 9 August 2008.
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in 2010, the king will forfeit most of  his powers of  appointment and the 
number of  ‘people’s representatives’ will increase to 17, or perhaps 21 if  the 
king declines Parliament’s offer to allow him to continue to appoint four 
of  its members. Parliament will choose the prime minister, who will pick 
his cabinet without monarchical interference. Although the king is likely to 
retain reserve powers, the lord chamberlain says he will act on the advice of  
the prime minister ‘in all matters of  governance’.
Pro-democracy parliamentarians are overjoyed. Their leader, ’Akilisi 
Pohiva, says the push for political change has come to an end. Tonga’s 
nobles, however, are worried about being outnumbered in a popularly 
elected assembly and the royally appointed prime minister, Feleti Sevele, has 
been slow to embrace reform. A special commission appointed in July now 
faces the task of  reconciling the politicians—sharply divided by the 2006 
riots—and supervising what will be the most important election the Pacific 
state has witnessed.
South and 
Central Asia
7 June 2008
THE AUSTRALIAN
WILLIAM MALEY
Help at grass roots will win over the people*
The launch of  further substantial military operations by Australian troops 
deployed in Afghanistan serves as a sobering reminder of  just how troubled 
that theatre of  operations remains. At the same time, it is important to note 
that Afghanistan is not another Iraq, that a key driver of  the insurgency 
blighting southern and eastern Afghanistan is external rather than internal 
and that much of  the country, including the capital Kabul, is relatively quiet 
most of  the time. For this reason, the Afghan cause is not hopeless, although 
putting the country back on a sure footing will still require years of  effort, 
given the decades of  disruption that Afghanistan experienced in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
Guerilla campaigns typically rely on sanctuaries in neighbouring states to 
sustain their momentum, and the insurgency in Afghanistan is no different. 
This was conceded by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf  in a speech in 
First published in The Australian, 7 June 2008.
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Kabul in August 2007: ‘There is no doubt Afghan militants are supported 
from Pakistan soil. The problem that you have in your region is because 
support is provided from our side.’ Dealing with these sanctuaries is the 
single most important step that needs to be taken to stabilise Afghanistan.
The establishment of  a new civilian government in Pakistan potentially 
offers more receptive interlocutors in Islamabad: Pakistan’s civilian politicians 
have every reason to fear the Talibanisation of  southwest Asia, and to move 
against the Afghan Taliban’s sanctuaries would allow the new government 
to approach its own radicals from a position of  greater strength. There is 
a strong case for NATO states, China, and countries such as Australia to 
engage actively with the new Pakistan government on this issue—although 
this will have to be done with more dexterity than has been displayed by 
Washington, which is now deeply unpopular in Pakistan because of  its 
efforts to prop up Musharraf  in the face of  widespread popular hostility to 
his rule.
All that said, Afghanistan faces serious problems beyond those created by 
Taliban insurgents. One is the problem of  poor governance. The 2001 Bonn 
conference which laid out the ground plan for Afghanistan’s transition saw 
‘ministries’ distributed to different political groups in order to lock them into 
the process. At the time these ‘ministries’ existed mainly on paper, but the 
prospect of  donor dollars arriving fuelled ferocious antagonisms between 
different agencies seeking to maximise their own cut. As a result, politics in 
Kabul has proved to be both vicious and petty, although kept in check to 
some degree by the presence of  international actors.
If  central politics has proved to be unpleasant, developments in various 
Afghan provinces have proved even more dispiriting. In early 2002, the 
deployment beyond Kabul of  the UN-mandated International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) was blocked by the US, which wished to conserve 
airlift assets for future use in Iraq. An eventual spin-off  was the deployment 
of  so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), in one of  which 
Australians troops are serving together which Dutch soldiers in the province 
of  Uruzgan. More immediately, however, the blocking of  ISAF expansion 
forced Afghan President Karzai to seek short-term peace by offering state 
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positions to potential ‘spoilers’. This has now come back to haunt him, with 
the greed and insensitivity of  such figures damaging the reputation of  the 
Afghan government in crucial parts of  the country. An unfortunate result 
is that traditional tribal leaderships have been multiply disenfranchised—at 
the level of  the central state because they lack the skills to interact with the 
donor community and in the provinces because they too often have had to 
make way for those hungry for local power.
The Taliban have also been able to exploit a number of  complex problems 
in rural Afghanistan in order to pick up supporters. One is rivalry between 
different elements of  the Pashtun ethnic group. President Karzai is a so-
called Durrani Pashtun, coming from a collection of  tribes and lineages with 
aristocratic connections. The Taliban are more drawn from Ghilzai Pashtun, 
some of  whom have long resented the Durranis’ positions. Exploiting 
Durrani–Ghilzai tensions, and even more specific rivalries in particular 
localities, has proved a fruitful Taliban tactic. Even more rewarding for the 
Taliban, however, has been the opium trade. There is no doubt that the 
Taliban receive a certain amount of  cash directly from narcotics. However, 
this is trivial compared to the political benefit that they receive from the 
periodic discussion of  mass eradication as a device for dealing with the 
problem.
To see why this is the case, it is important to grasp a number of  the 
peculiarities of  opium cultivation in Afghanistan. While around 80 per 
cent of  opium profits go to drug barons and traffickers, the 20 per cent 
that are received at farm-gate level support roughly two million people, 
many of  them poor wage labourers whose ‘opium income’ can make the 
difference between survival and utter destitution. Blithe statements about 
the importance of  eradication strike terror into the hearts of  such people 
and make them easy picking for Taliban recruiters. Afghanistan’s opium 
problem does need to be addressed, but through nuanced and carefully 
crafted policies. One would be facilitating access to credit for farmers who 
currently plant poppies as collateral for loans from drug barons so that they 
can buy new farm equipment for use in cultivating cereals—a practice which 
reflects the fragility of  Afghanistan’s banks, which are likely to win popular 
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confidence only if  a consortium of  Western central banks guarantees their 
deposits. Another would be to improve roads and refrigeration facilities so 
that fruit and vegetables could be transported to remote markets without 
risk of  spoilage. It is through policies such as these, rather than through 
simplistic eradication policies, that progress in this difficult area will most 
likely be achieved.
22 August 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
CLIvE WILLIAMS
The numbers don’t add up*
The killing of  10 French troops near Kabul, and the statement by US 
Commander General McKiernan about the need for significantly more 
troops to defeat the Taliban insurgency, will again raise concerns about the 
way the war is being conducted.
Australia’s hard-power/soft-power approach in Uruzgan Province 
where it is ‘surgically’ targeting the Taliban leadership at the same time as 
improving local infrastructure seems to be working quite well, but it is not 
being replicated effectively elsewhere in Afghanistan.
There is little doubt that the overall security situation is deteriorating 
because of  a lack of  combat troops on the ground. It is generally accepted 
that to defeat an insurgency you need a ratio of  10 to one. The Taliban 
in Afghanistan probably number about 10,000, meaning that it would be 
necessary to have an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of  
around 100,000 to get on top of  the situation. That is very unlikely to 
First published in Canberra Times, 22 August 2008.
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happen.
One of  the further difficulties of  dealing with the (Pashtun) Taliban is 
that there are more Pashtun in Pakistan than there are in Afghanistan. This 
gives the Taliban a surge capacity and ability to regenerate when necessary.
Given the troop shortage, the US and ISAF approach is to rely particularly 
on artillery and airstrikes from aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). 
The main problem with this approach is the collateral killing of  innocent 
civilians, thus creating more local support for the Taliban.
The key to military progress on the ground is a combination of  hard 
power and soft power. This means having appropriate hard power to 
keep the Taliban in check, while making local arrangements that will make 
it difficult for external terrorist groups to retain local support. This may 
include negotiated outcomes with the Taliban where they have local popular 
support.
Reliance on any positive developments in Pakistan would be misguided. 
Musharraf  stepping down will not make much of  a difference to the security 
situation. The Zardari/Sharif  coalition of  convenience will lead to divorce 
in due course, with the likelihood that the military will eventually step in 
once again ‘to restore order’.
In the meantime, the Pakistan military has no incentive to do anything 
decisive about the Taliban or al-Qaeda. The Pakistan military is being paid 
monthly by the US to conduct border operations and doing anything too 
decisive would kill the cash cow. At the same time, there is official and public 
support in Pakistan for the Taliban, and Bin Laden is significantly more 
popular than George Bush.
With the continuing deaths of  NATO troops in Afghanistan, there will 
be increasing domestic pressure in Europe to withdraw NATO contingents 
from ISAF. (176 international troops have died in Afghanistan so far this 
year.) Russia’s recent preparedness to use force to safeguard its security 
interests may accelerate that process. This will leave the US in the position 
of  having to make up the numbers itself  if  it wants to try to defeat the 
Taliban.
Realistically, there will always be international sanctuaries for terrorist 
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groups like al-Qaeda, and we may have to accept that containment, covert 
operations, psychological warfare and targeted assistance to foreign 
governments are more effective ways of  dealing with them than our regular 
military involvement in Muslim lands. Australian troop involvement will also 
make home-grown terrorist incidents more likely.
Cricket Australia would be unwise to contemplate any tours of  Pakistan 
while we have Australian troops fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan—simply 
because of  the Taliban’s capability to retaliate in Pakistan. The presidential 
level of  security offered does not mean much in a nation where the 
recent president was lucky to survive three assassination attempts, and the 
prospective prime minister was assassinated in 2007.
Thailand
21 December 2007
CANBERRA TIMES
ANdREW WALkER ANd NICHOLAS FARRELLY
King and Thais on high alert in crucial poll*
On Sunday, Thai voters go to the polls for the first time since the coup of  
September 2006. The election represents a key turning point in the troubled 
history of  Thai democracy. The vote is not just about the composition of  
the next government—there is a much deeper struggle about the nature of  
political authority going on.
In September 2006 telecommunications tycoon turned populist Prime 
Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, was removed from office by a military coup. A 
political crisis had been building for months and the armed forces finally took 
charge, ripping up the democratic constitution and condemning Thaksin to 
a life in exile. The soldiers who came onto the streets were careful to pledge 
their loyalty to the king, tying royally auspicious yellow ribbons around the 
barrels of  their guns.
This display of  loyalty was a savvy political move. Any guidebook will tell 
First published in Canberra Times, 21 December 2007.
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you that King Bhumibol Adulyadej is considered above reproach by many 
in Thai society. In Thailand, any criticism of  the king risks stern words or 
even a stint behind bars. He is protected by law and by the incessant royalist 
pulse of  public life.
In recent times this pulse has been quickening. In June 2006 the king 
celebrated 60 years on the throne. He is the world’s longest reigning monarch. 
And just two weeks ago, on 5 December, he celebrated his 80th birthday. 
These impressive milestones were punctuated by grand shows of  loyalty and 
reverence throughout the country. On the evening of  Bhumibol’s birthday 
many of  Thailand’s 65 million people donned yellow shirts and sang his 
praises at carefully choreographed public events.
But there have been some unwelcome guests in the midst of  these 
birthday celebrations—politicians vying for votes. The royalist atmosphere 
of  national unity has been punctured by Thailand’s distinctively virulent 
brand of  electoral politics.
After more than a year of  policy impasse, lacklustre economic performance 
and constitutional re-engineering, the generals have declared that Thailand 
is ready for a national election. That election pits the People Power Party, 
which is widely seen as a proxy for the exiled prime minister, against the 
Democrat Party, the major opposition party during the Thaksin era.
It will be difficult for either of  these parties to win enough seats to govern 
in its own right. The People Power Party will probably gain the most seats 
and may be able to form government with one or two of  Thailand’s motley 
collection of  minor parties. On the other hand the Democrat Party, even if  
it wins fewer seats than People Power, may still stitch together a government 
with several coalition partners. Either way there will be a lot of  horse-trading 
after the election and a rather unstable coalition government appears likely. 
Indeed, many commentators suggest that this instability was programmed 
into the new post-coup constitution in an attempt to avoid the single-party 
dominance that characterised Thaksin’s rule.
But this election is not just a contest between political parties. There is 
a much more deep-seated battle about the nature of  political authority in 
Thailand. On one side, there are those that argue ultimate political authority 
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lies with the electorate and is expressed by their elected representatives in 
Parliament. In the current political climate this view is symbolised by the 
exiled Thaksin and his proxy party. The name of  the party, People Power, is 
no accident and it is campaigning on a populist platform of  universal health 
care and robust government support for farmers.
But there are others, like those who staged the 2006 coup, who believe 
that supreme political judgement is held by the king and by his loyal servants 
in the military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary. They are keen to dismiss 
the policies of  People Power as crude pandering to electoral desires, pork-
barrelling and even outright vote buying. They contrast Thaksin’s brash self-
interest with the humility and generosity of  the king.
The military government, reliant on the king’s cultural force for its 
legitimacy, has attempted to amplify the contrast between the deceit and 
duplicity of  elected politicians and the morality of  the palace and its backers. 
No expense has been spared in promoting royal symbolism and the wearing 
of  the royal yellow has been made virtually compulsory in many official 
contexts. The royalists are suspicious of  all elected politicians. Nonetheless, 
the Democrats, led by an Eton and Oxford-educated cleanskin, are their 
best hope for a political system that retains its yellow hue.
But there are clouds on the royal horizon and the celebrations of  the 
king’s 80th birthday were tinged with anxiety. The king’s recent stint in 
hospital provided an opportunity for an outpouring of  affection, but it also 
highlighted the unresolved issue of  the royal succession. The crown prince, 
Prince Vajiralongkorn, has a chequered reputation and is highly unlikely 
to command the same level of  respect as his father. Bangkok high society 
swirls with rumours about his business dealings, private life and health. Not 
surprisingly, many in Thailand consider the king’s second daughter, Princess 
Sirindhorn, a better choice. She is commonly referred to as ‘Princess Angel’ 
and as a tireless promoter of  royal charity would be a more appropriate 
custodian of  the king’s carefully cultivated moral legitimacy.
According to some analysts, the 2006 coup was, in essence, an effort to 
guarantee the royalist elite a pre-eminent role in ‘making’ the next monarch. 
Thaksin was getting too popular, too close to some within the royal 
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household, and perhaps too likely to influence the succession. Thaksin’s 
economic assertiveness may also have challenged the royal inheritance. By 
one recent account the king is the world’s richest royal with the assets of  
the Crown Property Bureau estimated at US$33 billion. Moral legitimacy is 
clearly not all that is at stake.
Of  course, the royal family is not standing for election next Sunday. And 
most voters, regardless of  the party they support, would have no hesitation 
in declaring their affection for the monarch. But a strong electoral showing 
by Thaksin’s proxy party will be widely read as a rejection of  the view that 
political life should be controlled by Thailand’s royalist elite. The royal stakes 
are high.
15 July 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
ANdREW WALkER
Let the electorate judge the Thai government’s fate*
Only six months after the last election, Thai politics has, once again, 
descended into chaos. The government is under attack in the courts, in 
Parliament and in the media. A determined and vocal group of  protesters, 
who call themselves the People’s Alliance for Democracy, is waging a high-
profile campaign against the government on the streets of  Bangkok. A few 
weeks ago they broke through police barricades and surrounded Government 
House itself.
Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej must dread reading the newspaper 
each morning. Each day seems to bring a new crisis or an escalation in one 
First published in Canberra Times, 15 July 2008.
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of  his many existing problems.
On Tuesday last week, his deputy party leader and former speaker 
was found guilty of  vote buying. On Wednesday, the health minister was 
disqualified for not declaring his wife’s assets. And on Thursday the foreign 
minister resigned after a nationalist backlash against the government’s 
decision to support a Cambodian bid for World Heritage listing for an 
ancient Hindu temple.
The Preah Vihear temple is located on a disputed section of  the Thai-
Cambodian border. Even though the International Court of  Justice ruled in 
1962 that the temple belonged to Cambodia, opposition forces have accused 
the foreign minster of  being a traitor who betrayed Thai national sovereignty 
by supporting the Cambodian submission to UNESCO.
The constitutional court even weighed into the fray by ruling that the 
government should not have endorsed the Cambodian World Heritage bid 
without taking the matter to Parliament. It may seem like a rather arcane legal 
argument, but Preah Vihear is a lightning rod for ultra-nationalist sentiment 
and it poses a real risk to Samak’s government.
Nevertheless, the government may be more resilient than recent chaotic 
events suggest. The bottom line is Samak holds a commanding majority in 
the House of  Representatives. His People Power Party, in which deposed 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has considerable influence, fell just short 
of  an absolute majority in the election of  December 2007. In the weeks 
following the election Samak was able to stitch together a coalition with 
all the minor parties, leaving the Democrat Party alone on the opposition 
benches.
Samak’s parliamentary numbers meant that he could easily see off  the no-
confidence motion staged by the reinvigorated Democrats in late June. There 
may be nervousness among coalition partners, but Samak’s commanding 
majority means that he could live with some minor party defections.
Samak has also been able to cultivate a positive relationship with the 
military. You should never say never when it comes to coups in Thailand, 
but the signals from the top military brass suggest that they will not be 
resorting to a coup to solve the current crisis.
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With the military indicating that they will stay out of  the fight, Prime 
Minister Samak holds another important card up his sleeve. He could 
dissolve Parliament and call an election. Talk of  an election is enough to 
send opposition forces in Thailand running for cover.
The opposition Democrats know that Samak’s People Power Party would 
perform much better in an election than they would. There is still strong 
voter affection for Thaksin and for Thaksin-era policies and the electorate 
would, in all probability, express this support by voting for People Power.
A new election would be the fourth election loss for the Democrats since 
2001. They only avoided a loss in the 2006 election by boycotting it! Samak 
knows that his party holds the electoral upper hand and he will use the threat 
of  a new election to shore up the government’s position.
The protesters on the street also know that Samak has a strong electoral 
advantage. Their protests have attracted some support but it is hardly the 
mass mobilisation the People’s Alliance for Democracy hoped for.
The protest leadership is now proposing a ‘new politics’ for Thailand. 
The central plank in their ‘reform’ agenda is to have 70 per cent of  
parliamentarians appointed rather than elected. That is the only way they 
think they can get rid of  Samak and the enduring influence of  Thaksin in 
Thai politics. If  you can’t win an election then why not change the rules!
The People’s Alliance for Democracy doesn’t trust the electorate. They 
think that most voters, especially rural voters, are naïve and gullible. They 
don’t want these voters to be able to determine who forms a government. 
It’s hardly a democratic agenda.
Samak is a rough and tumble politician with a highly dubious political 
history. His government has been ham-fisted, arrogant and ill-informed on 
a number of  issues. Street protests, no-confidence motions, court cases and 
media condemnation are all legitimate strategies in a democratic system. 
Attacks on the government have produced some high profile casualties and 
caused some significant backdowns.
But Samak’s government is less than six months old. Opposition forces 
calling for Samak to hand over power (presumably to the Democrats) are 
overplaying their hand. The result of  the December 2007 election was clear 
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and the government should be allowed to govern. Thai politics is very messy 
at the moment but some of  democracy’s main checks and balances seem to 
be working.
Once the government has served its term, the electorate can make its 
judgement.
12 September 2008
CANBERRA TIMES
PETER WARR
Thailand’s democratic dilemma*
The ongoing political crisis in Thailand threatens to damage its huge tourism 
industry and to undermine the confidence of  both foreign and domestic 
investors. It has also deflected attention from important domestic concerns. 
Within the last fortnight rival groups have confronted one another on the 
streets with at least one death and many injuries.
The source of  the conflict is puzzling to outsiders. Two issues motivate 
the protesters, led by the so-called People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). 
The first is deep antipathy towards the present Prime Minister, Samak 
Sundaravej and, even more so, his patron-in-exile, former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, deposed by a military coup two years ago. The second, 
and more basic issue, is ambivalence towards electoral democracy itself.
Samak is a bellicose right-winger with a long and controversial political 
past. He is perceived as a crude proxy for Thaksin. A brilliant entrepreneur, 
Thaksin demonstrated an amazing capacity first to enrich himself  massively 
by manipulating government telecommunications regulators and then to use 
Published as ‘Compromise needed to resolve Thailand’s political crisis’, Canberra Times, 12 
September 2008.
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this wealth to advance himself  politically. Allegedly, he then misused this 
political power to enrich himself  and his family even further.
Thaksin is admired by the rural masses who were the basis of  his political 
support. These groups recognise the economic benefits that Thaksin brought 
to them while in power and could not care less about his alleged corruption 
or his limitless greed. But both Thaksin and Samak, along with all those 
closely allied to them, are despised by the Bangkok elite.
Contrary to their name, the PAD is essentially a conservative middle-
class movement who desire a return, at least partially, towards Thailand’s 
more authoritarian past. They perceive the electoral successes of  Thaksin, 
Samak and their allies as threatening the dominant position of  Thailand’s 
traditional elite—the army, the civil service and especially the monarchy. 
They have seen what electoral democracy delivers and they do not like it.
There is little doubt that if  new elections were held any time soon, 
Thaksin’s allies—‘proxies’ or not—would win again. Such is the magnitude 
of  their rural support.
The PAD has demanded that Samak step down and that two basic changes 
be made. First, the proportion of  the Parliament that is elected should be 
limited to 30 per cent, the rest appointed by the elite. Second, they want the 
possibility of  a prime minister who is not an elected member of  Parliament. 
Each of  these demands conflicts with the present constitution.
The PAD points out that the two most respected prime ministers of  
recent decades, Prem Tinsulanonda and Anand Panyarachun, were not 
elected but appointed by the king.
The position of  the PAD is thus a rejection of  one-person, one-vote 
electoral democracy. Beneath this is a disdain for the competence of  the 
poorly educated rural people who elected Thaksin and Samak.
Samak has refused to submit to ‘mob rule’. He has pointed out, with 
some justification, that unlike the self-appointed PAD leaders, he was duly 
elected to public office. But events of  the past two weeks have undermined 
his position.
First, the electoral commission has recommended to the constitutional 
court that Samak’s People Power Party (PPP) be dissolved for electoral fraud, 
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as was its predecessor, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party. If  the constitutional 
court agrees, members of  the PPP could simply reunite under a different 
name, but there would be a lingering stigma.
Second, when Samak declared a state of  emergency this week, giving legal 
control of  Bangkok to the army, the head of  the army, General Anupong 
Paochinda, publicly refused to act against the demonstrators. He even 
refrained from expressing the army’s support for the government.
Third, the highly respected foreign minister, Tej Bunnag, suddenly 
resigned. He was appointed only two months ago in the wake of  a farcical 
confrontation with Cambodia over the land surrounding an ancient temple 
on their border. His resignation isolated Samak.
Finally, this week the constitutional court voted to remove Samak 
from office because he had accepted payment for appearing on a cooking 
television program. His party could presumably re-elect him but, again, a 
stigma would remain.
Samak may be finished, but unfortunately the two most obvious alternative 
leaders within PPP are even closer to Thaksin than Samak was. Appointment 
of  either one as prime minister would merely prolong the crisis.
Cool heads within Thailand are urging restraint on all sides. They want a 
peaceful resolution, through the Parliament, in a manner consistent with the 
present constitution.
Thailand is groping, sometimes stumbling, towards a form of  democracy 
that suits its own circumstances. Finding that middle ground will require 
compromise on all sides.
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Lèse majesté and Harry Nicolaides*
In Thailand the legal system seeks to ensure that public comment about 
the monarchy can only be favourable. Under the lèse majesté provision of  
the criminal code, any action that insults or disrespects the royal family can 
bring a sentence of  up to 15 years behind bars.
The most recent victim of  this law is Melbourne man Harry Nicolaides, 
who has worked in Thailand as a university lecturer and freelance writer. He 
was arrested at Bangkok airport on 31 August 2008. As Nicolaides continues 
to languish in a Bangkok prison cell, the use and abuse of  the lèse majesté 
law has received a modicum of  worldwide scrutiny. However, since 21 
September, Nicolaides’s case has been completely out of  the news.
He has been quietly forgotten.
Lèse majesté is a weapon used to defend the perceived honour of  
Thailand’s royal family. According to Paul Handley, the author of  an 
unauthorised 2006 biography of  the king, ‘[i]n Thailand, all that truly stands 
between royal virtue and London-tabloid-style media treatment is the lèse 
majesté statute’.
Since Handley’s controversial book—which is banned in Thailand—there 
have been a number of  high-profile cases of  lèse majesté involving foreigners. 
The two most recent instances where accusations have been levelled at non-
Thais are illustrative of  the problems with implementing this law.
In December 2006 Oliver Jufer was charged with the offence after 
defacing images of  the king in Chiang Mai during a drunken spree. He was 
held for four months without bail and after a quick trial was sentenced to 
ten years in prison. Jufer served another few weeks before he was pardoned 
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by the king and deported to his native Switzerland.
At the time, outrage about his draconian treatment for an act of  immature 
vandalism led to even more outlandish attacks on the Thai monarchy. 
There was a flurry of  provocative and childish online protests that used 
the global reach of  the YouTube video-sharing website to mock the Thai 
royals. In response, the Thai government banned YouTube. This sparked 
further international bemusement and condemnation. To conform to local 
expectations of  fair comment, YouTube is today only available in Thailand 
in filtered form.
Since the Jufer fiasco, in April 2008 the BBC’s Bangkok correspondent 
Jonathan Head has been embroiled in a lèse majesté fight of  his own. He has 
not been charged but is the subject of  ongoing investigations. Head’s case is 
related to that of  Jakrapob Penkair, an outspoken critic of  military intervention 
in Thai politics and an eloquent ally of  deposed former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra. Comments made to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club 
of  Thailand during 2007 landed both men in trouble.
When only Thais are involved, lèse majesté does not get as much attention. 
But one case that has entranced the international press involved student 
activist and social critic, Chotisak Onsoong. Earlier this year he was charged 
with lèse majesté after refusing to stand during the playing of  the king’s 
anthem at a Bangkok cinema. Almost unique among recent lèse majesté 
cases, Chotisak welcomed the charge with further acts of  public defiance.
The view of  the king himself  on lèse majesté is not completely clear. In 
his 2005 birthday speech he cautioned against the overexuberant use of  this 
criminal provision. Nonetheless many factions within the Thai elite continue 
to indulge in episodes of  lèse majesté accusation and counter-accusation to 
score political points.
The king’s formidable media management apparatus is apparently 
comfortable with this situation. While he may have some personal 
reservations, the king has yet to make any explicit recommendation that 
lèse majesté be abolished. Perhaps it remains too useful as a tool for stifling 
open public debate about the role of  the royal family in national political 
and economic life. Lèse majesté helps guarantee an unrelenting public diet 
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of  positive royal news.
In Thailand it is even hard to report the details of  a lèse majesté charge 
without fear of  sanction. Detailed reporting runs the risk of  repeating the 
offence. Self-censorship reigns. So Harry Nicolaides will be unlikely to ever 
see substantial details about his case published in the Thai media.
Hopefully foreign journalists will exercise their greater freedom to report 
on his predicament. Some, including the BBC’s Jonathan Head, The Age’s 
Peter Gregory, Reuters, the Associated Press and Reporters Without Borders 
have already made important contributions. But for the past two weeks there 
has been silence.
All reports suggest that the charge relates to a passage in an obscure book 
published by Nicolaides that describes the rather flamboyant private life of  a 
Thai prince. This may have been an error of  judgement on Nicolaides’s part 
but it does not, in any way, justify his current treatment. Respect for other 
country’s legal systems is all very well. But this is a law that silences Thais 
and foreigners alike. It prevents what we would regard as perfectly normal, 
if  somewhat prurient, reporting on royal lives. More importantly, it muzzles 
public discussion of  a range of  issues that lie at the heart of  Thailand’s 
ongoing political crisis.
The Australian media could be doing more to highlight the plight of  
Nicolaides and to open up broader regional discussion on this outdated 
taboo.
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